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The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 formed one
of the most sweeping revisions of any federal environ-
mental statute in recent history. A wide array of techni-
cal improvements to existing provisions were joined with
entirely new substantive programs aimed at controlling
such diverse concerns as the development of new fuels,
reduction of acid rain, ozone depletion, and even global
warming. Aside from its ambitious substantive programs,
however, the 1990 Amendments were driven by a recogni-
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tion that the existing Clean Air Act had become largely
unenforceable. Thus, the Amendments greatly expand
the government's enforcement authority, and provide a
host of new enforcement options. In this article, the au-
thors discuss these changes to the civil and criminal en-
forcement provisions of the Act, and examine how these
revisions seem to contain a mixture of strengths and
weaknesses that raise as many concerns as they do hopes
that the new Act will better achieve the goal of protect-
ing and enhancing the quality of the Nation's air.
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I. Introduction
In the closing days of the 101st Congress, amid a flurry of
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last-minute bills and a bitter debate over the federal budget
deficit, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990,1 ending a thirteen year political stalemate during which
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990). The Amendments were enacted by the House and Senate on October 26 and
27, 1990, the last two days of the 101st Congress, and signed into law by President
Bush on November 15, 1990. Throughout this article the Clean Air Act will be re-
ferred to as "the Act" or the "CAA." The Act as it existed prior to its amendment in
1990 will be referred to as "the pre-1990 Act." Although Congress did not formally
give the amendments a short title, earlier versions of the House and Senate bills re-
ferred to the amendments as the "Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990," and this
article will refer to them as "the Amendments."
In the summer of 1989, the Bush Administration submitted clean air bills into
both the House of Representatives and the Senate. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(July 27, 1989) [hereinafter House Bill as Introduced]; S. 1490, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(Aug. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Administration's Senate Bill]. The House adopted H.R.
3030 as its markup vehicle and referred the bill to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce which reported the bill as amended on May 17, 1990. H.R. REP. No. 490,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. pt.1 (1990); see also H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989),
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 490, supra, at 1 [hereinafter House Report Bill]. House
bill 3030 was passed by the entire House chamber on May 23, 1990 by a vote of 401 to
21. 136 CONG. REc. H2944 (daily ed. May 23, 1990). The text of the bill was reported
on June 5, 1990. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 136 CONG. REc. H3171 (daily
ed. June 5, 1990) [hereinafter House Bill as Passed].
The Senate relied on its own markup vehicle, S. 1630, which was introduced Sep-
tember 14, 1989. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 135 CONG. REc. S11,139 (daily
ed. Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Senate Bill as Introduced]. Senate bill 1630 incorpo-
rated the enforcement provisions from the Administration's Senate Bill intact. Com-
pare Administration's Senate Bill, supra, §§ 601-613 with Senate Bill as Introduced,
supra, §§ 301-310, 135 CONG. REc. at 11,156-59. The Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works issued its report on S. 1630 on December 20, 1989. S. REP.
No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385; see also S.
1630, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (S. 1630 as reported by the Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works), 136 CONG. REc. S27 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1990) [hereinafter
Senate Report Bill]. Although the Committee amended the bill, the enforcement title
remained virtually unchanged.
After the Bush Administration threatened to veto S. 1630 over the implementa-
tion costs, Senator Mitchell withdrew it from the Senate floor. A panel of Administra-
tion officials and Senate leaders negotiated a compromise, which was submitted as a
substitute amendment. Mitchell-Dole Amendment No. 1293, 136 CONG. REc. S2031
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Mitchell-Dole substitute]. After the bill was
again placed on the Senate floor during debate of the Mitchell-Dole substitute, Sena-
tors Heflin, Nickles and others attempted to weaken the permit program and enforce-
ment sections of the substitute with an amendment of their own. Nickles-Heflin
Amendment No. 1373, 136 CONG. REC. S3211 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) [hereinafter
Nickles-Heflin Amendment]. The Nickles-Heflin Amendment was narrowly defeated
by the Senate by a vote of 50 to 47 on March 27, 1990. 136 CONG. REC. S3241 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 1990). The full Senate passed the Mitchell-Dole substitute and S. 1630
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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the Act had become largely ineffective as an environmental
enforcement tool.2 The great inertia that had stalled previous
on April 3, 1990 by a vote of 89 to 11. 136 CONG. REC. S3833 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990).
The text of the bill was reported on April 18, 1990. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess.
(1989), 136 CONG. REC. S4363 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Senate Bill as
Passed].
Both the House and Senate bills were then sent to a congressional conference
committee. The conference committee consisted of nine Senators and 138 House
members. See 136 CONG. REc. D823 (daily ed. June 28, 1990) (Senate conferees); 136
CONG. REC. H4377-78 (daily ed. June 28,1990) (House conferees and instructions); see
also 136 CONG. REC. H6908 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (appointment of additional House
conferees). Although the conference committee made numerous choices between
House and Senate versions of the bills, it provided little explanation in its final report
of the enforcement provisions in the conference agreement. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867. The entire
section discussing the title VII enforcement provisions consisted of two pages. How-
ever, to rectify the lack of meaningful conference report guidance, the Senate floor
managers of S. 1630 submitted a more detailed statement of managers on the confer-
ence bill that inter alia addressed the permit and enforcement titles. See Chafee-
Baucus Statement of Senate Managers, 136 CONG. REC. S16,933, S16,940-44, S16,950-
53 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Statement of Senate Managers]. Although the
Statement of Senate Managers was before the Senate prior to the vote on the confer-
ence bill, there was not sufficient time to have it reviewed and approved by all confer-
ees prior to its release. Id. at S16,933 (the Senate managers explained, "it is our best
effort to provide the agency and the courts with the guidance that they will need in
the course of implementing and interpreting this complex act"). However, Rep.
Dingell, a House cosponsor and floor manager of the House legislation, counseled
against court reliance for interpretive guidance on anything but official reports. 136
CONG, REc. E3714 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (extension of remarks made on Oct. 26,
1990 by Rep. Dingell).
The House passed the conference agreement on October 26, 1990 by a vote of 401
to 25. 136 CONG. REc. H12,943-44 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (now denominated as S.
1630); see Supplemental Report, H.R. Res. 399, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
H2756 (daily ed. May 23, 1990) (outlining procedures for the insertion of H.R. 3030
into S. 1630 as a substitute amendment). The Senate passed the conference agree-
ment on October 27, 1990 by a vote of 89 to 10. 136 CONG. REC. S17,434 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990). President Bush signed S. 1630 into law on November 15, 1990. Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
For further discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Stephen E. Roady,
Permitting and Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,178, 10,179, 10,180 n.1, n.5 (1991); The Honorable
Henry A. Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21
ENVT'L L. 1721 (1991); Theodore L. Garrett and Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air Act
Primer: Part III, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,301, 10,321-29 (1992). See also
136 CONG. REC. 3181 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) for the
general outline of Senate consideration.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the political forces responsible for the stale-
mate that precluded amendment of the Act during this period, see Waxman, supra
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efforts to improve the Clean Air Act seemed finally overcome
by increasing public concern with the threat of global warm-
ing, acid rain, and news of mysterious "holes" in the earth's
protective layer of atmospheric ozone.' In some respects, the
Amendments are the product of unique alliances among envi-
ronmental activists, industry groups, and an Administration
looking to claim it made good on candidate George Bush's
pledge to become the "environmental president." Thus,
among its many new substantive programs, the Act includes: a
gradual ban on ozone-depleting chemicals; an innovative mar-
ket-based approach to lower sulphur dioxide emissions that
have been linked to "acid rain"; requirements for use of
cleaner fuels and sales of automobiles that emit little or no air
pollution; and new provisions to break the regulatory logjam
in setting "safe" emissions standards for toxic air pollutants.
The Amendments were also driven by an obvious need to
craft legislation that could be rationally and stringently en-
forced. Relying on past experience with the Clean Water Act
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Congress
added to the Clean Air Act a national permitting system to
set and control emissions from stationary sources. The
Amendments considerably expand EPA's authority to assess
civil penalties without full-blown court proceedings and to is-
sue tickets for minor violations in a first-ever "field citation"
program. The Amendments also increased criminal penalties
for knowing violations of the law, and should make it easier
for EPA to gather investigative information, issue emergency
orders and recover substantial penalties from violators.
While these changes inspire hope that enforcement will
be more swift and certain, providing a more meaningful deter-
rent to would-be violators, the Amendments unfortunately
also leave numerous gaps, and even create new hurdles to air
pollution control. Time will tell how serious these flaws will
become. However, for now the Act offers a mixed bag of good
and bad news, rather than a total fix of the problems uncov-
ered during earlier efforts to control the most ephemeral of all
note 1, at 1721-42.




forms of environmental degradation, pollution of the air we
breathe. The purpose of this article is to survey the substan-
tive changes to the civil and criminal enforcement provisions
in the Clean Air Act as they apply to stationary sources, the
means by which they will be implemented, and the potential
strengths and weaknesses in carrying out the mandates of this
new legislation.
II. Civil Enforcement
The Amendments contain new civil enforcement authori-
ties that will have a profound effect on the compliance and
enforcement environment heretofore facing the regulated
community. The foremost of these, the operating permit pro-
gram, provides the linchpin of efforts to reinvigorate civil en-
forcement of the Act. For the first time, operating permits will
assemble in one document virtually every standard, limita-
tion, requirement or prohibition under the Act applicable to a
specific source, greatly simplifying compliance determinations
and enforcement. The Amendments also added two new tiers
of enforcement authority, administrative penalties and field
citations, giving EPA much needed flexibility in forum choice
in enforcement actions. In addition, new requirements for
source self-monitoring, reporting, and compliance certifica-
tions will allow state and local agencies to more effectively
target scarce resources at the worst offenders and help to en-
sure continuing compliance with the Act. The addition of
broad investigatory subpoena authority provides EPA a pow-
erful tool to ferret out noncompliant activities and develop vi-
able enforcement actions, potentially enhancing the quality of
proof offered at trial. Expanded and clarified penalty assess-
ment authority will increase industry incentives to comply
and allow EPA to exact meaningful recompense for noncomp-
liant activity.
The Amendments offer an unparalleled opportunity for
EPA to fashion a comprehensive, effective, and accountable
civil air enforcement regime. EPA has made clear its intention
to implement and apply these new and expanded authorities
aggressively, to usher in a new era of air pollution enforce-
1992]
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ment.4 Whether this invitation to substantially transform en-
forcement of the Act becomes a reality or a lost opportunity
depends in large measure on how EPA interprets these au-
thorities in the myriad of regulations it is required to write.
By any measure the task is a daunting one. The Amendments
require EPA to promulgate more than 55 rules before 1995,
many of which are likely to be highly contentious.5 In the next
few years it will be important to track EPA's success in meet-
ing this challenge and see whether new life can be breathed
into the Act's promise of clean air.
A. New and Modified Enforcement Authorities
1. Operating Permits6
The Act places the responsibility for attainment and
maintenance of the national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) 7 on the individual states through the adoption and
4. See James M. Strock, Stationary Source Enforcement, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS: BNA's COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW 255, 263 (Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. 1991) [hereinafter Strock, Stationary Source Enforcement];
James M. Strock, EPA's Enforcement Priorities for Fiscal Year 1991, 6 NAT'L ENVTL.
ENF. J. 3, 7-8 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter Strock, EPA Enforcement Priorities]; see gen-
erally James M. Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforcement in the 1990's, 20 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter Strock, EPA Environmental
Enforcement]; Herbert H. Tate, Jr., Enforcement Authority and the New Clean Air
Act, 7 NAT'L. ENVTL. ENF. J. 13 (June 1992).
5. See William K. Reilly, The New Clean Air Act: An Environmental Milestone,
17 EPA Journal (Jan-Feb 1991) at 3; see also Strock, Stationary Source Enforce-
ment, supra note 4; David P. Novello, EPA's Proposed Air Permit Regulations: Im-
plementing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,511, 10,512 (1991).
6. This article will address the provisions of the operating permit program that
have a direct bearing on enforcement of the Act. For more detailed discussions of the
scope, drafting and implementation of the permit program see Roady, supra note 1,
and Novello, supra note 5. For a review of the legislative history pertaining to title V
see Timothy L. Williamson, Fitting Title V Into the Clean Air Act: Implementing
the New Operating Permit Program, 21 ENVTL. L. 2085 (1991). In certain critical re-
spects, affected sources under title IV (concerning acid deposition control) will be
regulated by title V operating permit requirements; this topic, however, is beyond the
scope of this article.
7. Under the Act, each state has the primary responsibility for ensuring that the
NAAQS will be achieved and maintained. CAA §§ 101(a)(3), 107(a), 109, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401(a)(3), 7 407(a), 7409 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
[Vol. 9
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implementation of state implementation plans (SIPs)8 and the
delegation of many of the Act's federal programs to the
states.9 Upon approval by EPA, SIP requirements become
federally enforceable. 10 To be successful, this system places a
high premium on the cooperative development of productive
state and federal relations. Over the years, EPA and the states
have consistently improved their working partnership in im-
plementing the Act. Nevertheless, the highly decentralized
SIP system, delegating achievement and maintenance of air
quality standards to the states," created fertile ground for
conflicts between EPA, which must ensure national consis-
tency in implementation of the Act, and the states, which are
charged with promoting the more varied social and economic
goals of its inhabitants. 2
SIPs have proven to be elusive, complex, and difficult
documents to apply."1 In particular, it was frequently difficult
to reach agreement on which SIP provisions applied to a given
8. Each state is required to submit to EPA for approval a SIP consisting of the
laws, policy and strategy for timely achievement of the NAAQS. See generally CAA §
110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
9. For example, section 110 of the Act allows delegation of all or part of certain
of the Act's programs, including some enforcement authorities, to states and locali-
ties. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (Supp. I 1990). However, all programs are
not delegable to the states and states have discretion to request partial delegation of
programs. See, e.g., CAA § 112(l)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7412(l)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
10. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990); see also Union Elec-
tric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), af'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977);
Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979).
11. Throughout this article, reference to "state" enforcement authorities includes
any local enforcement authorities as well.
12. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 588 (5th Cir.
1981); American Cyanamid Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987) (state agency's
SIP interpretation inconsistent with Act not entitled to deference); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (same); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (upholding state interpreta-
tion of SIP and Act).
13. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,713 (May 10, 1991) (preamble to EPA proposed
rules for CAA Operating Permit Program) [hereinafter Preamble]. For a more thor-
ough examination of the difficulties inherent in the SIP system, see Williamson,
supra note 6, 2089-94; William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act Works
Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1,059, 1,071-93 (1981).
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process or facility. In the development of enforcement actions,
EPA often found itself in the difficult position of advocating
interpretations of the Act and SIPs which were at odds with a
state's own interpretation of the Act and laws in its imple-
mentation plan. 14 Understandably, courts were reluctant to
upset the customary deference due a sovereign's interpreta-
tion of its own laws. 15 Facility owners and operators found
themselves faced with uncertain legal requirements com-
pounded by the risk that reliance on state assurances might
prove insufficient to discharge their duties under the Act and
might subject them to additional federal liability. The uncer-
tain application of SIP provisions increased litigation risks for
EPA in enforcement actions, consumed scarce resources, and
hampered the Agency's ability to generate and maintain the
level of specific enforcement successes necessary to ensure a
general deterrent effect on would-be violators.
In title V of the Amendments, Congress enacted an oper-
ating permit program that will unify all the applicable state
and federal standards and limitations, including test methods,
monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, appli-
cable to each source in one document. 6 The operating permit
program holds the potential to greatly diminish the risk and
uncertainty under the pre-1990 Act regime because EPA,
states, and the regulated sources will have a forum to initially
agree on the requirements applicable to each source. In addi-
tion, the increased precision in the definition of legal obliga-
tions will greatly aid enforcement entities who will rely on
permits as the road maps of enforcement. However, to be suc-
cessful the operating permit program must be truly compre-
hensive or many of the evils of interpretation under the pre-
1990 Act may persist and continue to bedevil enforcement au-
thorities. In this regard, the scope of the permit shield and
14. See cases cited supra note 12.
15. Costle, 650 F.2d at 588.
16. The pre-1990 Act did include a federally-mandated permit program that ad-
dressed preconstruction permitting under the prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) program in title I, part C, and title I, part D provisions of the Act concerning
nonattainment area new source review (NNSR). Many states also independently op-
erated their own permitting programs. See Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,713.
[Vol. 9
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operational flexibility provisions in title V pose a serious
threat to the enforcement benefits offered by the Amend-
ments, especially if these provisions are not carefully inter-
preted and implemented with an eye toward clarity, certainty
and predictability.
Title V of the 1990 Amendments requires the states to
administer an operating permit program which meets certain
minimum federal requirements." By regulation, as required
by the Amendments, 18 EPA has set out proposed minimum
requirements for state programs' 9 which must be developed
and submitted to EPA for federal approval by November 15,
1993.20 In the event a state does not submit an approvable
permit program in a timely fashion, EPA must develop and
administer a program for the state.2' Title V requires that op-
erating permit program submittals apply to all "major
sources," sources subject to hazardous air pollutant or new
source performance standards (NSPS), "affected sources"
under title IV acid rain provisions and sources subject to new
source review permitting requirements.2
17. CAA § 502(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (Supp. II 1990).
18. Id.
19. Operating Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712 (May 10, 1991) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70) (proposed rule) (EPA proposed rules for Clean Air Act Oper-
ating Permit Program). During preparation of this article for publication, EPA
promulgated the final operating permit program rules. Operating Permit Program, 57
Fed. Reg. 32,250 (July 21, 1992) (final rule).
20. CAA § 502(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d) (Supp. 11 1990).
21. CAA § 502(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(3) (Supp. I 1990).
22. CAA § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (Supp. II 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,768, 21,770 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2(r), 70.3(a)) (pro-
posed rule). For purposes of the operating permit program, major source is defined to
include any air pollution source under section 302(6) of the Act and any major source
of hazardous pollutants under section 112 and any major source subject to new source
review. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,768-69 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.2(r)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,715-16. A major
source of hazardous air pollutants is defined as a source that emits or has the poten-
tial to emit, in the aggregate, ten tons per year of any one hazardous pollutant, or 25
tons per year of any combination of such hazardous pollutants. CAA § 112 (a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990). Section 302(j) defines "major stationary source"
to be "any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has
the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant." CAA §
302(j), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (1988). However, under the amended Act sources in certain
nonattainment areas will be subject to lower potential to emit thresholds depending
11
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State program submittals must include the authority to
issue permits up to five years in duration that assure compli-
ance with each standard, regulation, or requirement under the
Act and to terminate, modify or revoke, and reissue permits
for cause.2 3 In addition, states must have authority to enforce
permits and to recover civil penalties of up to a maximum of
not less than $10,000 per day for each violation. "4 By regula-
tion, EPA has proposed mandating that states have the fol-
lowing additional authority, derived by reference to the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program
(NPDES):2 5 to restrain a permit violator that poses imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare
on the severity of the area's nonattainment status under part D (nonattainment pro-
visions) of title I. For example, in an extreme ozone nonattainment area (i.e. Los
Angeles basin), the term "major stationary source" "includes (in addition to the
sources described in section 302) any stationary source ...that emits, or has the
potential to emit, at least 10 tons per year of volatile organic compounds." CAA §
182(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(e) (Supp. II 1990); see, e.g., CAA § 182(d), 42 U.S.C. §
7511a(d) (Supp. 11 1990) (in "severe" ozone nonattainment areas the major source
limit is 25 tons per year); CAA § 182(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c) (Supp. II 1990) (in
"serious" ozone nonattainment areas the limit is 50 tons per year); CAA § 189(b)(3),
42 U.S.C. § 7513a(b)(3) (Supp. II 1990) (in "serious" particulate matter (PM-10)
nonattainment areas the limit is 70 tons per year); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,769 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2(r)(3)(i), (y)) (proposed rule)
(definition of major source in nonattainment areas and definition of "potential to
emit"); Novello, supra note 5, at 10,511, 10,514-15 (1991) (discussion of applicability
and "major" source definition in proposed permits rule). EPA has proposed, at least
initially, to defer application of the permit program for five years to non-major
sources that would otherwise be subject to the permit program. For example, a non-
major source subject to the NSPS would be exempted from the requirement to have a
permit for five years. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,770 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 70.3(b)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,725-27.
However, states may decide to include some or all non-major sources in their permit
programs under the authority to add more stringent permitting requirements not in-
consistent with the Act. CAA § 506(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661e(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed.
Reg. 21,712, 21,767 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.1(d)) (proposed
rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,726.
23. CAA § 502(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5) (Supp. II 1990); 56 Fed. Reg.
21,712, 21,770-71 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(vi)) (pro-
posed rule).
24. CAA § 502(b)(5)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(E) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed. Reg.
21,712, 21,781 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.11(a)(3)(i)) (proposed
rule).
25. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,755 (referencing 40 C.F.R. § 123.27 NPDES
requirements).
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or the environment; to enjoin violators; to seek civil penalties
for violations of the permit, any fee or filing requirement, in-
spection, entry or monitoring condition; and to assess criminal
fines up to a maximum of not less than $10,000 for knowing
violations of applicable standards and limitations, and for
false statements.2  The burden of proof under state law for
permit violations shall be no greater than under the Act. 27
States are encouraged to adopt administrative penalty author-
ity, but are not mandated to do so.2
Initial applications for individual permits are required to
be submitted within one year from the date a source becomes
subject to a permit program approved or administered by
EPA.2 Sources that become subject to permit requirements
after program approval will have up to one year to submit
permit applications." After the effective date of any approved
title V permit program, it will be unlawful for any person sub-
ject to the permit requirements to operate without a permit or
26. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,781 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.11(a)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,755.
27. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,781 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.11(b)(2)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,755.
28. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,755.
29. CAA § 503(a)(1), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(a)(1), (c) (Supp. II 1990). State fail-
ure to timely adopt a program requires EPA to administer a federal permit program,
in which case, the one year period to submit applications will begin to run from the
date EPA promulgates the federal program. CAA §§ 502(d)(3), (h), 503(c), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7661a(d)(3), (h), 7661b(c) (Supp. II 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,780-81 (May
10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.10) (proposed rule); see also Preamble,
supra note 13, at 21,764 (discussing future promulgation of the default federal permit
program). States must submit proposed permit programs by November 15, 1993 at
the latest. CAA § 502(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1) (Supp. II 1990). Within one year
from program submittal (November 15, 1994 at the latest), EPA must wholly or par-
tially approve the state program submittal. Id. If disapproved by EPA, the state has
180 days (or up to two years at EPA's discretion) after receipt of the notice to resub-
mit the program for review and EPA must act on the resubmission within one year.
Id.; 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,772 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.4(e),
(f)(1)) (proposed rule). Assuming these statutory deadlines will be complied with, ini-
tial source state permit applications could be required as late as mid-November 1997.
At the other extreme, assuming a June 15, 1992 promulgation date of the final
permits rule, permit applications could be required as early as June of 1993. This
scenario assumes early submission, quick review and approval of the state program
submittal and short state permit application deadlines.
30. CAA § 503(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
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in violation of any terms or conditions of the permit."1 For
sources that become subject to a permit program, failure to
submit a timely and complete permit application to the per-
mitting authority will also be a violation of the Act. 32 A timely
and complete permit application is defined as one that the
permitting authority determines contains all the necessary in-
formation3 "needed to begin to process the application."
Other than routine background information, the proposal
requires permit applications to include certain emissions-re-
lated information (e.g. fuel use); identification of control
equipment and all applicable air pollution control require-
ments; description of the applicable test methods for deter-
mining compliance with each requirement; and descriptions of
reasonably anticipated alternative operating scenarios. 5 To be
complete, a source that is not in compliance at the time of
permit application submission must include a compliance plan
that contains a schedule of compliance, with enforceable mile-
stones, that must be incorporated into the permit.36 Addition-
ally, the statute requires the permitting authority to promul-
31. CAA § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(6)(i)) (proposed rule).
32. CAA §§ 503(c), (d), 113(b)(2), (d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661b(c), (d),
7413(b)(2), (d)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,773 (May 10, 1991) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(a)) (proposed rule).
33. The information must be consistent with the permit contents requirements
of CAA § 502(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b) (Supp. I 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,773
(May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(c)) (proposed rule).
34. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,768 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.2(h)) (proposed rule).
35. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,773 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.5(b)) (proposed rule).
36. CAA § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,773 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(b)(7)(iii)) (proposed rule).
The compliance plan language in section 504(a) of the Act does not explicitly apply
only to sources not in compliance at the time of the permit application's submission.
Id. EPA's decision to so limit the requirement has been controversial. See Novello,
supra note 5, at 10,519 n.86. However, even for sources not in compliance, the propo-
sal makes clear that the terms of the compliance schedule submitted in the compli-
ance plan, including milestones, will be enforceable. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,773 (May
10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(b)(7)(iii)) (proposed rule). The preamble
discussion also notes that compliance plans will not immunize sources from enforce-




gate streamlined procedures for making expeditious
completeness determinations.3 7 EPA has interpreted this pro-
vision to require that a completeness determination be made
within thirty days from submission of the application. 8 In the
event the permitting authority fails to make a timely com-
pleteness determination, the application will be deemed com-
plete upon the expiration of the thirty-day period.3 9
Submission of a timely and complete permit application
will provide a source with a limited "application shield" that
protects it from enforcement (for operating the facility with-
out a permit) during the period the permitting authority actu-
ally processes and writes the permit.' ° An application shield
will persist until the permitting authority issues or is deemed
to have issued a permit, provided the source timely submits
any information required or requested by the permitting au-
thority necessary to complete action on the permit applica-
tion.41 Failure to submit the requested information in a timely
manner "' terminates the application shield and will render the
source in violation for operating without a permit. 43
In order to be approved, a title V operating permit appli-
cation must contain source-specific terms and conditions suffi-
cient to ensure compliance with all Act and implementation
plan requirements, including emission limitations and stan-
dards, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting require-
ments." For major sources, a permit must include all applica-
ble requirements for all pollutants emitted by that source and
37. CAA § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
38. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.7(a)(4)) (proposed rule).
39. Id.
40. CAA § 503(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(d) (Supp. I 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,776-77 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(b)) (proposed rule).
41. CAA § 503(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(d) (Supp. H 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,777 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(b)(1)(i)) (proposed rule).
42. The proposed regulations define "timely" to mean compliance with "the
deadline specified by the permitting authority." 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777 (May 10,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(b)(1)(i)) (proposed rule).
43. Id.; see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,735; see also supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
44. CAA § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,774-75 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6) (proposed rule).
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regulated by the Act, regardless of whether the source is "ma-
jor" for that pollutant.45 Major source permits must also in-
corporate all applicable requirements for all regulated emis-
sion units at the source. 6 Permits must mandate that any
required monitoring information be submitted to the permit-
ting authority at least semi-annually and all "deviations"
from permit requirements must be clearly identified.' 7 Per-
mits must also set forth inspection and entry requirements 48
as well as monitoring and compliance certification require-
ments pursuant to regulation.' 9 EPA has proposed that once a
permit has been issued and has become final its terms may
not be challenged in an enforcement proceeding.50
The following discussion will address some implementa-
tion issues crucial to effective enforcement of the Act that are
raised by the proposed operating permit program.
a. "State-Only" Requirements
The permit proposal states that "[a]ll applicable require-
ments under the Act" in a permit approved pursuant to 40
C.F.R. part 70 are federally enforceable,"1 and that each per-
45. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,770 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.3(c)(1)) (proposed rule), 21,774 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(1)) (proposed
rule). For non-major sources required to obtain a permit, EPA interprets the Act to
require the permit to address only those requirements which trigger the permit obli-
gation. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,770 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.3(c)(2)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,727; Novello,
supra note 5, at 10,516.
46. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,770, 21,774 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 7 0.3(c)(1), 70.6(a)(1)) (proposed rule).
47. CAA § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (Supp. H 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,774-75 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §70.6(a)(3)(iv)(A)) (proposed
rule).
48. CAA § 504(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c) (Supp. H 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(c)(3)) (proposed rule).
49. CAA §§ 114(a)(3), 504(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(a)(3), 7661c(c) (1988 & Supp. II
1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(c)(2)) (proposed rule). Title VII of the Amendments added "enhanced" monitor-
ing and compliance certification requirements, which differ from the title V require-
ments in some respects. See discussion infra parts II.B.1., 2 (enhanced monitoring
and compliance certification subsections).
50. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,760.
51. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
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mit must include a statement that "[any permit noncompli-
ance constitutes a violation of the Act and is grounds for an
enforcement action." 5 In addition, EPA has determined that
each permit must specifically designate, and segregate in the
permit, the provisions of the permit that are not federally en-
forceable, either because they are not required by the Act or
because they are "more stringent" than required by the Act.5 3
The proposed rule and statutory provision imply that permit
requirements will be presumed to be federally enforceable un-
less the permitting authority identifies the requirement as
"state-only." However, in the preamble, EPA states to the
contrary that permit requirements will be presumed to be not
federally enforceable unless there is an affirmative showing
that the requirement is mandated under the Act." If the pre-
sumption against federal enforceability were to prevail in the
final rule, a state issued permit that failed to segregate some
or all state-only requirements would be presumed to be not
federally enforceable unless, on a requirement-by-requirement
basis, federal applicability could he shown. This state of af-
70.6(b)) (proposed rule). This language is based on section 502(a) which states in
pertinent part:
After the effective date of any permit program approved or promulgated
under this title, it shall be unlawful for any person to violate any require-
ment of a permit issued under this title, or to operate . . . a major source, or
any other source (required to obtain a title V permit) .... except in compli-
ance with a permit issued by a permitting authority under this title.
CAA § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 766ta(a) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
52. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(a)(6)(i)) (proposed rule) (emphasis added).
53. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(b)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,729-30. As an exam-
ple of those so-called "state only" requirements, the preamble points to new state
toxic air pollutant programs, many of which are likely to become effective several
years before EPA completes promulgation of the maximum achievable control tech-
nology (MACT) standards required under title III of the Amendments. Preamble,
supra note 13, at 21,729-30.
54. In the preamble, EPA states that it is proposing "that only those provisions
of a permit identified as being required under the Act or necessary for its implemen-
tation will be federally enforceable. Each provision required or needed under the Act,
will have to be clearly marked for EPA to consider it federally enforceable." Pream-
ble, supra note 13, at 21,729. This appears to contradict the language in the proposed
rule. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(b)) (proposed rule).
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fairs would be virtually indistinguishable from pre-1990 Act
SIP enforcement, messy and uncertain, a scenario the permit
title was specifically designed to rectify.
As proposed, the requirement to identify and segregate
so-called "state-only" requirements without clearly specifying
a presumption of federal enforceability, creates considerable
uncertainty as to which permit terms will be enforceable and
in which court, state or federal. Unless this issue is clarified in
the final permit rule, the "state-only" provisions will most as-
suredly result in protracted litigation, possibly returning regu-
lated entities to the paralysis that existed prior to the Act's
amendment.
b. Permit Shield
The application and interpretation of the permit shield
provisions of section 504(f) of the Amended Act will be criti-
cally important to the enforcement of Act requirements for
permitted sources. During consideration of the Amendments
industry argued that good faith operation in compliance with
an operating permit should entitle sources to a "safe harbor,"
free from government or citizen enforcement of requirements
outside the confines of the permit.5 5 The Amendments incor-
porated the safe harbor concept in the permit shield provi-
sions of section 504(f).5 6 Section 504(f) states that the permit-
ting authority may provide in the permit that compliance
with the permit is deemed compliance with other applicable
provisions of the Act, provided (1) the permit includes such
provisions, or (2) the permitting authority makes an explicit
determination, referenced in the permit, that other provisions
of the Act do not apply to the source. 7 The decision to apply
55. See Claudia Copeland, Comprehensive Clean Air and Clean Water Permits:
Is the Glass Still Just Half Full?, 21 ENVTL L. 2135, 2161 n.120 (1991).
56. CAA § 504(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (Supp. II 1990).
57. The shield provision states in its entirety:
Compliance with a permit issued in accordance with this title shall be
deemed compliance with section [502]. Except as otherwise provided by the
Administrator by rule, the permit may also provide that compliance with the
permit shall be deemed compliance with other applicable provisions of this
Act that relate to the permittee if-
[Vol. 9
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the permit shield is discretionary with the permitting author-
ity, though EPA can limit the breadth of the shield by rule.58
EPA has proposed excluding application of the permit shield
to: violations of the Act that occurred prior to or at the time
of permit issuance; the acid rain program; and the information
gathering authority under section 114 of the Act.59 In addi-
tion, section 303 emergency order requirements are exempt by
statute. As the preamble notes, omission (as opposed to misin-
terpretation) of an applicable requirement of the Act by mis-
take or otherwise, will not shield a source from enforcement
liability.6 0 The logic for this position is twofold. First, to be
shielded under section 504(f) a requirement must be specifi-
cally referenced (i.e. not omitted) in the permit. Second, it
would be unwise policy to encourage sources to be forgetful or
less than comprehensive in their permit application submit-
tals. In its proposal, EPA encourages states to fully employ
the permit shield, though absent explicit notice, permits will
be presumed to not provide a shield.6
How broadly the shield is interpreted is of critical impor-
tance to enforcement of the Act. A narrowly interpreted shield
(1) the permit includes the applicable requirements of such provi-
sions, or
(2) the permitting authority in acting on the permit application
makes a determination relating to the permittee that such other pro-
visions (which shall be referred to in such determination) are not ap-
plicable and the permit includes the determination or a concise sum-
mary thereof.
Nothing in the preceding sentence shall alter or affect the provisions of [CAA
§ 303,] including the authority of the Administrator under that section.
CAA § 504(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (Supp. II 1990).
According to the Statement of Senate Managers, this provision represented a
compromise that "balances competing concerns in a fashion that protects both indus-
try and the quality of our nation's air." Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1,
at S16,943. Congress was apparently concerned that decisions regarding application
of the shield be conducted in the open, to preserve the public's right to know how
sources are regulated. Id. See also Roady, supra note 1, at 10,189 n.89.
58. CAA § 504(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (Supp. II 1990).
59. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(h)(3)) (proposed rule).
60. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,744.
61. See Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,719, 21,744; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(h)(2)) (proposed rule).
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would apply only to the requirements of the Act that are ex-
plicitly addressed in the permit. Requirements not addressed
in the permit that become applicable to the source after per-
mit issuance would not be shielded and the source would still
be obliged to comply or face possible enforcement action. A
broad interpretation would shield a source from any require-
ment of any provision of the Act addressed in the permit.
This would include new requirements under any provision
that becomes applicable, to a source after permit issuance, for
the remainder of the permit term, if the general "provision"
of the Act was simply addressed somewhere in the permit,
even though the applicable requirement was not.2 Under a
broad shield, similarly situated sources could have dramati-
cally different compliance requirements and costs, due to luck
or greater success in navigating the permitting process. EPA
has proposed a broad shield interpretation that would exempt
a source from compliance with the specific "requirements" of
a general "provision" if the provision was already addressed in
the permit.13
62. This interpretation appears to conflict with the Act requirement that permits
with a term of three years or more must be revised to incorporate requirements
promulgated after issuance of the permit. CAA § 502(b)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(9)
(Supp. II 1990); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,778 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 70.7(g)) (proposed rule).
63. See Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,744 (for example, "if the permit imposes
the specific 'requirements' of an applicable MACT standard, or determines there are
no such requirements under section 112, then the source is protected from applica-
tion of the 'provisions' of section 112 for the duration of the permit term"). This
decision has also been strongly criticized. See Novello, supra note 5, at 10,521. At
least one commentator has cogently argued that a narrow interpretation is more con-
sistent with the statute and Congressional intent. See Williamson, supra note 6, at
2112-19. Examination of the Senate's rejection of the Nickles-Heflin Amendment is
instructive in this regard. The permit shield was "the major issue raised by [the Nick-
les-Heflin] amendment .... " 136 CONG. REC. S3182 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (floor
statement of Sen. Durenberger). According to Senator Nickles, the amendment pro-
posed that a source's compliance with its permit constituted compliance with all Act
"requirements addressed in the permit and existing at the time the permit was is-
sued." 136 CONG. REC. S3166 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990)
(emphasis added); Nickles-Heflin Amendment, supra note 1, 136 CONG. REc. at S3213
(proposed shield provision, section 352(f)(1)(A)); see also 136 CONG. REc. S3171 (daily
ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (colloquy between Sens. Baucus and Nickles concerning the
breadth of the proposed shield). In addition, the shield would have precluded modifi-
cation of the permit after issuance unless EPA determined there was a material mis-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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Other than for requirements explicitly preempted from
permit shield application, a permit shield can only be dis-
solved or altered by reopening the permit for cause, a cumber-
some process accorded the same procedural process as initial
permit issuance.a However, the permitting authority is man-
dated to reopen permits for cause when: (1) the remaining
term of a permit exceeds three years and new requirements
become applicable to the source; (2) the permitting authority
or EPA determines that the permit contains a material mis-
take or; (3) EPA determines the permit must be revised "to
assure compliance with the applicable requirements of the
Act."6 5
take, or "actual harm to public health" would result absent permit modification. Id.
at S3171-72; Nickles-Heflin Amendment, supra note 1, 136 CONG. REC. at S3212-13
(proposed sections 351(b)(5)(D), 352(f)(2) and 353(f)). Opposition to the broad per-
mit shield proposal was central to the amendment's defeat. See 136 CONG. REC. S3234
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("This amendment shields way
too much."); 136 CONG. REC. S3175 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Chafee in opposition to Nickles-Heflin amendment and in favor of a "partial shield"
modeled on the Clean Water Act); 136 CONG. REc. S3187 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990)
(statements of Sen. Jeffords) ("I do not think we should allow sources to violate one
provision of the [Act] simply because it holds a permit covering some other require-
ments."). In considering the Senate's deliberations, this history also argues in favor of
the narrow interpretation of the permit shield.
64. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,778 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.7(g)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,744-45.
As noted above, section 504(f) of the CAA prohibits application of the shield to
actions by EPA pursuant to section 303. However, under the existing proposal there
has been no explicit recognition of the emergency chemical accident prevention order
authority under section 112(r)(9). Unless the permitting authority provides otherwise,
sources will surely argue that the permit shield protects them from compliance with
orders issued under section 112(r)(9). We argue below that the section 112(r)(9) order
authority will rarely be used. See discussion infra part II.A.4.b. (order authority for
prevention of chemical accidents subsection). This will most surely be the case if, in
order to issue a section 112(r)(9) order, the permitting authority must first reopen the
permit for cause - an implausible, unworkable scenario. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,776-78 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. § 70.7) (proposed rule); see also
Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,741.
65. CAA §§ 502(b)(5)(D), (b)(9), 504(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(b)(5)(D), (b)(9),
7661c(a) (Supp. II 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,778 (May 10, 1991) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(g)(i)-(iv)) (proposed rule). EPA does not explain the circum-
stances under which a permit would have to be reopened for cause "to assure compli-
ance with applicable requirements of the Act." However, as discussed in the next
section of this article, EPA appears to interpret similar language in section 504(a) to
require that permits only meet this requirement at the time of issuance or renewal.
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c. Operational Flexibility
More than any other aspect of the revised Act, the con-
cept of operational flexibility presents the greatest potential
threat to the enforceability gains offered by the Amendments.
Fundamentally, permits are designed to create certainty and
enforceability in the discharge of Act obligations. However, to
remain profitable and competitive, industry must be adapta-
ble to shifting needs and markets and not unduly hampered
by permit constraints. The Act attempts to resolve the inher-
ent tension between the goals of the permit program and the
needs of industry in the proposed permit rule. The proposed
permit rule offers a number of approaches to strike a balance
and allow flexible source operation including, operational flex-
ibility notice pursuant to section 502(b)(10) of the Act, per-
mitting in the alternative, minor "fast track" permit amend-
ment and "off-permit" activity. Each approach is designed to
minimize or eliminate the procedural delay attendant to the
formal permit revision process, which can take up to 18
months.16 EPA and state interpretation of the parameters of
operational flexibility will delimit the extent to which permits
truly reflect the comprehensive statement of source duties and
obligations under the Act; actions that will determine the de-
gree to which the promise of certainty and enforceability can
be delivered by the permit program. Given the stakes of the
debate, it is not surprising that no other aspect of the Amend-
ments relating to enforcement has received such intense inter-
est and public scrutiny." In the absence of clear direction in
Accordingly, unless the permitting authority specified otherwise, regulated opera-
tional changes at a facility would not necessarily require the permit to be reopened
for cause, and permits would not be required to reflect current source operating prac-
tices until completion of the permit renewal process. See Novello, supra note 5, at
10,521.
66. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§
70.7(a)(2), (d)(3)) (proposed rule).
67. See, e.g., Chafee Voices Concern About CAA Permit Plan Allowing Excess
Emissions, INSIDE EPA (May 3, 1991) at 8; Environmentalists Protest CAA Permit
Regulation, Question Process, INSIDE EPA (May 3, 1991) at 10; Waxman Lambastes
EPA CAA Permit Proposal, Targets White House Influence, INSIDE EPA (May 3,
1991) at 7; Waxman Pursues Problems With CAA Permit Proposal In Follow-Up To
Hearing, INSIDE EPA (May 24, 1991) at 13; States Say They'll Veto Minor Permit
[Vol. 9
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the final permit rule, considerations of operational flexibility
in general, and section 502(b)(10) in particular, may well
prove to be the Trojan Horse in the fight for clean air.
Section 502(b)(10) of the Act sets out that the permitting
authority must allow operating changes within a permitted fa-
cility without the need for a formal permit revision, provided
the changes do not constitute a modification under title I of
the Act6" and "do not exceed the emissions allowable under
the permit." 69 Prior to its effective date, the source is required
to give the permitting authority and EPA seven days written
notification of the change." EPA has proposed that the notice
shall "describe the proposed changes, including changes in
emissions, and any requirements that would be applicable as a
Changes Under EPA's CAA Proposal, INsIDE EPA (Jun. 7, 1991) at 13; OGC Memo
Suggests CAA Permit Amendment Shielding Some Changes Legally Weak, INSIDE
EPA (Oct. 4, 1991) at 1; EPA Paper Suggests More Reviews For CAA Minor Permit
Changes, INSIDE EPA (Oct. 11, 1991) at 15; EPA Sends CAA Permit Plan To OMB
With Beefed Up Public Review Requirements, INSIDE EPA (Oct. 25, 1991) at 6; EPA
Draft CAA Permit Reg Sets Expanded Review For Even Minor Changes, INSIDE EPA
(Nov. 8, 1991) at 1; EPA Begins Battle To Defend CAA Permit Reg Against White
House Critics, INSIDE EPA (Nov. 15, 1991) at 3; Waxman Says Competitiveness
Council Guilty of 'Wantonly Illegal Activities' On EPA Rules, 22 Env't Rep. Current
Developments (BNA) (Nov. 22, 1991) at 1,787; EPA, White House CAA 'Minor Per-
mit Amendment' Talks Halt As DOJ Reviews Issue, INSIDE EPA (Nov. 22, 1991) at 7;
White House, EPA, Continue To Work To Reach Agreement On Air Permit Rule, 22
Env't Rep. Current Developments (BNA) (Jan. 24, 1992) at 2,172; White House Com-
petitiveness Council To Craft Options For CAA Permit Rule, INSIDE EPA (Apr. 3,
1992) at 1; War Over Clean Air Regs Gathers Momentum, NAT. L. J., Apr. 13, 1992,
at 5; Bush Curbs Clean Air Provision, WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 1992, A-1, col. 1.
68. For a discussion of the various definitions of "modification" under different
programs, see Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,746-47 n.6; see also Williamson, supra
note 6, at 2107-08 n.77.
69. Section 502(b)(10) states:
Provisions to allow changes within a permitted facility (or one operating pur-
suant to section 503(d)) without requiring a permit revision, if the changes
are not modifications under any provision of title I and the changes do not
exceed the emissions allowable under the permit (whether expressed therein
as a rate of emissions or in terms of total emissions[)]: Provided, That the
facility provides the Administrator and the permitting authority with written
notification in advance of the proposed changes which shall be a minimum of
7 days, unless the permitting authority provides in its regulations a different
timeframe for emergencies.
CAA § 502(b)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(10) (Supp. II 1990) (a footnote explains that
"[a] closing parenthesis probably should precede the colon").
70. CAA § 502(b)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(10) (Supp. II 1990).
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result of the change. '71 Section 502(b)(10) operational flexibil-
ity will be an option where the proposed change would not be
prohibited by the permit and would also not result in ex-
ceedance of allowable emissions under the permit. 2 Though a
source's activities would still be subject to any applicable Act
requirements, the proposal notes that the permit shield would
not apply.73 Notwithstanding that a section 502(b)(10) opera-
tional flexibility change is fundamentally not a permit "revi-
sion," EPA asked for comment on whether administrative
amendment of the permit should be required after the change
takes effect.74 Though the proposal is silent on the issue, this
might allow arguments to be made that the permit shield
should apply since the permit would now "address" the
changed requirements.
EPA has also proposed a "fast track" minor permit revi-
sion scheme to implement operational flexibility changes.75
Under the proposed rule, the source must give the permitting
authority at least seven days notice as required by the statute,
and submit a notification of the proposed change that "shall
describe the proposed changes, including changes in emis-
sions, any requirements that would be applicable as a result of
the changes, and the revised permit language under which the
source proposes to operate. '17 Minor permit amendments
must "compl[y] with all applicable requirements of the Act
relevant to the source. '77 EPA proposes to allow the proposed
change to go into effect after seven days unless the permitting
authority objects, at which time the permitting authority may
require the proposed change to be reviewed under the proce-
71. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(d)(3)(ii)) (proposed rule).
72. Id.
73. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,746 (discussion of operational flexibility).
74. Id.
75. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(d)(3)(v)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,748.
76. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777-78 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.7(f)(2)) (proposed rule).





dures for full permit modifications. 8 Minor permit amend-
ments will be eligible for permit shield protection.7 9
EPA has also proposed that operational flexibility be al-
lowed by permitting in the alternative."' In essence, permit-
ting in the alternative allows a permit to state a menu of op-
tions, each of which includes the necessary terms and
conditions sufficient for the option to be approved as a stand
alone permit requirement. Among other requirements, each
option on the menu must include sufficient monitoring and re-
cordkeeping to assure compliance and enforceability. At any
given time, the source must be operating in compliance with
any one of the permitted scenarios, but any change between
menu options requires no approval by the permitting author-
ity."1 Permitting in the alternative has the virtue of being
clear in its delineation of source obligations and enforceable,
while allowing the source to exercise considerable flexibility.
Provisions created in this manner also benefit from the oppor-
tunity to have the permit shield apply.
In the permit proposal, EPA has also suggested that
sources should be allowed to operate outside the confines of
the permit terms and conditions in certain circumstances. The
argument for this position derives from a deceptively simple
proposition: since the nature of a permit under the Act is to
allow any activity it does not explicitly prohibit, a source
should not need to revise its permit in any fashion when its
operational changes are not otherwise regulated by the Act or
permit.8 2 Elaborating on this theme, the preamble to. the pro-
posed permit rule states that "a permit change is not affirma-
tively required to authorize every change in practices which
are otherwise legal under the SIP or federal law merely be-
78. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777-78 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.7(d), (f)(2)(iii)) (proposed rule).
79. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,744.
80. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(d)(3)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,747-48.
81. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(d)) (proposed rule).
82. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,718 (discussing permit content), 21,746 (dis-
cussing operational flexibility and permit revisions).
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cause an existing permit does not address the practice. ' s3
Thus, a source may operate its facility without specific au-
thorization in the permit ("off-permit"), provided that the
permit, SIP or Act do not expressly prohibit the activity."'
Apparently EPA interprets the requirement in section 504
that permits include "such ... conditions as are necessary to
assure compliance with the applicable requirements of the
Act ' 85 as only applicable to permit issuance and renewal.
In effect, the proposal appears to suggest that after a per-
mit has been issued a source may elect to operate "off-permit"
any time it wishes unless the Act or SIP explicitly requires
incorporation of the changes into the permit. In other words,
in many cases the issue of whether a permit must be amended
during its term is discretionary for both the source and the
state. EPA notes that any such operation would be subject to
the applicable Act requirements and enforcement, but states
that the permit shield could not apply since the activity would
not be covered by the permit.86 Under this interpretation, a
source would have the option of operating "off-permit" and
re-subjecting itself, EPA and the permitting authority, to
many of the problems inherent under the pre-1990 Act, a re-
sult the permit program and the Amendments were explicitly
designed to ameliorate. Consequently, the more widespread
the practice of off-permit activity, the less effective the per-
mits program will become. Indeed, it has been noted else-
where that the current proposal may actually encourage
sources to maximize off-permit activity.87
As proposed, EPA's interpretation of the operational flex-
ibility opportunities in the Act present a number of areas ripe
for misunderstanding and abuse. One overriding concern re-
lates to the requirements for testing (especially gap-filling),
monitoring and recordkeeping. Operational flexibility provi-
sions will enjoy wide use if sources believe they can employ
83. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,746.
84. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(d)(3)(iv)) (proposed rule); see also Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,746.
85. CAA § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
86. CAA § 504(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (Supp. H 1990).




them to avoid these requirements. Although the proposed mi-
nor permit amendment and operational flexibility provisions
note that proposed changes must comply with all relevant re-
quirements of the Act, the notice requirements do not explic-
itly require monitoring, recordkeeping, and adequate test
methods sufficient to assure compliance with the underlying
emissions limitations, as required by section 504(c) and else-
where in the Act." Furthermore, the proposal allows a source
to avoid the full permit revision process, requiring public
comment and thorough review by the permitting authority,
unless it makes a "major modification," or increases emissions
above allowable levels.89 But a major modification is an emis-
sions related concept; it is not usually triggered when compli-
ance methods and testing procedures are modified. Thus, un-
less EPA or the state permitting authorities prohibit such
changes, or define "major modification" for purposes of the
permit program to include any changes to compliance and
testing requirements, there will be ample opportunity for
sources to rewrite or interpret compliance terms more to their
liking, resulting in overly permissive or potentially unenforce-
able permit conditions."
As noted in the preamble, because historically SIPs have
not always been explicit about compliance and testing re-
quirements, permitting authorities will now be required to fill
in gaps (e.g., add averaging times or test methods when they
are absent) in order to insure the enforceability of each indi-
vidual permit.9 1 It takes a great leap of faith to believe per-
88. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,776-77 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§
70.6(d)(3)(ii), 70.7(f)(1)(ii)) (proposed rule); CAA § 504(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c)
(Supp. II 1990).
89. See supra note 68.
90. The proposed rule does, however, require that relaxations of monitoring and
reporting requirements or milestones in required compliance schedules (for noncom-
plying sources) be reviewed as full permit modifications. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,777
(May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(d)(2)) (proposed rule).
91. Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,713, 21,733 (discussing the background and
purpose of proposed 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 and how absent or inadequate test methods
must be rectified by the permitting authority). In addition to gap filling required by
title V, the approach being considered for the enhanced monitoring and compliance
certification requirements pursuant to title VII will also require case-by-case determi-
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mitting authorities will be able to make these difficult deter-
minations within the seven day notice period, or that sources
themselves will routinely impose upon themselves fully en-
forceable and potentially costly testing and monitoring re-
quirements in the absence of any enforceable duty to do so.
To forestall this outcome, state permitting authorities could
refuse to allow operational flexibility notices or minor permit
amendment proposals to go forward without full review as
permit modifications when presented with vague or questiona-
ble testing, monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting
requirements.
In the proposed permit rule, EPA requested comment on
all of its operational flexibility proposals and the issue has be-
come the focal point of discussions between the EPA and Ad-
ministration officials during inter-agency review of the final
regulations.2 One hopes the final product will clarify the lim-
its of operational flexibility and the permit shield and provide
sufficient guidance to all parties as to how compliance should
be determined, monitored and reported. Otherwise, the per-
mit program could become fundamentally flawed, riven with
loopholes, and the source of renewed conflict, uncertainty and
stagnation in the effort to ensure clean air.
2. New and Modified Administrative Authorities
A critical obstacle to the Agency's effective enforcement
of the pre-1990 Act concerned the lack of administrative pen-
alty authority. Under the pre-1990 Act statutory scheme sec-
tion 120 noncompliance penalty order authority was the only
administrative penalty order authority available to EPA. It
was complex, resource intensive and failed to promote flexible,
cost-effective enforcement. 3 Section 120 authorized recoup-
nations by the permitting authority, which are not easily susceptible to summary
treatment. See discussion infra part II.B.1. (enhanced monitoring and compliance
certification subsection).
92. See Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,718; see also supra note 67.
93. Section 120 requires use of a formula for determining economic benefit; the
formula is so complex that the provision allows EPA to hire a contractor to make the
determination. CAA § 120(c), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(c), (d) (1988). For example, once




ment of the economic value the source gained through non-
compliance ("economic benefit"),9 4 but since the pre-1990 Act
penalties only ran from the date of the notice of noncompli-
ance, section 120 actions could not recoup penalties for past
violations even where the full economic benefit of noncompli-
ance extended to the period before notice of noncompliance."
Penalties under section 120 were intended to level the playing
field for violators vis-a-vis their competitors - competitors
who had absorbed compliance costs into operating budgets,
product prices, and bottom lines. Because the penalties failed
to account for the seriousness (or "gravity") of the violation,
section 120 penalties alone failed to meet either the general or
specific goals of deterrence outlined in EPA penalty policies. 6
In addition, the section 120 noncompliance penalty scheme
failed to provide for injunctive-type relief to deter future vio-
lations or require compliance schedules and remediation of
any environmental harm inflicted. In theory, section 113(a)
administrative compliance orders could have provided the
needed injunctive-type relief absent in the section 120 order
context, but the effective thirty-day limitation on the duration
of section 113(a) administrative orders proved to be an un-
workably short time-frame for EPA supervised compliance or-
ders. 7 Burdened with these flaws, the use of section 120 fell
quired to review the source's actual expenditures and, if necessary, provide reim-
bursement for any overpayment. CAA § 120(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(d)(4) (1988). See
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 463-65 (D.C. Cir. 1983), for a general dis-
cussion of the exhaustive and complex requirements of section 120. See also 40 C.F.R.
pt. 66 for the regulations governing section 120 penalty assessments.
94. CAA § 120(d)(2)(A), (a), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(d)(2)(A), (a) (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
95. Id.; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
American Cyanamid v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1987).
96. See, e.g., EPA, Policy on Civil Penalties, (EPA General Enforcement Policy
#GM-21) (Feb. 16, 1984) at 3.
97. The thirty day limitation applied primarily to orders issued for SIP viola-
tions. In order to avoid possible judicial challenge, EPA determined that it should
effectively limit administrative orders concerning SIP violations to thirty days be-
cause section 110(i) of the pre-1990 Act prohibited issuance, inter alia, of administra-
tive orders by EPA or the states which modified any stationary source requirements
of the SIP. CAA § 110(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(i) (1988) (amended 1990). Since section
113(d) delayed compliance orders were specifically allowed to modify SIPs under sec-
tion 110(i), and section 113(a) orders were not, EPA determined that the statutory
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into disfavor. 8
Due to these shortcomings EPA directed virtually all sig-
nificant enforcement action into the civil judicial arena, which
in turn created a host of other problems. Civil judicial cases
require EPA to enlist the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
prosecute the enforcement actions, which increased manage-
ment involvement and transaction costs. Additionally, the
high cost of litigation drained limited enforcement resources
and restricted the breadth of EPA enforcement initiatives to
the most high profile violations. Over time, an added down-
side to the focus on civil judicial enforcement actions
emerged. DOJ appeared reluctant to bring enforcement ac-
tions for purely "procedural" violations (e.g., testing, monitor-
ing, reporting, and recordkeeping violations). The argument
was made that unless the violations were connected with ex-
ceedances of emissions standards, where the public health was
arguably threatened, judges would be unsympathetic. Given
the lack of an appropriate alternative administrative forum,
EPA found it increasingly difficult as a practical matter to
pursue, publicize, and deter wholly "procedural" violations.
Similar arguments dampened enthusiasm for prosecution of
cases for past penalties, where a source had already come into
compliance and court-ordered injunctive relief was not
needed. The situation was particularly difficult for EPA, in
light of the critical importance to the Agency of testing, moni-
toring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements to its abil-
ity to carry out its mission. It became clear that the pre-1990
Act simply lacked the flexible authorities necessary to punish
and deter civil violators broadly and swiftly.
scheme could be construed as limiting the duration of section 113(a) orders. See EPA,
Duration of Section 113(a) Orders, (Apr. 30, 1982). EPA also determined that orders
addressing NSPS and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) violations could be issued for longer duration but only if the failure to
come into compliance arose from circumstances beyond the effective control of the
source (e.g. force majeure). Id. at 2.
98. For example, during fiscal year 1991, non-compliance penalties were not
sought at all by EPA under section 120. EPA, Enforcement Accomplishment Report,
(April 1992) at Appendix entitled "National Penalty Policy Report," Table 4 "Sum-




a. Administrative Compliance Orders
The 1990 Amendments generally address the above-men-
tioned enforcement concerns by providing EPA with the flexi-
bility to pursue violators for large and small transgressions.
Under the amended Act, the duration of administrative com-
pliance orders has been expanded to a maximum of one
year." This will allow EPA to use compliance orders to ad-
dress a wide variety of violations. In addition, the amend-
ments to section 113(a) considerably broaden the scope of ac-
tivity subject to administrative treatment by EPA. EPA may
now issue administrative compliance orders whenever it deter-
mines that a person has violated or is in violation of any re-
quirement or prohibition of a SIP, a SIP during a period of
federally assumed enforcement, title I (attainment and main-
tenance of air quality standards), title IV (acid deposition),
title V (operating permits), title VI (stratospheric ozone de-
pletion)'00 or section 303 of title III (emergency orders). 10' Ap-
plicable violations now include, but are not limited to, any re-
quirement or prohibition of any rule, plan, order, waiver,
permit, or permit fee approved under the aforementioned pro-
visions or titles. 10 2
As was the case under the pre-1990 Act, except for orders
concerning violations of hazardous air pollutant requirements
or prohibitions, administrative compliance orders issued pur-
suant to section 113(a) do not take effect until the order re-
cipient has had an opportunity to confer with EPA concerning
the violation. 10 3 Additional pre-1990 Act requirements appli-
cable to compliance orders remained in place. A copy of the
compliance order must be given to the applicable state air
pollution control agency and the order must state with reason-
able specificity the nature of the violation and provide for
compliance "as expeditiously as practicable" based on the se-
99. In addition, the order is not renewable. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
100. CAA § 113(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
101. CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. II 1990).
102. CAA § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1990).
103. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
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riousness of the violation and good faith efforts to comply.'0 4
Orders directed at corporations must be issued to appropriate
corporate officers. 10 5 Further, the Amendments explicitly clar-
ify that no order issued under section 113(a) shall preclude
additional state or federal civil or criminal enforcement or a
source's duty to comply with the provisions of the Act, a per-
mit, or a SIP.10 6 The Amendments also subject violators of all
the substantive provisions in section 113(a) to the new admin-
istrative penalty order authority.
b. Administrative Penalty Orders
New section 113(d) governs the issuance of administrative
penalty orders and it allows the assessment of civil penalties
up to $25,000 per day of violation, limited to actions where
the total penalty sought does not exceed $200,000."10 Adminis-
trative penalty authority is restricted to matters where the
first date of alleged violation occurred no more than twelve
months prior to initiation of the administrative action. 08 In
appropriate cases the Administrator and the Attorney General
may jointly determine to enlarge the time period and the
maximum penalty amount, though the decision is not judi-
cially reviewable. 0 9
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. CAA § 113(a)(4), (a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4), (a)(5) (Supp. I 1990).
107. CAA § 113(d)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1990). See also
CAA § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1988) (amended 1990) (repealed provision con-
cerning delayed compliance orders). See infra part II.C.1 (statutory maximum liabil-
ity subsection) for discussion of the meaning of "per day of violation."
108. CAA § 113(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (Supp. II 1990). The statute and
the legislative history fail to clarify what Congress meant by "initiation" of the ac-
tion. Clearly, at the outside, filing of an administrative complaint pursuant to the
Consolidated Rules of Practice would qualify as "initiation" of the action. See 40
C.F.R. § 22.13 (1991).
109. CAA § 113(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (Supp. H 1990). Neither the Act
nor the legislative history give any clear indication how this authority should be exer-
cised. The section-by-section analysis of S. 1490, the Administration's Senate Bill,
suggests the use of this provision "to increase the penalty limit for certain cases or
categories of cases" and notes that such agreements would be "especially appropriate
for categories of cases which routinely involve multiple violations, each of which may




Recipients of administrative penalty orders must be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the record in accor-
dance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).11 ° Fail-
ure to pay a final administrative penalty order subjects the
nonpaying party to a collection suit in federal district court
for the penalty amount, with interest."1 The costs, attorneys
fees, and the "enforcement expenses" incurred by the United
States in pursuit of the collection action "shall" be assessed
against nonpaying parties, and the district court is precluded
from reviewing the amount, validity, and appropriateness of
the penalty order in the action.1 2 In addition to any penalty
and interest collected in the suit, parties that fail to pay a
penalty order assessment shall be required to pay a quarterly
nonpayment penalty equal to ten percent of the aggregate
amount of the outstanding penalties and nonpayment penal-
ties accrued as of the beginning of each quarter.11 3
EPA has issued guidance setting out its view of the ap-
propriate circumstances for use of the administrative penalty
order authority. " In general, the factors to be considered in-
clude the statutory limitations, the need for court-supervised
injunctive relief, evidence of criminal violation, the extent of
the need for post-filing discovery, and the novelty of legal is-
sis of the "Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989," 135 CONG. REC. S9651, S9665 (daily
ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (submitted into the record by Sen. Chafee). Could this authority be
exercised on a case-by-case basis? For example, could an administrative complaint be
amended to request greater penalties if more serious violations are discovered during
the action? Alternatively, would enlargement be appropriate, for example, if in five
years inflation has made virtually all proposed penalties too insignificant for adminis-
trative penalty orders to be effective? Congress did, however, express concern that a
record be kept of the basis and reasons for such enlargements for future Congres-
sional review. See HR. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 393.
110. CAA § 113(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1990); see also Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1988). EPA has recently
completed amendment of the Consolidated Rules of Practice setting out these hear-
ing requirements. See Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties Under the Clean Air Act, 57 Fed. Reg. 4316 (Feb. 4, 1992) (amending
the Consolidated Rules of Practice, 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.01, 22.34, 22.43).
111. CAA § 113(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (Supp. II 1990).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. EPA, Guidance on Choosing the Appropriate Forum in Clean Air Act Sta-
tionary Source Civil Enforcement Actions, (Oct. 29, 1991).
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sues.115 EPA intends to issue section 113(a) compliance orders
in conjunction with penalty orders to provide any needed in-
junctive relief.1 6 A critical factor in the forum selection deci-
sion-making is whether the compliance order is capable of de-
livering the remedy EPA desires, including any injunctive-
type relief. Drawn-out compliance milestones, the need for
construction of capital-intensive pollution control equipment,
and a generally uncooperative attitude toward achieving com-
pliance, all militate against use of the administrative forum.1 7
EPA has also indicated that the penalty amount pled in ad-
ministrative actions will be equal to the "preliminary deter-
rence amount" as defined in EPA civil penalty guidance.""
Given the possibility of statutory maximum penalties in the
judicial forum, and the potential for more costly procedures,
alleged violators may find the administrative forum a more
hospitable venue for resolution of enforcement actions.
3. Field Citations
In furtherance of Congress' efforts to streamline enforce-
ment of the Act, reduce costs, and provide EPA enhanced
flexibility, a novel field citation program was created to allow
EPA to issue "tickets" for some violations. 1 9 Once regulations
have been promulgated, EPA may assess civil penalties not to
exceed $5,000 "per day of violation"' 20 for "appropriate minor
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 3-4.
118. EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy at 1-2 (Oct. 25,
1991) (hereinafter Penalty Policy]. The preliminary deterrence amount equals the
sum of the economic benefit of noncompliance plus an additional penalty amount to
account for the seriousness of the violation (gravity component). Id. at 4. Based on
the degree of a violator's cooperation, an administrative complaint may actually plead
an amount that includes a deduction of up to 10% of the gravity component of the
penalty calculation. Id. at 1. On May 22, 1992, as part of a coordinated enforcement
initiative, EPA announced the arrival of the new administrative penalty order author-
ity by filing 50 cases assessing penalties of more than $4 million in 26 states and
Puerto Rico. Fifty Clean Air Act Enforcement Actions Taken, DAILY ENVTL. REP.
(BNA) at 4 (May 21, 1992).
119. CAA § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. II 1990).
120. Id. The "per day of violation" language lacks clarity. See discussion infra
part II.C.1. (statutory maximum liability subsection).
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violations."1 '1 Payment of a civil penalty assessed by a field
citation appears to preclude the imposition of further penal-
ties for the same violation on the day for which the citation
was issued, though payment does not preclude the assessment
of additional penalties or bar other actions to enforce a viola-
tion if it continues beyond the period covered by the field ci-
tation.' 22 Although those persons who are issued a field cita-
tion are entitled to notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and present evidence, the hearing is not subject to the
provisions of the APA.' 5 EPA is currently drafting regula-
tions establishing the parameters of the field citation program
121. CAA § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. II 1990). The term "minor
violations" is not defined in the Act. The Senate viewed minor violations as "viola-
tions discovered during the course of an inspection . . . [or] violations of routine re-
porting and record-keeping requirements." See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 365,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3748. See also H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at
393-94 (field citations limited to appropriate "minor violations" and expressed con-
cern that parties not be required to travel to Washington, D.C. to receive a hearing).
122. Section 113(d)(3) provides that "[p]ayment of a civil penalty required by a
field citation shall not be a defense to further enforcement by the United States or a
State to correct a violation, or to assess the statutory maximum penalty pursuant to
other authorities in the Act, if the violation continues." CAA § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added). The meaning and relevance, if any, of
this provision is unclear and is discussed nowhere in the legislative history. If the
violation were to continue, the statute appears to mandate that payment of the field
citation should have no preclusive effect on further statutory maximum penalties,
either for the violation on the day the field citation was issued or thereafter. If so, an
administrative penalty order or civil judicial action could be pursued under section
113(b). CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. II 1990). For purposes of penalty
assessment under section 113(e)(1), the field citation penalty could be a mere offset
factor under the category "payment by the violator of penalties previously assessed
for the same violation." CAA § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). See
discussion infra parts II.C.2.a., b., c. (penalty assessment criteria section and subsec-
tions). If the cited violation does not continue, the statutory language would appear
to suggest that the assessment of additional penalties for the same violation on the
date of the citation is precluded by the payment of the field citation levy. However,
the "if the violation continues" language may merely reflect inadvertent drafting in-
consistencies to which little meaning can be ascribed. See EPA, Guidance on Effect
of Clean Water Amendment Civil Penalty Assessment Language, (Aug. 28, 1987)
(interpreting similar CWA language). An additional question concerns what effect the
payment of a field citation will have on determinations of the duration of the viola-
tion under section 113(e). Would the existence of a field citation constitute any "cred-
ible evidence" under section 113(e)(1) or operate to defeat the presumption of contin-
uing violation under section 113(e)(2)? These issues appear open to debate.
123. CAA § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. II 1990).
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and the hearing procedures. 12 4 The specter of inspectors issu-
ing broadly worded field citations for major violations of the
Act that have potential preclusive effect on other enforcement
actions, combined with due regard for the maintenance of
good state relations, should drive EPA to substantially limit
the scope and nature of the field citation authority delegated
to field inspectors.
4. Emergency Order Authority
a. Section 303 Emergency Order Authority
Pre-1990 Act section 303 emergency order authority was
hobbled by overly-restrictive terms and procedural require-
ments that precluded its effective use in the abatement of air
pollution emergencies. The orders were only effective for a
maximum period of twenty-four hours, 125 and could not be is-
sued by EPA until after state and local authorities had been
contacted and had "not acted to abate such [endangering pol-
lution] sources. ' ' 2 Additionally, the orders were limited to
circumstances posing imminent and substantial endangerment
to the health of persons. Protection of human health, welfare
or the environment were not factors meriting consideration.12
Furthermore, in order for a source to incur civil liability, non-
compliance with a section 303 order had to be willful. The
maximum fine was set at $5,000 per day of violation, consider-
ably lower than the $25,000 maximum per day fine for most
other violations, and there were no criminal sanctions for
124. See Field Citation Rule for Air Act Violations Will Be Proposed in June,
EPA Official Says, 22 Env't Rep. Current Dev. (BNA) 2517 (stating that the pro-
posed rule is slated for release in June of 1992 and the final rule in May of 1993). The
House bill sent to the conference committee appeared to allow for de novo review of
field citations in federal court. House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601, 136 CONG.
REC. H3234-35. The final law, however, requires judicial review to be on the record
and based on the substantial evidence standard of review. CAA § 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(d)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
125. CAA § 303(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1988) (amended 1990). Upon commence-
ment of an enforcement action the order automatically became effective up to 48
hours (or longer if ordered by the court). Id.
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knowing noncompliance with a section 303 order.'28 As a re-
sult of these infirmities, EPA rarely issued section 303
orders.'29
The Amendments remedied the deficiencies in the ex-
isting section 303 order authority and brought the Act into
conformity with the emergency authorities in other major en-
vironmental laws.1 30 In addition as discussed in the next sec-
tion below, Congress created an entirely new, though some-
what redundant, emergency order authority for the prevention
of accidental releases of certain extremely hazardous
substances.'
Amended section 303 allows EPA, upon a finding that a
source of pollution is causing imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the health of persons, human welfare, or the
environment, to seek a restraining order in United States dis-
trict court, or when such a suit would be impracticable under
the circumstances, to issue administrative orders for a period
of up to sixty days. 32 Prior to taking any action pursuant to
section 303, EPA must consult with state and local authorities
128. CAA § 303(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7603(b) (1988) (amended 1990). In a clear exam-
ple of an irrational system of priorities and incentives under the pre-1990 Act, failure
to comply with a section 303 emergency order premised on an actual finding of immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to human health was sanctioned less severely
than, for example, failure to comply with an information request under section 114,
which rarely was the direct cause of increased air pollution or adverse public health
effects. Compare CAA § 113(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(4) (1988) (amended 1990)
with CAA § 303(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7603(b) (1988) (amended 1990).
129. Apparently, a section 303 order has only been issued once, in Birmingham,
Alabama in 1971. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 327-28 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1406-07.
130. Cf. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988); see Clean Air Act; Enforcement Au-
thority Guidance (Guidance on Using the Order Authority Under Section 112(r)(9)
of the Clean Air Act, as Amended, and on Coordinated Use With Other Order and
Enforcement Authorities), 56 Fed. Reg. 24,393 (May 30, 1991) (discussing emergency
order authorities in other major environmental statutes); S. REP. No. 228, supra note
1, at 370-71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3753-54.
131. CAA §§ 112(r)(9), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(r)(9), (Supp. II 1990).
132. CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. II 1990). The 60-day order limitation is
automatically extended 14 days if EPA files suit in district court to enforce the order
within the 60 day period. In addition, courts are authorized to extend the period
indefinitely. Id.
37
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
and ascertain the accuracy of the information upon which the
action is based. 133 The amended Act makes it a felony to
knowingly fail to comply with a section 303 order and civil
violators will now be subject to the $25,000 per day statutory
maximum civil penalties under section 113(b).13" Congress re-
pealed paragraph (b) that set out the difficult to prove "will-
ful" standard of liability and feeble penalties for failure to
comply with section 303 orders. Congress also deleted the pro-
vision requiring EPA to defer action until it determined that
state and local authorities had not acted to abate the
danger.3 '
The changes made to section 303 order authority are sure
to invigorate its use as an enforcement option in the future.
Where EPA was powerless under the pre-1990 Act, the exten-
sion of section 303 to the protection of human welfare and the
environment empowers EPA to act to abate threats to wildlife
habitats, ecosystems, buildings, and other structures. By de-
leting the "unrealistically short" ' 6 time limits on the duration
of section 303 orders and the open-ended requirement to defer
to state action, section 303 orders become viable options for
EPA. Increased civil and criminal liability for violations of
section 303 orders will help EPA leverage swift, concerted re-
medial results. In contrast to EPA's experience under the pre-
1990 Act, mere reference to section 303 order authority will
likely prove to be an effective incentive to focus parties in ne-
gotiations, leverage quick compliance, and remedy dangerous
environmental conditions. As is already the case in enforce-
ment of other media statutes, section 303 order authority is
likely to become a key tool in EPA's integrated enforcement
arsenal in the future.
133. CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. If 1990).
134. CAA §§ 113(b), 303, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b), 7603 (Supp. II 1990). The Senate
Bill as Passed would have mandated only misdemeanor incarceration up to one year.
Senate Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 605(b)(3), 136 CONG. REC. at S4438.
135. Compare CAA § 303(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7603(b) (1988) (amended 1990) with
CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. II 1990). The House Bill as Passed would have
retained the requirement to defer to state abatement actions, but allowed section 303
actions where the state action was not adequate to abate the threat. House Bill as
Passed, supra note 1, 136 CONG. REC. at H3235.
136. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 370, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3753.
[Vol. 9
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
1992] CLEAN AIR ACT
b. Order Authority for Prevention of Chemical Accidents
In conjunction with an ambitious program to address
chemical accidents, Congress added a new section 112(r) to
the hazardous air pollutant section of the Act entitled "Pre-
vention of Accidental Releases." ' Section 112(r) requires
EPA to generate by rule a list 3 ' and threshold quantities'39 of
at least 100 substances "which, in the case of an accidental
release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated
to cause, death, injury, or serious adverse affects to human
health or the environment.""" Facilities that possess more
than the threshold amount of a listed substance are required
by the Amendments to conduct a hazard assessment of poten-
tial accidental releases and implement a risk management
plan to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases of
the listed extremely hazardous substances and to develop
prompt emergency response programs for such accidental
releases.""
137. CAA § 112(r), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (Supp. 11 1990).
138. CAA § 112(r)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3) (Supp. II 1990).
139. CAA § 112(r)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(5) (Supp. II 1990).
140. CAA § 112(r)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3) (Supp. 11 1990). The same section of
the statute also defines the standard for listing the substances as those "which pose
the greatest risk of causing death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health
or the environment .... " Id. (emphasis added).
141. CAA § 112(r)(7)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. I 1990). In ad-
dition, the Amendments impose an enforceable general duty on owners and operators
of stationary sources involved with extremely hazardous substances to identify acci-
dental release hazards, to design and maintain safe facilities and to minimize the
consequences of accidental releases. CAA § 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (Supp. II
1990). This so-called "general duty" clause is modeled on a similar general duty
clause in the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1988); see also S.
REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 206, reprinted in 1990 US.C.C.A.N. at 3591. Looking to
the effect the National Transportation Safety Board has had on transportation safety
and accident investigation, Congress added a section that establishes the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board to investigate chemical accidents, conduct
studies of accidental releases and accident prevention, and to recommend regulatory
changes to EPA. CAA § 112(r)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6) (Supp. II 1990); see also S.
REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 205-208, 228, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3590-93,
3612. Congress intended the "Board, through its investigations and reports, . . . to
drive the regulatory agenda in [the chemical accident prevention] field." S. REP. No.
228, supra note 1, at 208, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3593. However, due to
Bush Administration concerns about the constitutionality of procedures for ap-
pointing Board members (which have apparently been resolved), the Board has not
39
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To specifically address the prevention of accidental re-
leases, Congress also supplemented the emergency order au-
thority of section 303 with a new order authority. Section
112(r)(9) provides EPA with authority to prevent or abate an
actual or threatened accidental release of a regulated sub-
stance (listed pursuant to section 112(r)(3)), or other "ex-
tremely hazardous" substances.'" Upon a determination by
yet been appointed, but $5 million funding to establish the Board has been included
in the Administration's fiscal year 1993 budget request. See Statement by President
Bush Upon Signing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3887-1, 3887-2; Administration in Major Switch Acts to Implement
CAA Chemical Accident Board, INSIDE EPA, July 19, 1991, at 1; see also Executive
Office of the President, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FY 1993, H.R. Doc. No. 178,
102 Cong., 2d Sess. A-933. In any event, it seems improbable that the Board will be
functioning in time to provide any input into the development of the accident pre-
vention rules currently being drafted by EPA, as envisioned by Congress and ex-
pressed in the Amendments. See CAA § 112(r)(6)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(H)
(Supp. 11 1990) (calling for Board pre-promulgation recommendations to EPA on haz-
ard assessments, the list of extremely hazardous substances and risk management
plans) and CAA § 112(r)(6)(K), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(K) (Supp. II 1990) (calling for
a Board report, to be completed by Nov. 15, 1992, recommending regulatory propos-
als to EPA for consideration in its development of risk management plan
regulations).
142. On its face, section 112(r)(9) covers actual or threatened "accidental re-
lease[s]" of a regulated substance. An "accidental release" is defined to mean "an
unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous sub-
stance into the ambient air from a stationary source." CAA § 112(r)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(r)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). A "regulated substance" is defined as "a substance
listed under [§ 112(r)](3)." Id. In addition, section 112(r)(1) states that the objective
of subsection (r) is to "prevent the accidental release and to minimize the conse-
quences of any such release of any substance listed pursuant to § [112(r)](3) or any
other extremely hazardous substance." CAA § 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (Supp.
11 1990) (emphasis added). Given the broad remedial purpose of subsection (r) and
the ambiguity of the statutory language, EPA has indicated in guidance that it will
interpret section 112(r)(9) to apply to both threatened or actual accidental releases of
substances listed pursuant to section 112(r)(3) and other additional "extremely haz-
ardous substances." See Clean Air Act: Enforcement Authority Guidance, 56 Fed.
Reg. 24,393, 24,394 (May 30, 1991) (Guidance on Using the Order Authority Under
Section 112(r)(9) of the Clean Air Act, as Amended, and on Coordinated Use With
Other Order and Enforcement Authorities) [hereinafter Order Authority Guidance].
Neither the Amendments nor EPA define "extremely hazardous substance" for pur-
poses of accidental release prevention, though the Senate report on S. 1630 notes
that, in addition to substances listed by EPA, the term "extremely hazardous sub-
stances" was intended to include the approximately 360 substances listed under
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11001-
11050 (1988 & Supp. 1990). See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 211, reprinted in
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the Agency that "there may be an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the human health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of an actual or threatened accidental release of
a regulated substance . . ." the United States district court is
given the jurisdiction to grant "such relief as the public inter-
est and the equities of the case may require" in the district in
which the threatened or actual release occurs.1"' In addition,
after notice has been given to the affected state, EPA is au-.
thorized to "take other action under this paragraph including,
but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to
protect human health."144 Further, section 112(r)(9)(A) re-
quires EPA to take action under section 303 whenever it is
"adequate to protect human health 45 and the environ-
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3596.
143. CAA § 112(r)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(9)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
144. Id. The limitation of these orders to the protection of "human health"
marks an unusual departure from other major emergency order provisions. Does this
mean this authority cannot be used to issue orders necessary to protect "human wel-
fare" or "the environment," where human health is not endangered? For example,
would a section 112(r)(9) order be available to EPA where there is a threatened re-
lease of an extremely hazardous substance at an unmanned remotely operated pump-
ing station which is located in an area otherwise uninhabited by humans, upwind
from a wildlife reserve harboring endangered species? Since a section 303 order would
clearly be available under EPA interpretations, and since section 112(r)(9) cannot be
invoked when section 303 is available, this question appears academic. Nevertheless,
the limitation of this provision to "orders ... necessary to protect human health"
serves to highlight the limited utility of this authority in abatement of actual emer-
gencies. Id.
145. Note that the statutory language omits reference to circumstances where
the sole imminent and substantial endangerment is to the human "welfare." There-
fore, EPA might argue that no deference is required to section 303 when the "human
welfare" is exclusively threatened. Nevertheless, as discussed below, this application
of the statute seems unlikely. One might ask whether there would be any advantage
in such an approach. Section 303 places a 60 day limit on the term of an emergency
order, requires EPA to consult with state authorities prior to acting and requires con-
firmation of the accuracy of the information underlying its decision to act. In addi-
tion, section 303 allows for the issuance of an administrative order only after a deter-
mination that a civil judicial action is not practicable. Section 112(r)(9), on the other
hand, places no explicit limit on the duration of an abatement order and only re-
quires EPA to notify the state of its intended administrative action and requires no
consultation with state authorities or information confirmation. Taken to its extreme,
if the "human welfare" was imminently and substantially endangered by a listed sub-
stance or any other extremely hazardous substance, EPA could forgo section 303 and
issue a section 112(r)(9) order containing no time limitation, without any consultation
with state authorities and without any attempt to invoke judicial authority. Never-
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ment."'1 Administrative orders issued pursuant to section
112(r)(9) are enforced in the appropriate United States dis-
trict court as if issued pursuant to section 303.147 Noncompli-
ance with a section 112(r)(9) order subjects the violator to the
full $25,000 statutory maximum civil liability under section
113(b) as well as section 113(c) criminal liability.148 Unlike
section 303 emergency order provisions, the statute places no
explicit limits on the scope and duration of the section
112(r)(9) order authority.
Given the requirement that section 303 relief must be un-
available before section 112(r)(9) authority may be used, and
since EPA construes section 303 emergency order authority to
apply to threatened or accidental releases to air,'49 section
112(r)(9) is arguably duplicative and will not likely be invoked
independently by EPA.5'° In practice, it is difficult to imagine
a set of circumstances that could not be addressed under the
sweeping authority delineated in amended section 303. Sec-
tion 303 applies to "a pollution source or combination of
sources (including moving sources) [that] is presenting an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to public health or wel-
fare, or the environment . . . . ,,'5'
Although there are no judicial, interpretations of section
303, EPA has interpreted section 303 to apply to any air pol-
theless, the likelihood of such a scenario seems remote since in practice none of the
limitations in section 303 are likely to provide any real obstacle to the Agency's issu-
ance of administrative orders (the sixty day limitation on section 303 orders can be
extended by court order and state consultation and information confirmation are
hardly burdensome).
146. CAA § 112(r)(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(9)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
147. CAA § 112(r)(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(9)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
148. CAA § 113(b)(2), (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2), (c)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
149. See EPA, Guidance on Use of Section 303 of the Clean Air Act 2-3 (Sept.
15, 1983) [hereinafter 303 Guidance].
150. Indeed, there is some question whether a source that has a shield provision
in its permit could be subject to a section 112(r)(9) order since the permit program
proposal does not exempt section 112(r)(9) orders from the shield. See 56 Fed. Reg.
21,712, 21,776 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(h)(3)(i), (iv)) (pro-
posed rule) (section 303 emergency orders and section 114 information gathering au-
thority are exempted from any permit shield). See discussion supra part II.A.l.b.
(permit shield subsection).




lution'52 emission that is presenting an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to public health, or welfare, or the en-
vironment, ' 83 including threatened releases as well as actual
accidental releases by any pollution source." Thus, where
section 112(r)(9) is limited to substances listed pursuant to
section 112(r)(3) or other extremely hazardous substances,
section 303 relief can be obtained for endangerment caused by
emissions or threatened emissions of substances listed pursu-
ant to section 112(r)(3), other extremely hazardous sub-
stances, or any other air pollution, even emissions of "criteria"
pollutants (for which primary and secondary NAAQS have
been set). 56 For example, amended section 303 authority.
could in theory be invoked by the Agency to abate threats to
health and welfare caused by legal emissions of smoke and
particulate matter from wood stoves and fireplaces in a moun-
tain valley choking on the pollutants.
Viewed in context with section 303, it seems that Con-
gress did not really intend section 112(r)(9) order authority to
be of substantial use. While section 112(r)(9) provides the ap-
pearance of direct congressional action to address threatened
accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances, given
that EPA is constrained to use its expanded section 303 au-
thority in the first instance, section 112(r)(9) will in all likeli-
hood be of little practical import. Nevertheless, in the unlikely
event that courts limit section 303 to actual, ongoing releases
of pollution to the air, excluding threatened releases, section
112(r)(9) would undoubtedly acquire greater relevance.
5. New Source Review
Under the pre-1990 Act, section 113(a)(5) entitled EPA to
issue orders prohibiting the construction or modification of
152. "[A]ir pollutant" is defined in the Act to mean "any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive .
. substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air . . .
CAA § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (Supp. II 1990).
153. 303 Guidance, supra note 149, at 1-2.
154. Id. at 2-3. See also Order Authority Guidance, supra note 142, at 24,394-95.
155. 303 Guidance, supra note 149, at 1-2.
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any stationary source in any area covered by an applicable im-
plementation plan when EPA had found that the state was
not acting in compliance with the part D provisions of the Act
concerning nonattainment area new source review (NNSR)."'
The order could only take effect after the person to whom it
was issued had an opportunity to confer with EPA concerning
the alleged violation. 157 Once it was issued, the order was not
subject to judicial review until EPA initiated a judicial action
in federal court to enforce the order under section 113(b)(5) at
which time the validity of the order could be reviewed and
civil penalties assessed.158
The pre-1990 Act had no comparable provision in section
113(a) to address a state's failure to adhere to part C provi-
sions requiring new source review under the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program applicable to areas
in attainment with the NAAQS.159 Instead, the PSD program
was addressed exclusively by section 167 of the pre-1990
Act,16 0 which permitted EPA or the state to issue an order or
seek an injunction to halt "construction" of a major emitting
facility6  that failed to adhere to PSD permitting require-
ments in an area covered by the PSD program. 6 ' Section 167
orders could not be directly enforced under section 113, but in
some cases EPA could bring a separate action under section
113(b)(2) alleging violations of the applicable SIP. 163
Congress amended section 167 order authority to explic-
itly include the prevention of the "construction or modifica-
tion" of facilities that fail to comply with PSD permitting re-
156. CAA § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (1988) (amended 1990).
157. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (1988) (amended 1990).
158. CAA § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988) (amended 1990); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977); Asbestec Constr. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 849
F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1988).
159. CAA §§ 160-169a, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1988) (amended 1990).
160. CAA § 167, 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (1988) (amended 1990).
161. See CAA § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1988) (amended 1990) (defining
"major emitting facility").
162. CAA § 167, 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (1988) (amended 1990).
163. CAA § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7431(b)(2) (1988) (amended 1990); Solar Tur-
bines, Inc. v. Seif, 688 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (administrative order not
self-enforcing), aff'd 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989).
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quirements' and section 113(b) was modified to allow for the
direct enforcement of section 167 orders.163 Addressing incon-
sistencies in treatment of PSD and NNSR violations, the
Amendments streamlined the existing section 113(a)(5) au-
thority to allow EPA to issue orders in areas where EPA finds
a source has failed to comply with the NNSR and PSD pro-
gram requirements concerning the construction of new, and
the modification of existing, units.16 6 In addition to retaining
the existing civil judicial authority to seek penalties and in-
junctive relief under section 113(b), the statute authorizes is-
suance of administrative penalty orders.16 7 Furthermore, the
Amendments clarified that like other administrative orders
under section 113(a), order issuance will not bar criminal
prosecution.6 8
The new options for enforcing PSD orders and the addi-
tion of the power to issue administrative penalty orders for
new source violations may increase the incentive for violators
to comply with cease construction orders rather than risk los-
164. CAA § 167, 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). The bill
passed by the Senate included language that would have codified EPA's interpreta-
tion that section 167 prohibits "operation" as well as construction and modification,
and a provision allowing for an informal hearing prior to effectuation of the order.
See Senate Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 609, 136 CONG. REc. at S4439. Both of
these provisions were not adopted. See Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1,
at S16,953. However, the Statement of Senate Managers clarified that although "op-
eration" was not adopted as proposed in the Senate Bill, Congress intended "to pre-
serve the current interpretation of the EPA that it can prohibit the operation of a
source upon discovering that such source is operating in violation of new source re-
quirements." Id. at S16,951. The Statement also noted the importance of such en-
forcement actions and encouraged EPA to continue to exercise this authority
judiciously.
165. CAA § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
166. CAA § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (Supp. II 1990). The Amendments
also eliminated references to section 129(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 (concerning enforcement of pre-1977 Act preconstruction review requirements in
40 C.F.R. pt. 51) and to pre-1990 Act section 110(a)(2)(I) (concerning SIP plan sub-
mittal requirements for Part D programs).
167. CAA § 113(a)(5)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
168. CAA § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1990). Nor will the issu-
ance of an order under this section prevent the state or EPA from assessing penalties,
or interfere with their authority to enforce other provisions of the Act, or relieve any
person from other requirements under the Act. CAA § 113(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(a)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
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ing a challenge in an enforcement action and incurring liabil-
ity for potentially significant penalties. Moreover, section 167
orders will not fall into disuse since, unlike section 113(a) or-
ders, they take effect immediately, eliminating the need to
wait for the violator to confer with EPA prior to the order's
effect.
6. Notices of Violation
In order to enforce SIP violations, the pre-1990 Act re-
quired EPA to notify the state and the person in violation and
provided that "[i]f such violation extends beyond the [thirti-
eth] day after the date of the .. .notification," EPA could
issue an administrative compliance order, section 120 penalty
order, or bring a civil judicial action in accordance with sec-
tion 113(b). 119 EPA was empowered to bring a SIP enforce-
ment action whenever such person "violates" an administra-
tive compliance order issued under section 113(a) or
"violates" a SIP either during any period of federally assumed
enforcement or "more than [thirty] days after having been no-
tified by [EPA] .. .of a finding that such person is violating
such requirement.""1 ' The statement of the thirty-day notice
provision in the present tense elicited differing interpreta-
tions, Some courts held that to be actionable a SIP violation
had to continue beyond the thirty-day period, interpreting the
statute to create, in effect, a thirty-day grace period.17 1 Al-
though EPA interpreted this provision solely as a notice pro-
vision, it was obligated in the face of such bad precedent and
uncertain litigation prospects to focus on violations that con-
169. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
170. CAA § 113(b)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2)(B) (1988) (amended 1990) (em-
phasis added).
171. United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1122, 1127-29 (D.
Colo. 1987) (alleged violation must persist 30 days); United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
736 F. Supp. 1539, 1546 (W.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp.
1110, 1121-23 (D. Md. 1987) ("A violating source can avoid civil penalties if it ceases
violation within 30 days of the NOV."). However, courts have found subject matter
jurisdiction for enforcement if the same violation was repeated any time after the 30
day period had run. See e.g., United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp.
1141, 1155-56 (D, Colo. 1988).
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tinued past the end of the thirty-day period. The existence of
the "cure" period and judicially imposed constraints on the
use of otherwise admissible evidence to prove continuing
thirty-day violations '72 contributed to the diminished viability
of SIP enforcement.1 73
The Amendments remedy these deficiencies by codifying
EPA's longstanding interpretation that the notice provision
was only intended to give the states the opportunity to en-
force SIP violations in the first instance, rather than to pro-
vide violators a thirty-day grace period or to bar enforcement
of noncontinuous violations.1 74 Congress amended section
113(a)(1) to clarify that "any time after the expiration of
thirty days following the date on which such notice of viola-
tion is issued," EPA may enforce the violation "without re-
gard to the period of violation, 1' 75 and section 113(b) was
172. See discussion infra part II.C.2.b. (duration of violation subsection).
173. Another more serious impediment to SIP enforcement concerned a number
of court interpretations holding that EPA's failure to timely act on SIP revisions
barred or limited certain enforcement actions. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,
698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (penalties held in abeyance until completion of final
action on the SIP by EPA); American Cyanamid v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987)
(precluding assessment of penalties for the period after the SIP was required to have
been acted on by EPA); see also EPA, Revised Guidance on Enforcement of State
Implementation Plan Violations Involving Proposed SIP Revisions, (Aug. 29, 1989).
In General Motors v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2528, 2533 (1990), the Supreme Court
ended this dispute, and obviated the need for a legislative fix in the Amendments, by
upholding EPA's interpretation that existing SIP provisions remained valid and en-
forceable until a revision was approved by EPA.
174. The Senate report reads as follows:
Section 113(a)(1) [and 113(b)(2)], as amended, clarifies and confirms
that the 30-day notice provision is intended solely to allow the State an op-
portunity to take appropriate action. The notice does not, and never was,
intended to require that EPA show the source to have been in continuous
violation for 30 days .... The 30-day notice is not a shield to protect sources,
but rather ensures that the States will have an opportunity to exercise their
enforcement prerogatives under the Act prior to initiation of a Federal en-
forcement action.
S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 361-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3744-45.
The Senate Report also cites favorably to United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
682 F. Supp. 1141, 1156 (D. Colo. 1988) (rejecting the argument that the 30-day no-
tice provision relieves defendants of liability for penalties while the 30-day clock is
running); see also H.R. REP. No. 490 pt. 1, supra note 1, at 391 (30-day notice only
intended to give states time to exercise enforcement prerogatives).
175. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). The actionable pe-
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amended to clarify that a violation is actionable whenever a
person "has violated, or is in violation of" any requirement or
prohibition of a SIP.17 6 Further, § 113(b)(1) was amended to
clarify that an action "shall be commenced . . . more than
[thirty] days following the date of [EPA's] notification under
[section 113(a)(1)] that such person has violated, or is in vio-
lation of" a SIP requirement or prohibition. 177
At least one court has already interpreted these changes
and the legislative history to hold that the thirty-day notice
provision clarified but did not substantively change a source's
obligations under the Act. '7 The Act as amended ensures that
SIP violators will no longer be able to hide behind the thirty-
day notice provision since liability will attach for each day of
violation, whether before or after the date of the notice of vio-
lation and regardless of the violation's duration. As a result of
these changes and others that increase EPA's enforcement op-
tions, SIP enforcement should enjoy a vigorous revival.
7. Pre-enforcement Review of Notices of Violation, Ad-
ministrative Orders and Information Requests
Section 307(b) of the pre-1990 Act provided for judicial
review in the United States circuit courts of appeals for "any
final action" of the Administrator under the Act179 and fur-
ther provided that any final action that could be reviewed
thereunder was barred from judicial review in a civil or crimi-
riod of violation is, of course, subject to the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2462
(1988) (general federal five year statute of limitation for fines, forfeitures and civil
penalties).
176. CAA § 113(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. United States v. LTV Steel Co., No. 91-1067, slip op. (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6,
1991). LTV moved to dismiss the case alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
claiming the amendments to the 30-day notice provision imposed new substantive
requirements that obligated EPA to issue an additional notice of violation after the
effective date of the 1990 Amendments. Based upon an examination of the legislative
history and due deference to the Agency's interpretation of the statute, the court
rejected LTV's claims that the changes were substantive and denied LTV's motion to
dismiss. Id. at 7-8.
179. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
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nal proceeding for enforcement.180 However, the pre-1990 Act
failed to define "final action" and the law was unclear which
actions were exempt from pre-enforcement review.18' Courts
rendered divergent opinions on the matter.'82 From the
Agency's perspective, interpretations that would allow pre-en-
forcement review of administrative orders and other EPA in-
vestigative activities threatened to delay enforcement actions
indefinitely in a quagmire of hearings and legal proceedings
while the threat to public health and the environment re-
mained unabated.
Seeking to clarify the matter, both House and Senate
bills originally introduced during the 101st Congress included
separate sections to clarify that pre-enforcement review was
not available for administrative notices or orders, subpoenas,
or actions for information, entry and inspection pursuant to
section 114.183 After both chambers reported bills out of com-
mittee, only the Senate version still retained the separate sec-
tion barring pre-enforcement review.' 84 However, neither of
180. CAA § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1988) (amended 1990).
181. Pre-Act section 307(b)(1) did however enumerate some specific actions (e.g.
delayed compliance orders under section 113(d)(1)(D) and noncompliance penalty or-
ders under section 113(d)(1)(E)) that were considered "final actions" subject to judi-
cial review. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
182. See, e.g., Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 688 F. Supp. 1012 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(issuance of a section 165(a) administrative order is "final action"); Asbestec Constr.
Services, Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1988) (issuance of a section 113(a) admin-
istrative compliance order does not constitute "final action"); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d
299 (8th Cir. 1979) (notice of violation is not final action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 839
(1979); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 947 (1976) (same); Conoco Inc. v. Gardebring, 503 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (notice of violation is final action); Dow Chemical Corp. v. EPA, 635 F. Supp.
126, 130-31 (M.D. La. 1986) (section 114 request is not final action),. aff'd on other
grounds, 832 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1986).
183. The bills broadly referred to this issue as "Reviewability of Administrative
Orders." See House Bill as Introduced, supra note 1, § 602; Senate Bill as Introduced,
supra note 1, § 302, 135 CONG. REC. S11,157. In addition, both bills encompassed
section 303 emergency orders, and actions under sections 206(c) and 208, concerning
mobile source information collection.
184. Compare Senate Report Bill, supra note 1, § 602, 136 CONG. REc. at S75
with House Report Bill, supra note 1, §§ 601-611, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 490,
supra note 1, at 131-38. The Senate Report contains a detailed discussion of the ra-
tionale for precluding pre-enforcement review of orders or notices issued under sec-
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the two bills ultimately sent to the conference committee in-
cluded the separate provisions. 185 Nevertheless, in the Senate,
the issue became one of heated debate' 86 when Senator Nick-
les introduced an amendment pertaining to permits and en-
forcement, that among its other features, explicitly allowed
APA-type pre-enforcement review of administrative orders.' 87
Opposition to the pre-enforcement judicial review provisions
in the Nickles amendment contributed to its defeat by a close
vote. 88
tion 113 and other enumerated provisions of the Act. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note
1, at 366-67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3749-50.
185. However, as discussed below, the Senate Bill as Passed included language to
amend sections 113(a)(4) and 167 to allow a non-APA type hearing within thirty days
of the issuance of an administrative compliance or section 167 order. Senate Bill as
Passed, supra note 1, §§ 601(e), 609(b), 136 CONG. REC. at S4436, S4439.
186. One senator described the Nickles Amendment as a "killer amendment,"
136 CONG. REC. S3182 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (floor statements of Sen.
Durenberger), and another senator described it as a "gutting amendment." 136 CONG.
REc. S3234 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (floor statements of Sen. Baucus).
187. See Nickles-Heflin Amendment, supra note 1, at S3215-16 (proposing sub-
stitution of new enforcement and permit titles). Permit modifications, extension of
the shield to all Act violations, curtailed citizen suit provisions, and cost-benefit anal-
ysis requirements were among the most hotly contested issues in the proposed Nicli-
les-Heflin amendment. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Section 601(e) of
the Nickles-Heflin amendment made issuance of section 113(a) administrative orders
subject to the following proposed sections of the Act (also proposed by the Nickles-
Heflin Amendment): section 113(d)(2) (providing APA hearings); section 113(d)(4)
(granting authority to seek judicial review); and section 113(d)(5) (penalty assessment
enforcement). See Nickles-Heflin Amendments, supra note 1, at S3215-16. In addi-
tion, however, consistent with the Administration's bill, the Nickles-Heflin Amend-
ment also explicitly precluded pre-enforcement review of: section 113 notices of viola-
tion; section 120 findings of violation; section 303 emergency orders; administrative
subpoenas under section 307(a); and actions under section 114. See Nickles-Heflin
Amendments § 602(a), (b), supra note 1, at S3217. Senator Heflin, a co-sponsor of the
Nickles-Heflin Amendment, noted that the Mitchell-Dole substitute amendment No.
1293 would "significantly expand EPA['s] power to issue various types of administra-
tive orders." He further stated: "We are in agreement on the need to expand EPA's
administrative order authority. Where we disagree is on the kind of administrative
hearing a person is entitled to before one of these orders goes into effect." 136 CONG.
REC. S3169 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (floor statements of Sen. Heflin in support of
Nickles-Heflin Amendment).
188. See 136 CONG. REC. S3238-40 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (statement of Senate
Majority Leader Mitchell opposing the Nickles-Heflin Amendment); 136 CONG. REc.
S3173-74 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (floor statement of Sen. Lieberman opposing Nick-
les-Heflin Amendment and supporting no pre-enforcement review of administrative
orders); 136 CONG. REc. S3176, S3185, S3235 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (Sen. Chafee's
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As considered by the conference committee, the House
bill was silent on pre-enforcement review in general. In mod-
eration of the Senate's earlier position that broadly barred
pre-enforcement review, the Senate bill sent to the conference
allowed informal non-APA type hearings for administrative
and section 167 orders.8 9 Nevertheless, the conferees deferred
to the House bill that had no provision for pre-enforcement
review of administrative orders.' 90 The Statement of Senate
Managers explained the absence of a pre-enforcement review
bar in the final conference bill. The statement referred to the
earlier discussion in the Senate Report that favored no pre-
enforcement review and stated that, with respect to adminis-
trative orders, the issue had been properly resolved by the
courts that had precluded pre-enforcement review and that
therefore "no new statutory language addressing the issue
[was] necessary."19' Thus, the legislative history confirms that
floor comments opposing pre-enforcement review provisions in the Nickles-Heflin
amendment); 136 CONG. REC. S3185, S3187-88 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1990) (Sen. Baucus
floor comments opposing pre-enforcement review provisions in Nickles-Heflin
Amendment); 136 CONG. REC. S3236-37 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (same); 136 CONG.
REC. S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1990) (rejecting the Nickles-Heflin Amendment by a
vote of 50 to 47).
189. The language in the original Senate bill submitted by the Bush Administra-
tion barring pre-enforcement review was changed at the insistence of the Administra-
tion itself. For one explanation of the reasons for this change of position, see 136
CONG. REc. 3181-82 (Mar. 26, 1990) (floor statements of Sen. Durenberger). The
Mitchell-Dole substitute amendment included language that explicitly allowed for
pre-enforcement review of administrative orders. See Mitchell-Dole substitute, supra
note 1, at 601(e), 136 CONG. REC. at S2090; see also supra note 185. The Senate Bill as
Passed was silent on pre-enforcement review of emergency orders, subpoenas, notices
of violations and information requests.
190. See Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,950-51, S16,953.
191. See Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,953 (discussed
under the heading referencing section 706, entitled "Judicial Review Pending Recon-
sideration of Regulation"). This was a curious statement since the Senate had agreed
earlier to add provisions imposing an opportunity for limited pre-enforcement review.
In addition, concerning administrative orders under section 113(a), the Statement of
Senate Managers clarifies that by adopting the House version the conferees agreed to
"leave[] intact current law which has been interpreted correctly as barring pre-en-
forcement review of administrative compliance orders." Id. at S16,951. In Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 1977), the court examined the legisla-
tive history of the 1970 Clean Air Act (which is virtually indistinguishable in form
from the history of the 1990 Amendments on this topic) to determine whether, absent
an express provision in the Act barring pre-enforcement review, the Agency could
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Congress intended pre-enforcement review to remain unavail-
able for administrative compliance and section 167 orders.
However, as concerns section 114 information requests, sec-
tion 307(a) subpoenas, notices of violation and section 303
emergency orders that Congress considered expressly exempt-
ing from pre-enforcement review, the legislative history is less
conclusive though it is clear that Congress expressed no desire
to impose any pre-enforcement review limits on these
authorities.192
8. Restricted Definitions of "Operator" and "Person"
The Amendments limited the civil liability of low level
employees by altering the definition of "operator" to exclude
"any person who is a stationary engineer or technician respon-
sible for the operation, maintenance, repair, or monitoring of
equipment and facilities and who often has supervisory and
training duties but who is not senior management personnel
or a corporate officer."' 93 This provision will prohibit civil ac-
tions against low-level employees in their individual capacity,
but will have no effect on actions against corporations, other
overcome the "strong presumption favoring such review." The court concluded that
since pre-enforcement judicial review is "wholly inconsistent" with enforcement
mechanisms established in the Act, Congress must have intended to preclude pre-
enforcement judicial review of compliance orders. Id. at 891. The Statement of Sen-
ate Managers concerning the 1990 Amendments suggests Congress intended courts to
reach the same conclusion.
192. Further indication of congressional intent can be found in the adoption of
the "sufficient cause" defense in section 113(e)(1) of the Amended Act, which sug-
gests that information requests under section 114 and administrative subpoenas
under section 307(a) were intended to be reviewed only in enforcement actions. See
discussion infra part II.B.4. (sufficient cause subsection). The Amendments also clari-
fied that under section 307(b) of the Amended Act a petition for EPA reconsideration
of a final rule or final action does not postpone the effectiveness of the rule or action,
or render either non-final for purposes of judicial review. CAA § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1) (Supp. II 1990). In addition, a petition for reconsideration will not toll
the sixty-day period for filing an appeal in the appropriate court. Id. This amend-
ment overrules West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1988), insofar as
the court held that a pending petition for reconsideration rendered the challenged
Agency action non-final for purposes of judicial review. See S. REP. No. 228, supra
note 1, at 372, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3755. This change will help to elimi-
nate unnecessary procedural delay.
193. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. II 1990).
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business entities, or senior corporate personnel who are the
typical targets of civil enforcement actions. Drawing the dis-
tinction between "senior management" and "technician[s]"
will involve fact-specific determinations most likely to occur
in criminal law proceedings, since it is exceedingly rare for
EPA in a civil action to sue corporate personnel in their ca-
pacity as individuals.19' 4
9. De Minimis Violations / Prosecutorial Discretion
Prior to its amendment, section 113(b) of the pre-1990
Act stated that EPA "shall, in the case of any person which is
the owner or operator of a major stationary source, . . . com-
mence a civil action for a permanent or temporary injunction,
or to assess and recover a civil penalty . . . , or both, when-
ever" certain conditions were met.'9 5 As was the case with
other major environmental statutes, parties argued that the
statute imposed a non-discretionary duty on EPA to prose-
cute all violations meeting the specified conditions. These ar-
guments have met with varying degrees of success and re-
sulted in some ambiguity and uncertainty for EPA.' 6
Congress settled the question for civil judicial violations
by amending section 113(b) to state that EPA "shall, as ap-
propriate" file civil actions against violators.'97 In so doing,
Congress appears to have intended to extend the grant of
prosecutorial discretion to all de minimis civil and criminal
violations addressed by section 113.198 Given the clear state-
194. See discussion infra part III.D.1. (shifting scienter and the new definition of
"person" subsection).
195. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (amended 1990) (emphasis
added).
196. See, e.g., City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1374 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981)
(interpreting the "shall" in CAA section 113(a)(1) as discretionary); Dubois v.
Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 948-49 (8th Cir. 1987) (construing "shall" in Clean Water Act
section 309(a)(1) as discretionary); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 490-91 (5th
Cir. 1977) (same). But see Save the Valley v. Ruckleshaus, 565 F. Supp. 709, 710
(D.D.C. 1983) (interpreting "shall" in CAA section 167 as non-discretionary); Green
v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225, 1228-30 (D.D.C. 1983) (construing "shall" as mandatory
in section 309(a)(3) of the Clean Water Act).
197. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. I 1990).
198. The House bill also would have created a new section 113(a)(6) which would
1992]
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ment of congressional intent in the legislative history, and the
longstanding rule that agency exercises of enforcement discre-
tion are generally judicially non-reviewable, 199 the courts
should give effect to the expressed congressional intent even
in the absence of the enactment of clear discretionary lan-
guage throughout all relevant sections of the Amendments.
B. Information Gathering Authority
Pre-1990 Act limits on information gathering and investi-
gative authority constrained enforcement. In particular, regu-
lated sources were under no obligation to demonstrate their
compliance status to either EPA or the states on a continuing
basis. 00 Nor, in most cases, were sources required to submit
monitoring data to EPA on an ongoing basis. Rather, EPA
carried the burden of determining a source's compliance sta-
tus through on-site inspections or the issuance of source-spe-
cific investigatory letters requiring the collection and submis-
sion of emissions data pursuant to section 114 of the Act. °1
have exempted section 113 from application to de minimis violations as determined
by the Administrator. See House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601, 136 CONG. REc.
at H3233. The Senate bill contained no comparable provision and the conference
committee decided to delete the House clause and achieve the same result through
statements in the legislative history. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 347 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3879 ("It is the conferees' inten-
tion to provide the Administrator with prosecutorial discretion to decide not to seek
sanctions under section 113 for de minimis or technical violations in civil and crimi-
nal matters."); see also Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,951. Nev-
ertheless, other provisions of the amended Act continue to employ the word "shall."
See, e.g., CAA § 113(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (Supp. II 1990) (penalty order en-
forcement) and CAA § 120(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (noncompli-
ance penalties). By its emphasis on "de minimis and technical" violations, the confer-
ence committee report appears to imply that the Agency does not have the authority
to decline prosecution in cases of substantial, nontechnical violations. Perhaps Con-
gress avoided the proposed House de minimis language to preclude renewed argu-
ments that exercises of enforcement discretion should be subject to judicial review.
199. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 229 (1979).
See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (decision not to prosecute or
enforce civilly or criminally is generally within agency's absolute discretion).
200. See United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1124 (D. Md. 1987).
201. CAA § 114(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990); and see S.
REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 368, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3751; see also
CED's v. EPA, 745 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding EPA's assertion of
broad authority to require emission testing and monitoring under section 114), cert.
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Only pursuant to a neutral inspection scheme, or on the basis
of any information available suggesting noncompliance, could
EPA compel sources to conduct tests, perform specified moni-
toring and demonstrate compliance.210
While neutral inspection schemes have their place in en-
forcement, inspections are costly and their hit-or-miss, ran-
dom effectiveness can be a poor use of agency resources.
Without accurate, representative and timely monitoring data
upon which to rely, it was difficult to target the most egre-
gious violators and greatest threats to public health and safety
for inspection and remedial action. Effective targeting of spe-
cific facilities for investigations, like good detective work, re-
quired EPA to scour all sources for clues of noncompliance,
act on hunches and rely on public tips. The system was cum-
bersome and very inefficient - a cat and mouse game that
put a premium on sources obscuring their emissions profiles
from EPA and the public.03
In addition, except in cases where the information re-
quest or inspection turned up "smoking gun" evidence of vio-
lations, section 114 was not entirely effective for investigating
denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985).
202. Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In Barlow's, the Court
upheld the issuance of a warrant for inspection of a work place by OSHA when con-
sent to enter was not voluntarily given by the owner. The Court set out two require-
ments for issuance of the warrant: probable cause that a violation had occurred or
issuance of the inspection request pursuant to a neutral inspection scheme. EPA has
stated that its policy is to apply this case to inspections under the Act. See EPA, The
Clean Air Act Compliance/Enforcement Guidance Manual 3-15 to 3-16 (revised July
27, 1987); EPA, Regional Office Criteria for Neutral Inspections of Stationary
Sources - Amended Guidance (May 13, 1981) (outlining EPA's criteria for selection
of stationary sources for routine compliance inspections pursuant to the Barlow's de-
cision). See also Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720, 722-23 (S.D. Ind. 1981)
(upholding section 114 warrants against constitutional challenges), aff'd, 682 F.2d 626
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1982); see generally John A. Hamill, EPA
Entry and Post-Entry Rights With and Without Warrants, 4 NAT'L. ENVTL. ENF. J. 3
(May 1989).
203. In addition to other formidable obstacles, such as the inability to sue for
past violations of the Act, citizen suit enforcement was greatly impeded by the lack of
public access to useful emissions information. This article will not discuss the sub-
stantial impact of the Amendments on citizen enforcement of the Act. For a discus-
sion of citizen suit enforcement, see David T. Buente, Citizen Suits and the Clean
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past violations. The formality of section 114 letters gave
sources the opportunity to close corporate ranks, tailor pre-
emptive defenses and deny EPA access to critical information.
For example, since the pre-1990 Act lacked authority to sub-
poena witnesses at the investigative stage to testify about past
operating and recording practices, EPA had no other truly ef-
fective means to verify the critical facts prior to case filing.
Though judicial actions provided federal rules of discovery,
the inability to accurately determine the nature of the
source's past operation effectively ensured that many cases
would never be filed at all. Moreover, discovery might occur
too late to uncover fresh memories, key witnesses and critical
evidence.
In what could prove to be one of the most far reaching
changes to the pre-1990 Act structure of enforcement, Con-
gress created new enhanced monitoring and compliance certi-
fication procedures that shift the burden to each regulated
source to demonstrate continuing compliance to state and fed-
eral authorities on a routine basis. As its model for shifting
the burden to sources to demonstrate compliance, Congress
looked to the similar approach embodied in the NPDES pro-
gram of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which effectuates bur-
den shifting through its discharge monitoring reporting
requirements.' 4
Congress clarified that the Agency has the discretion to
require a source (or groups or classes of sources) or any person
who may have necessary information, to collect information
on a "one-time, periodic, or ongoing basis," thereby eliminat-
ing possible arguments that section 114 authority was limited
to one-tiime, case-specific applications to persons who owned
or operated stationary sources. The Amendments also clarified
that in addition to testing, monitoring and reporting concern-
ing direct emissions of pollutants, EPA can require monitor-
ing and recordkeeping of control equipment parameters (e.g.,
incinerator combustion temperature, pressure drop across a
204. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 368, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3751;
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bag house), production variables or other indirect data when
direct monitoring is impractical."°5 This authority will be of
considerable assistance to EPA in developing acceptable sur-
rogate instrument or parameter monitoring techniques to be
used for compliance certification determinations where direct
emission monitoring or sampling or continuous emission mon-
itoring technology is unavailable, too costly, or otherwise im-
practical. Further, in addition to the existing section 114 au-
thority, the Amendments add provisions clarifying that EPA
can prescribe auditing procedures in addition to monitoring
methods,1°6 prescribe sampling procedures and specified peri-
ods for emissions sampling,0 7 and require the submission of
compliance certifications on a case-by-case basis. 08 These
changes arm EPA with potent and clear authority to accu-
rately and routinely determine any source's compliance status
and to generate the information necessary for sound rule de-
velopment 20 9 and virtually guarantee that EPA enforcement
actions will be easier to develop and prove.
205. CAA § 114(a)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(E) (Supp. 11 1990).
206. CAA § 114(a)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1990). As the
Agency and States move towards market-based pollution allowance trading regimes,
which rely heavily on source monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting to accurately
quantify emissions, the ability to require source self-audits will become paramount to
enforcement and compliance monitoring. See New Rules Harness Power of Free Mar-
kets to Curb Air Pollution, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at Al (discussing new CAA
market based programs).
207. CAA § 114(a)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1990).
208. CAA § 114(a)(1)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(F) (Supp. I 1990). The Amend-
ments also eliminated some references to the Administrator in the masculine form.
Compare CAA § 114(a)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(E) (1988) (amended 1990) with
CAA § 114(a)(1)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(G) (Supp. 11 1990). Indicative of the seat
of the pants, eleventh hour decision-making that characterized passage of the
Amendments, the language in section 114 concerning section 129 was amended in two
separate places resulting in two different versions of the language. Compare Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 § 302(c), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990)
(conforming amendments) with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
549 § 702(a)(1), (2), 104 Stat. 2399, 2680 (1990).
209. Amended section 114(a) allows information gathering in furtherance of de-
velopment of SIPs, new source performance standards (NSPS), section 112 (MACT)
emissions standards and solid waste combustion regulations. CAA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
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1. Enhanced Monitoring and Compliance Certification
New section 114(a)(3) requires the Administrator to pro-
mulgate regulations by November 15, 1992, to require any
person who owns or operates a major stationary source to per-
form "enhanced monitoring and ... [submit] compliance cer-
tifications." ' In addition, under the title V permit program
provisions, each permit is required to set forth, inter alia,
compliance certification requirements sufficient to assure com-
pliance with the terms and conditions of the permit. 1 ' Provi-
sions in title V also state that the permit program implemen-
tation regulations must require each permit to mandate at a
minimum, annual compliance certifications and prompt re-
porting of any deviations from permit requirements to the
permitting authority." ' Compliance certifications and en-
hanced monitoring data will be available to the public under
section 114(c) and sections 502(b)(8) and 503(e), applicable to
sources subject to operating permit requirements.21 3
The amended Act sets out minimum requirements for
compliance certificafions, which EPA can supplement by reg-
ulation."1 4 The certification must include: (1) an identification
of each requirement for which compliance is being certified; '15
210. CAA § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (Supp. II 1990). EPA currently has
a working-group formed to complete this task. BNA, Outlook for Pending Rulemak-
ing, at 1991 (Nov. 1991).
211. CAA § 504(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c) (Supp. II 1990).
212. CAA §§ 114(c), 502(b)(2), 503(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7414(c), 7661a(b)(2),
7661b(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
213. Section 503(e) of the CAA states that section 114(c) trade secret protection
is available to information submitted in the permitting process. CAA § 503(e), 42
U.S.C. § 7661b(e) (Supp. II 1990). However, section 114(c) trade secret protection
does not extend to "emission data." CAA § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988); 40
C.F.R. § 2.301(e) (1991). "Emission data" is defined broadly by EPA. 40 C.F.R. §
2.301(a)(2) (1991); see also RSR Corp. v. EPA, 588 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Tex. 1984)
(EPA's determination that documents were "emission data" not entitled to confiden-
tial treatment was arbitrary and capricious). As noted above, section 114(a) was
amended to allow EPA to require indirect data and equipment parameter monitoring
in certain cases. CAA § 114(a)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(E) (Supp. II 1990). Un-
less courts were to determine that this information did not qualify as "emission"
data, trade secret status would not apply to any monitoring data required to be sub-
mitted to state or federal authorities pursuant to title V or section 114.
214. CAA § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (Supp. H 1990).




(2) the compliance status; '16 (3) the method used for deter-
mining the compliance status of the source with the require-
ment; 17 and (4) whether compliance is continuous or inter-
mittent.218 Furthermore, the statute clarifies that submission
of a compliance certification in no way limits EPA's authority
to investigate or otherwise implement the Act. 1 9
It is important to note here that the source is required to
engage in an analysis of its past operating practices and form
a conclusion as to its compliance status. Thus, EPA, the
states, and the public will be provided direct and regular ac-
cess to a stream of information that will identify violators,
provide useful evidence for proving violations, and deliver
sound information upon which to target further enforcement
and regulatory activity.2 0 The value and reliability of the
data for civil purposes is enhanced by the imposition of felony
criminal liability for false reporting, knowing omissions, and
misleading statements. '
Although the statute does not define what is meant by
"enhanced" monitoring, the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended that the "enhanced" monitoring data re-
quired by section 114(a)(3) should form the basis for compli-
ance certifications. The House committee report stated that
the new provision "clarifies and confirms that EPA has au-
thority under section 114(a) to require enhanced monitoring
and to require such monitoring in compliance certifica-
tions."2 22 In conformity with this view, in its preliminary pub-
lic pronouncements on the enhanced monitoring and compli-
ance certification rulemaking, EPA has interpreted section
114(a)(3) as permitting the use of "enhanced" monitoring in-
formation as the basis for compliance certifications. 23
216. CAA § 114(a)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 11 1990).
217. CAA § 114(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
218. CAA § 114(a)(3)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3)(D) (Supp. H 1990).
219. CAA § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (Supp. II 1990).
220. See Buente, supra note 203, at 2243-45.
221. CAA § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
222. H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 394 (emphasis added).
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Throughout the debate of the Amendments in the 101st
Congress, the legislative proposals concerning compliance cer-
tifications and enhanced monitoring remained virtually un-
changed from the bill originally submitted by the Administra-
tion. However, the House bill sent to the conference
committee contained a provision that exempted from disclo-
sure in compliance certifications, any information "subject to
applicable law concerning self-incrimination.""22 The Senate
bill contained no comparable provision, but the committee re-
port stated its understanding that compliance certifications
could be used as evidence in civil and criminal actions. 28 Nev-
ertheless, the conferees deleted the language concerning self-
incrimination from the final conference agreement.22 Thus,
224. House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 602(b), 136 CONG. REc. at H3235.
225. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 368-69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3751-52 ("[Clompliance certifications and emission data submitted pursuant to
this authority will facilitate enforcement, due in part to the fact that such data and
certifications can be used as evidence. Sources are subject to criminal sanctions for
any false statements, omissions, and misrepresentations contained in their
submissions.").
226. CAA § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (Supp. II 1990). Congress is pre-
sumed to have known that it was unnecessary to write explicit statutory language for
the Fifth Amendment to apply in either criminal or civil proceedings. See, e.g., Mc-
Carthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (privilege applies in civil and criminal
proceedings); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (privilege applies to any
proceeding civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (elected representatives are pre-
sumed to know the law). Possibly this explains why the conference committee deleted
the language from the final agreement. However, the House language concerning self-
incrimination may have been an attempt to cast doubt on the procedural protections
Congress intended to apply to compliance certifications admitting civil violations,
which ordinarily are not entitled to protection by the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). Such an
ambiguity might have opened the provision to arguments under the "applicable law"
that Congress intended the privilege against self-incrimination to apply in proceed-
ings for civil penalties based on claims the Act was unduly punitive or "quasi-crimi-
nal" in nature. See id. at 248-49 (first, courts must determine whether the legislature
intended the penalty to be civil or criminal in nature; second, if the penalty was in-
tended to be civil, courts must determine if the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect so as to negate that intention); Rex Trailer Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956). Although in Ward a similar argument was addressed and
rejected under self-reporting provisions of the Clean Water Act, the argument clearly
is not frivolous. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 254; see also United States v. Nevada Power
Co., No. 87-861, slip op. 6-8 (D. Nev. May 31, 1990) (applying Ward factors to dismiss
affirmative defenses that penalty scheme in section 113(b) of the Clean Air Act vio-
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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compliance certifications that show periods of noncompliance
can be expected to be relied upon by EPA and state enforce-
ment authorities as evidence to be used against them in civil
enforcement actions.227
The enhanced monitoring and compliance certification
provisions will subject industry air pollution practices to
heightened scrutiny by EPA, state, and citizen enforcers. Bet-
ter quality, more frequently reported data concerning indus-
try compliance will allow facility owners and operators to be
held more accountable for noncompliant activity and will in-
crease the likelihood that enforcement will be more swift and
more certain.
2. Enhanced Monitoring and Compliance Certification
Rulemaking Status
In August of 1991, EPA distributed a Public Document
stating its preliminary positions and interpretations of the en-
hanced monitoring and compliance certification (EM/CC) pro-
visions in the Act.228 EPA prepared the document in conjunc-
lated defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights). Thus, the language in the
House bill concerning self-incrimination appears to have had the potential to emascu-
late the compliance certification requirements. Removal of the self-incrimination lan-
guage from the final law would appear to reinforce the view that compliance certifica-
tions may effectuate the burden shifting "similar to the reporting requirements" of
the NPDES program. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 368, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3751.
227. Indeed, source self-certification of non-compliance under the Act is similar
to the discharge monitoring reporting requirements under the Clean Water Act,
which have been held to constitute admissions sufficient to support liability on sum-
mary judgment. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Monsanto, 600 F.
Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzche,
Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1538 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.
1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
1394, 1400 (D.N.J. 1985).
228. Enhanced Monitoring and Compliance Certification Rulemaking, 56 Fed.
Reg. 37,700 (Aug. 8, 1991) (notice of document availability and announcement of a
public meeting on August 22, 1991); EPA PUBLIC INFORMATION DOCUMENT: ENHANCED
MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATION, Air Docket No. A-91-52, 2 (August
1991) [hereinafter PUBLIC DOCUMENT]; see also, EPA Floats Plan To Require Rigor-
ous Monitoring For All Major CAA Sources, INSIDE EPA, Aug. 16, 1991, at 1; Utili-
ties Fear Enhanced CAA Monitoring Data Could Overstate Violations, INSIDE EPA,
Aug. 30, 1991, at 7. EPA included a disclaimer in the document that "the current
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tion with its mandate to promulgate rules to provide guidance
and implementation of EM/CC requirements, and to further a
more public approach to major rulemaking piloted by the Of-
fice of Air and Radiation involving "roundtable" public par-
ticipation prior to the proposal of regulations." 9
The Public Document noted that the proposed operating
permit program includes elements relating to title V monitor-
ing and compliance certification 23 0 and proposed to implement
the title VII provisions through the operating permit program.
The operating permit program requires, at a minimum, sub-
mission of an annual compliance certification, submission of
monitoring reports every six months and prompt notification
to the permitting authority of any "deviations" from the
terms and conditions of the permit. 23 ' Certifications and all
approach is still a preliminary conceptual position that does not reflect a final EPA
position" and the Agency requested comment on its suggested approach. See PUBLIC
DOCUMENT, supra, at 2.
229. See Novello, supra note 5, at 10,514, n. 30; see also Reilly May Seek
Agencywide Use of CAA Consensus-Building Approach, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 1, 1991, at
3-4; Some In Industry Accuse EPA Air Chief of Unethical 'Dealing' on CAA Regs,
INSIDE EPA, Dec. 20, 1991, at 3-4; Air Chief Defends Consensus Rulemaking Against
Industry Attacks, INSIDE EPA, Dec. 20, 1991, at 4.
230. See Operating.Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,774-76 (May 10,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(a)(3), 70.6(b), 70.6(c)(1)-(2), 70.6(c)(6) and
70.6(c)(6)(iii)) (proposed rule). The preamble states that:
Certifications... must include any periods of noncompliance, reasons for
the noncompliance, how noncompliance was corrected, and how it will be
prevented in the future .... The compliance certification must document not
only the current compliance status at the time of preparation of the report,
but also whether compliance over the reporting period was continuous or in-
termittent (i.e. whether there were periods of noncompliance).
Preamble, supra note 13, at 21,736-37. Notwithstanding this language in the pream-
ble, the rule itself appears to condone the use of initial compliance determination
methods (sometimes referred to as compliance "snapshots"), as opposed to methods
capable of determining continuing compliance. See 56 Fed. Reg. 21,776 (May 10,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(c)(6)(iii)(D)) (proposed rule). On the other
hand, the title VII rule as initially conceived by the EPA workgroup, would impose a
monitoring system selection criteria "that will ensure that a monitoring method is
used that is sufficiently reliable and timely to show whether an affected unit is oper-
ating in compliance with the applicable emissions limit or standard." No particular
type of monitoring system will be required, "so long as the selected system provides a
reasonable assurance that any period of noncompliance with the applicable emissions
limit will be identified." PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 4.
231. PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 2-3. The concept of a "deviation" is
62http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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reports must be signed by a responsible corporate official who
shall certify its truth, accuracy and completeness. 23 1 Upon
promulgation, the EM/CC rules will become "applicable re-
quirements" under the Act, necessitating that the permitting
authority include them as enforceable terms and conditions in
each source's operating permit. 33
The EM/CC rules propose to require sources to base com-
pliance certifications on enhanced monitoring data generated
by a system proposed by the source and selected by the per-
mitting authority during the permitting process.3 4 Selection
of the appropriate monitoring system, although flexible, will
require that the monitoring method selected provide sufficient
timely and reliable data to assure that the source is operating
in compliance and that the monitoring system is capable of
reasonably assuring that all periods of noncompliance will be
identified.235 According to the Public Document, the rule
might also require that the selected enhanced monitoring sys-
tem be subject to certain performance specifications, calibra-
tion requirements and quality assurance procedures.2 36 Semi-
annual enhanced monitoring reports, modelled on excess
emission reports currently required under the NSPS, inter
alia, will include the number and duration of deviations from
the enhanced monitoring standard employed, the reasons for
the deviations, if any, preventive or corrective measures
taken, an accounting of monitoring down time and the total
operating time of the emissions unit during the reporting pe-
intended to include any excess emissions or deviation from an established limit. This
includes measurements that fall below a minimum standard (e.g., an incinerator com-
bustion temperature limit) as well as failure to keep records of activities required by
work practice rules (e.g., recording leak detection and repair activity required by the
benzene NESHAP, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 subpart J). In addition, the EPA will have to
define what is meant by "prompt" reporting of deviations since Congress was silent
on the issue.
232. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,774, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 70.5(b)(10), 70.6(c)(2)) (proposed rule).
233. CAA § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (Supp. II 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712,
21,774-76 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 70.6(a)(3), 70.6(c)(1)-(2),
70.6(c)(6)) (proposed rule).
234. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 3-4.
235. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 4.
236. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 5.
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riod.2 7 The Public Document takes the position that all devi-
ations from the enhanced monitoring system requirements
must be reported regardless of whether the source believes a
violation has occurred so that independent determinations
can be made by appropriate authorities and the propriety of
corrective actions can be assessed.238 Additionally, EPA has
suggested that sources found in noncompliance will thereafter
be required to submit quarterly monitoring reports docu-
menting deviations from the applicable requirements of the
Act as expressed in the operating permit.13 9
Under this proposal, enhanced monitoring and compli-
ance certifications would apply to every major stationary
source that is subject to the operating permit requirements.24 °
Under the proposed operating permit rule, a permit for a ma-
jor source must address all applicable requirements for all reg-
ulated emissions units, regardless of whether each emission
unit emits a pollutant for which the source is a major
source.2"1 But under EPA's preliminary approach, the title
VII EM/CC regulations will only apply to emission units at
the source for which the source is classified as "major." '242 In
this paradigm, a "major" source for purposes of the permit-
ting program will have to implement monitoring and certify
compliance covering all regulated emissions units pursuant to
40 C.F.R. part 70 and title V, but will only be required to per-
form "enhanced" monitoring and compliance certification
pursuant to section 114(a)(3) for each emission unit concern-
ing the pollutants for which it is major. Therefore, unfortu-
nately, there is the potential, if not the likelihood, that
sources will have at least two distinct compliance certification
237. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 3; see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(c)
(excess emission reports).
238. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 4.
239. See PUBLIC DOCUMENT, supra note 228, at 1.
240. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,768-69 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.2(r)) (proposed rule); see also CAA §§ 501(2), 502(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(2),
7661a(a) (Supp. II 1990). See supra note 22 for a discussion of "major source" for
purposes of the operating permit program.
241. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,770 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
70.3(c)(1)) (proposed rule); see also Novello, supra note 5, at 10,516.




and monitoring requirements that will have to be complied
with independently.
3. Subpoena Authority
Section 307(a)(1) of the pre-1990 Act permitted the Ad-
ministrator to "issue subpoenas for the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses and the production of relevant papers,
books, and documents, and [to] administer oaths" in a very
limited range of circumstances.2 43 Administrative subpoenas
could only be issued in proceedings related to presidential de-
terminations of regional or national air quality emergencies;
manufacturer requests for waivers of carbon monoxide emis-
sions standards for new light duty vehicles; information re-
quests for the Administrator's report to Congress on the pro-
gress of implementation of new motor vehicle engine
standards for light duty vehicles; and information requests in
support of determinations concerning fuel additive regula-
tions. " ' EPA was not authorized to use administrative sub-
poenas in enforcement actions.245
Consonant with the overall thrust of the Amendments,
which shift the emphasis in air enforcement from federal
courts to the presumptively more expeditious and cost-effec-
tive administrative forum, 4" Congress was intent on updating
the subpoena authority to reflect recent experience under the
Toxic Substances Control Act 24 7 and the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.248
Under these laws subpoenas have proven to be broad, power-
243. CAA § 307(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
244. Id.
245. Indeed, the lack of subpoena authority in the Act posed such a problem for
air enforcement that EPA occasionally utilized TSCA's broadly worded subpoena
provision to develop cases. See TSCA § 111(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c) (1988). A similar
use of the TSCA subpoena authority was memorialized and upheld in EPA v. Alyesko
Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of TSCA subpoena for CWA
investigation).
246. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 361-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3744-45.
247. TSCA § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c) (1988).
248. CERCLA § 109(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)(5) (1988). See S. REP. No. 228,
supra note 1, at 369-70, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3752-53.
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ful, and persuasive enforcement tools. 249
The Amendments greatly expand the scope of matters
subject to subpoena authority. Specific references to manufac-
turer requests for waivers of emissions standards were de-
leted2 50 and the authority was broadened to inquiries in con-
nection with "any investigation, monitoring, reporting
requirement, entry, compliance inspection, or administrative
enforcement proceeding under the Act .... ,,15" The expanded
scope of authority also includes, but is not limited to; federal
enforcement proceedings; requests for information; record-
keeping; inspections; monitoring and entry to facilities; non-
compliance penalty proceedings; solid waste incineration rule
making; new source review orders; mobile source enforcement
proceedings; emergency orders and federal procurement
requirements." 2
The transformed subpoena authority has the potential to
significantly bolster air enforcement case development. For
example, in investigations of building renovations regulated
by the asbestos NESHAP 253 it is frequently not possible for
EPA to determine whether a source has violated the require-
ment that all asbestos containing material be kept adequately
wet during removal unless the inspector visits a site and actu-
ally views the dry removal. Subpoenas could be used to ques-
tion employees under oath about the removal procedures fol-
lowed during a particular suspect renovation. This might help
EPA to discourage the practice of some asbestos contractors
who deny EPA inspectors entry to the site for an inspection
during business hours, necessitating that EPA go through the
time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant for entry. Con-
tractors know that by the time EPA returns with the warrant,
249. See, e.g., EPA v. Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988);
see also John A. Hamill, EPA Administrative Investigative Tools: An Inside Per-
spective, 4 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 85 (1989).
250. Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 703, 104 Stat. 2933, 2681 (1990).
251. CAA § 307(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
252. Id. Earlier versions of the legislation contained, in addition to the enumer-
ated sections ultimately adopted, the catchall phrase "or to otherwise carry out the
provisions of the Act." See, e.g., House Bill as Introduced, supra note 1, § 605; Senate
Report Bill, supra note 1, § 605, 136 CONG. REC. at S76.




the demolition can be halted or completed and solid evidence
of violations can be made unavailable, since information re-
quests under section 114 can only recover "records" or docu-
ments which are frequently not material to proving dry strip-
ping violations. In the future, EPA could issue the subpoena
at the time of the original entry refusal, returnable shortly
thereafter. This will allow EPA to gather fresh testimony of
recollections of the removal operation from those actually in-
volved. EPA could also issue subpoenas to plant operators to
have them explain discrepancies in monitoring reports, acci-
dental releases, or bypasses of control equipment.
Although as of June 1992, EPA has issued only one inves-
tigative subpoena under the Act, 5 ' the authority is likely to
be used aggressively in appropriate circumstances in the fu-
ture. Already, the availability of subpoenas has proven to be
persuasive in encouraging source owners, operators and em-
ployees to voluntarily discuss unexplained, potentially viola-
tive conduct, where in the past EPA was without recourse.
4. "Sufficient Cause" Defenses
Courts have imposed civil penalty liability on owners and
operators that fail to respond to EPA's information requests
under the Act and other statutes. '55 In conjunction with ex-
pansion of the subpoena authority under section 307(a) and
the information collection and compliance certification au-
thority under section 114, Congress also created a defense to
the assessment of penalties for violating these sections when
"sufficient cause" could be shown for failure to comply. '
254. EPA Region V has recently issued the first subpoena under the Amended
Act in an asbestos NESHAP demolition case similar to the circumstances posed
above. EPA Press Release, EPA Uses New Air Act for First Time to Subpoena As-
bestos Information (June 12, 1992).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Hugo Key & Son, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1135 (D.R.I.
1989) (CAA); United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 624 F. Supp. 1185 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1987) (RCRA); United States v. Liviola, 605
F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (RCRA and CERCLA); see generally Hamill, supra
note 249.
256. CAA § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990). Amended section
113(e)(1) states: "The court shall not assess penalties for noncompliance with admin-
istrative subpoenas under section 307(a), or actions under section 114 of this Act
1992]
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Neither the statute nor the legislative history offer any clarifi-
cation of what constitutes "sufficient cause." Applying Fourth
Amendment principles of reasonableness as well as Fifth
Amendment due process requirements, courts have construed
that potential targets may not avoid EPA's information re-
quests unless they have an "objectively reasonable justifica-
tion for refusing to respond."2 57 It seems reasonable to con-
clude that the sufficient cause defense to EPA's information
gathering authority under the Act will be construed similarly.
Thus, a targeted source might legitimately avoid responding
to an information request as well as avoid penalties if the
source can show the inquiry is beyond EPA's delegated au-
thority or is otherwise unlawful. For example, the sufficient
cause defense finds potential application in the area of trade
secret protection. Under sections 307(a) and 114 any trade se-
cret information submitted is entitled to confidential treat-
ment by EPA. 58 In addition, any information submitted
under either section is generally available to the public. 2 9
Thus, one might conclude that "sufficient cause" to violate
would exist where the information requested under sections
114 or 307(a) included trade secrets and the Agency prospec-
tively determined to disclose the information to the public in
where the violator had sufficient cause to violate or fail or refuse to comply with such
subpoena or action." Id. The location of this provision in the penalty assessment sec-
tion of the Amended Act and its characterization as a "defense" suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to allow issues of sufficient cause to be raised outside the context
of an enforcement action, since an enforcement action is the only method for EPA to
obtain civil penalties or for a source to raise any "defense." This provision is consis-
tent with the view that information requests and subpoenas in general are not final
actions and therefore are not subject to pre-enforcement judicial review. See also in-
fra note 261 and supra section II.A.7 (pre-enforcement review of notices of violation,
administrative orders and information requests subsection).
257. U.S. v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1987) (con-
struing RCRA) (additional cases cited therein); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812
F.2d 383, 388-92 (8th Cir. 1987) (construing CERCLA); see also See v. Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applies to review of
administrative subpoenas); supra notes 201-02 (concerning entry and inspection
authorities).
258. CAA §§ 307(a), 114(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(a), 7414(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990);
40 C.F.R. § 2.301 (1991).




contravention of established administrative procedures.260
Perhaps Congress created the defense because it was con-
cerned that the increased liability and stringency in penalty
assessment under the Act would chill persons from asserting
legitimate objections to overly intrusive and unreasonable in-
formation requests. If this was the goal, the defense may pro-
vide only limited comfort from the reach of those sweeping
authorities. Since it is doubtful that either section 114 infor-
mation requests or section 307(a) subpoenas are subject to
pre-enforcement review,"' the aggrieved person will have to
approach EPA informally with a justification for its failure to
comply or wait for EPA to bring an enforcement action to
raise the "sufficient cause" defense. This will still be a high-
risk gamble since under the new section 113(e) (concerning
burden shifting for penalty assessments), once EPA proves its
prima facie case for failure to comply with the information
request or subpoena, for purposes of determining the number
of days of violation, noncompliance will be considered contin-
uous. Sources will face the possibility of substantial penalties
should the court reject application of the "sufficient cause"
defense, but in appropriate cases judges will, of course, have
ample discretion to reduce or eliminate penalties altogether.
5. Use of Independent Contractors for Inspections
Under the pre-1990 Act, EPA's authority to use contrac-
260. The existence of trade secret status does not entitle a party to refuse to
submit the information to EPA, rather it only provides protection from public release
of the information. CAA § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 2.301(e)
(1991). Upon submission of information to EPA, administrative remedies are availa-
ble to contest EPA confidentiality determinations. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 2, sub-
part B (1991). Nevertheless, where a person has reason to believe EPA intended to
release information claimed confidential without complying with the procedural re-
quirements, a source would arguably be justified in not complying with the informa-
tion request.
261. Cf. Wearly v. F.T.C., 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (court dismissed action to
review trade secret status of information subpoenaed by FTC because action not ripe
until subpoena was enforced). See also Dow Chemical v. EPA, 635 F. Supp. 126
(M.D. La. 1986) (section 114 information request not subject to pre-enforcement re-
view), a/f'd on other grounds, 832 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1986); see discussion supra part
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tors to perform inspections was hotly contested. Circuit courts
of appeals split on the issue of whether the term "authorized
representative" (in pre-1990 Act section 114(a)(2)) included
persons employed by EPA on a contract basis for the purpose
of performing inspections and on-site emissions sampling.262 A
dual state of affairs persisted as EPA, standing by its inter-
pretation, continued to affirm its power to use contract in-
spectors in every jurisdiction, except in the sixth and tenth
circuits which had struck down the practice.2 6 EPA guidance
sets out a strategy for pursuing favorable judicial resolution of
the matter in the courts.2 4  During consideration of the
Amendments, Congress was unable to reach a consensus on
whether the practice should be condoned and, as a result, the
Supreme Court may ultimately be called upon to decide the
issue.
Seeking to confirm EPA's position, the Administration's
bill included a provision amending section 114(a)(2) to clarify
that EPA was empowered to use contractors to enter and in-
spect facilities for compliance with the Act.265 In support of its
proposal, the Senate Report pointed to EPA's limited inspec-
262. See Stauffer Chem. Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981) (disallowing
contractor inspections); accord United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174
(6th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 165 (1984). But see Bunker Hill Co.
v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA's use of contractor inspectors);
accord Aluminum Co. of America v. EPA, 663 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1981). See also In re
Litton Indus. Automation Systems, Inc., No. TSCA 1-89-1042 (Oct. 25, 1990) (al-
lowing contractor inspections under TSCA § 11, 42 U.S.C. § 2610 (1988)).
263. See EPA, Use of Contractors to Conduct Clean Air Act Inspections After
the Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., at 3-4
(Feb. 22, 1984).
264. Id.; see also EPA, The Clean Air Act Compliance and Enforcement Man-
ual, at 3-7 to 3-8 (July 22, 1987).
265. House Bill as Introduced, supra note 1, § 604(a). According to the Senate
Report, the provision was modelled on CWA § 308(a)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(B)
(1988) (stating that EPA or its "authorized representative (including an authorized
contractor acting as a representative of [EPA])" may conduct inspections). See S.
REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 369, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3752. The Sen-
ate Bill as Passed, would have amended section 114(a)(2) to read as follows, adding
the information contained in the parenthetical: "the Administrator or his authorized
representative, (including an authorized contractor acting as a representative of the
Administrator), upon presentation of his credentials" may enter and inspect facilities





tion resources and the Agency's frequent need for specialists
knowledgeable of unique industrial processes.26 6 In contrast,
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce reported the
Administration's bill, H.R. 3030, out of committee after ex-
plicitly deleting the provision approving the use of contract
inspectors and declined to confirm the position that under the
pre-1990 Act, EPA possessed the authority to use contractors
for inspections.267 The committee was apparently concerned
about conflicts of interest and the potential for compromise of
trade secrets and other confidential information. The commit-
tee made it clear that, in its view, "only Federal employees
and officials should carry out [inspection] activities."26 The
final conference agreement failed to adopt the Senate lan-
guage and is silent on the contractor inspection issue, as is the
conference report.26 9 Representative Dingell, a House manager
of the Amendments and a member of the House-Senate con-
ference committee, apparently believed the silence should be
interpreted as a prohibition on EPA's use of contract inspec-
tors. 70 In contrast, the Statement of Senate Managers sug-
gests that the absence of any explicit congressional language
clarifying the issue means EPA should interpret the silence to
allow the continued use of contractors for inspections. 7 1
EPA's 1984 contractor inspection policy remains in effect
and the Agency has made no public indication that it intends
to disavow the use of contract inspectors. Indeed, to the con-
266. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 369, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3752.
267. See H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 395-96.
268. H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 396. The Senate version also addressed
the trade secret concern by reaffirming that their misappropriation was criminally
actionable. See Senate Report Bill, supra note 1, § 604(b), 136 CONG. REC. at S76; S.
REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 369, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3752 (discussing
proposed amendment to section 114(c) subjecting contractors to criminal liability
under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 for unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets).
269. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 952, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3879-80.
270. See 136 CONG. REC. E3714 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (extension of remarks
made on Oct. 26, 1990 by Rep. Dingell) ("Congress did not authorize the use of con-
tractors for enforcement ....").
271. Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952-53 (discussed
under "contractor listings" section).
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trary, in its proposed operating permits regulation, EPA has
explicitly required each permit to include, in addition to in-
spection and entry requirements, a provision allowing the use
of an authorized representative of the permitting authority,
defined as "including an authorized contractor acting as a rep-
resentative of the Administrator," to conduct inspections.2 72
Predictably, in light of the heated debate surrounding the is-
sue, this provision has been criticized.2 7 In the end, resolution
of this issue will likely be decided by the courts without the
benefit of clear guidance in the legislative history.
C. Liability, Penalties and Sanctions
The Amendments effectuated a number of important
changes in the provisions concerning liability, penalties and
sanctions. Among the pre-1990 Act's shortcomings was en-
forcement authorization for only a select number of specified
provisions of the Act.2 7 ' In addition, ambiguities in the draft-
ing of the Act and years of implementation and litigation re-
vealed that many of the Act's key provisions relating to liabil-
ity and penalties were susceptible to conflicting
interpretations. Adverse Clean Water Act case law had cast
doubt on EPA's longstanding interpretation that the statutory
maximum penalties under the Clean Air Act applied to each
violation, regardless of the number of violations on one day,
and to each day of multi-day averaging periods.7 5 Other case
law questioned the type of proof necessary for EPA to prove
continuing violations and the manner in which courts should
determine penalty assessment. 76
272. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,775 (May 10, 1991) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. §
70.6(c)(3)) (proposed rule).
273. See Novello, supra note 5, at 10,520 n.95.
274. For example, pre-1990 Act section 113(b)(3) only allowed EPA to initiate a
civil action for violations of sections 111(e) (NSPS), 112(c) (NESHAPs), 119(g) (con-
cerning pre-1977 Act suspension conditions in fuel-shortage related temporary com-
pliance date extensions), 113(d)(5) (concerning coal conversion sources), 119 (primary
nonferrous smelter orders), 323 (relating to the cost of certain vapor recovery equip-
ment) or any regulation under Part B of the Act (relating to ozone). See CAA §
113(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(3) (1988) (amended 1990).
275. See infra notes 280-81 and 312 and accompanying text.




The Amendments redress most of the infirmities in the
pre-1990 Act concerning liability, penalties and sanctions. Im-
portantly, the Amendments subject sources to enforcement
for violation of "any" "requirement or prohibition" of all ti-
tles of the Act, except title II concerning mobile sources. ' "
Liability now clearly attaches for violations "including, but
not limited to, a requirement or prohibition of any rule, order,
waiver or permit promulgated, issued, or approved under the
Act" and for payment of any fees owed to the United
States. '78 Additionally, as discussed below, the Amendments
clarified that in judicial cases the statutory maximum penalty
applies to each violation irrespective of the number of viola-
tions on one day. Once EPA proves its prima facie case, in
many cases continuing violations can be presumed. The dura-
tion of violations can be established by any credible evidence
and the criteria for penalty assessment has been clarified.
Further, the Amendments strengthen the federal procurement
bar applicable to criminal and civil violators of the Act. How-
ever, the Amendments also create some unfortunate new po-
tential ambiguities concerning the maximum liability expo-
sure to which a source is subject under the administrative
penalty order and field citation authorities.
1. Statutory Maximum Liability
Under the pre-1990 Act civil penalties were authorized up
to amounts of "not more than $25,000 per day of violation. 2 79
EPA interpreted this language to mean $25,000 per day for
each violation. 280 However, EPA was vulnerable to the argu-
277. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. I 1990). The "amendments fill an
important gap in the Act, which currently does not subject the violators of any [sic]
significant regulations and orders to criminal and civil sanctions." S. REP. No. 228,
supra note 1, at 361, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3744. Title II of the Act, concern-
ing mobile sources, has its own enforcement provisions. See CAA § 205, 42 U.S.C. §
7524 (Supp. II 1990).
278. CAA § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
279. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (amended 1990).
280. See EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy, at 6-7
(Sept. 12, 1984) (per day of each violation interpretation implicit in discussion of
litigation practicalities); EPA, Clean Air Act Stationary Source Civil Penalty Policy,
at 7 (Mar. 25, 1987) (same); see also, e.g., United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp.
1992]
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ment that the "per day of violation" language imposed a
$25,000 daily cap on penalties regardless of the number of
separate violations that occurred during a single day.2s ' To
forestall this outcome, clarification of statutory maximum lia-
bility was a key goal of the Amendments.
Concerning civil judicial actions, the Amendments codi-
fied EPA's interpretation and amended the maximum liability
language in the statute to "$25,000 per day for each viola-
tion." 2 However, as concerns administrative penalty author-
ity and field citations, Congress may have unwittingly resur-
rected the pre-1990 ambiguity by again stating maximum
liability in terms of "per day of violation." The legislative his-
tory of the administrative penalty and field citation provisions
does not show whether Congress intended the provisions to be
interpreted- differently from the section 113(b) civil judicial
language, as clarified by the Amendments, and opens these
provisions to challenge.
The legislative proposals introduced in each chamber
concerning civil penalty liability and the statutory maximum
days of violation were directed at clarifying existing authority
concerning the "per day of violation" language in the pre-1990
Act.2 3 Concerning administrative penalty orders, field cita-
1110, 1125-26 (D. Md. 1987) (EPA sought more than $25,000 for several violations on
the same day); United States' Memorandum in Opposition to SCM's Motion in
Limine and SCM's Motion to Conform the Relief Sought by Plaintiff, at 4, United
States v. SCM Corp., No. R-85-9 (D. Md. Sept. 15, 1986) (quoting the complaint
requesting penalties of "not more than $25,000 per day of each violation"): Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings, at 19-25, United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp., No. 82-2623-
IH (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1984) (bench ruling announcing decision against Kaiser, up-
holding government position that statutory maximum penalties under CAA section
113(b) are properly construed to be per day for each violation, and imposing statu-
tory maximum penalties for each of 33 violations).
281. This argument was successfully made to restrict EPA's interpretation of
similar language in the CWA. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
611 F. Supp. 1542, 1554-56 (D.C. Va. 1985) (interpreting "$10,000 per day of such
violation" in CWA to mean a maximum $10,000 per day liability, regardless of the
number of violations), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
282. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
283. Integral to that effort was the proposal to create a new "Penalty Assessment
Criteria" section to further clarify penalty liability. CAA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)
(Supp. 11 1990). As stated by the Senate committee considering the Administration's
[Vol. 9
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tions and penalty assessment criteria, the Senate and House
bills introduced in the 101st Congress were identical in clari-
fying that in each case violations were per day for "each viola-
tion."2 " In the House, the bill was subsequently modified
(without any explanation) which resulted in, inter alia, dele-
tion of the word "each" from all relevant sections of the
bill.2 a This version of the House bill was approved and sent
to the conference committee.28
In the Senate, subsequent to the committee report of the
bill, the field citation and penalty assessment criteria were
amended. For field citations the maximum penalty was
changed to "not to exceed $5,000 per inspection" and total
penalties were capped at $25,000 per facility over a six month
period.287 Otherwise, the "per day for each violation" language
proposal, the goal was for administrative penalty assessments "to be calculated using
the same criteria specified in section 113(e) for use in section 113(b) court actions." S.
RP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 364, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747. Through-
out the legislative process, the Senate consistently advocated application of the same
statutory maximum and penalty assessment criteria to both administrative penalties
and judicial penalties assessed under section 113(b).
284. See House Bill as Introduced, supra note 1, § 601(1), (m); Senate Bill as
Introduced, supra note 1, § 301(h), (i), 135 CONG. REC. at S11,157. After mark up by
the Senate committee, the bill retained the same "each violation" language. Although
the bill was not changed, the Senate Report explained that "[as a complimentary
power to the Act's current civil penalty authority, new section 113(d) authorizes as-
sessments of civil administrative penalties up to the same statutory maximum con-
tained in section 113(b) for civil judicial penalties ($25,000 per day for each viola-
tion)." S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 364-65, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3747-48 (the report also stated that "the amendment sets a cap of $200,000 on admin-
istrative assessments for any one violation.") (emphasis added).
285. See House Report Bill, supra note 1, § 601, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 490
supra note 1, at 134-5 (penalty orders: "per day of violation"), 135 (field citation:
"per day of violation") and 136 (penalty assessment criteria: "each day of violation").
The penalty assessment criteria section continued to apply to all civil subsections of
section 113, including section 113(d). Id. § 601, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 490 at 136.
Neither the motivation nor the rationale for these changes is discussed in the House
Report. See id., reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 490 at 393-94.
286. House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601, 136 CONG. REc. at H3233-35.
287. Senate Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601(i), 136 CONG. REc. at S4437 (em-
phasis added). Consistent with these changes, the penalty assessment criteria was
also altered so that the duration of the violation section (section 113(e)(2)) no longer
applied to field citations. Id. § 601(j), 136 CONG. REC. at S4437. Presumably this was
necessary since maximum penalties were limited on the basis of each "inspection,"
not per day of violation. There does not appear to be any explanation for these
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was retained. This version of the Senate bill went to the con-
ference committee.
The conference agreement adopted the House "per day of
violation" version of the field citation program.288 Concerning
administrative penalty orders, language identical to the House
"per day of violation" formulation was agreed upon, however,
according to the Statement of Senate Managers, the adopted
language was meant to give effect to the proposed Senate ver-
sion of the law289 which had provided that maximum penalties
were "per day for each violation." The legislative history pro-
vides no indication whether the omission of "each" was inten-
tional or inadvertent, though according to the Statement of
Senate Managers, the final language was intended to
"clariffy] that the penalties can amount to as much as
$25,000 per day of violation...290
Inevitably, arguments will be made that Congress consid-
ered and rejected maximum penalties per day for each viola-
tion for the field citation and administrative penalty pro-
grams. Viewing the legislative history as a whole, however, a
more compelling argument can be made that Congress' expan-
sive clarification in section 113(b) applies of equal force to the
"per day of violation" language in section 113(d). Congress
clearly expressed its intention in the Amendments to "clarify"
that the "per day of violation" language in pre-1990 Act sec-
tion 113(b) should be interpreted broadly to mean "per day of
each violation."29' The mere reiteration of the "per day of vio-
changes in the legislative history.
288. CAA § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (Supp. II 1990); see also Statement
of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,951-52. Arguably, this constituted an ex-
pansion of the more limited "per inspection" language in the Senate bill.
289. Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,951-52.
290. Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952 (emphasis added).
Concerning the duration of the violation penalty assessment criteria, the conference
agreement adopted the language of the House bill (which stated that a "penalty may
be assessed for each day of violation") and the Senate language excluding field cita-
tions from consideration under section 113(e)(2). See Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 701, 104 Stat. 2679 (1990). But once again, according to
the Statement of Senate Managers, the final language of both provisions was derived
from the Senate bill. See Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952.
291. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 359, 364, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3742, 3747; H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 390-91.
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lation" language in the administrative penalty order and field
citation sections of the statute, without any congressional ex-
planation, does not support the inference that Congress in-
tended the phrase to have a more restrictive meaning. More-
over, congressional "clarification" of the perceived ambiguity
ratified long standing EPA policy and practice. If Congress
had intended a more restrictive meaning it could have
amended the language accordingly or, at least, discussed its
intention to limit liability in the legislative history. During
consideration of the Amendments the only intention Congress
expressed on this topic was to expansively interpret the per
day of violation language to apply to "each violation." Con-
gressional silence should not be interpreted to overcome an
expressed contrary congressional intention in the statutory
scheme and legislative history. 92 Nevertheless, in light of the
292. Generally, courts must give effect to congressional intent where Congress
has "directly spoken" to the question at issue. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837, 842-3 (1984). To determine whether Congress has directly spoken, courts
must examine "the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and
design of the statute as a whole." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988). Courts must employ "traditional tools of statutory construction," to divine
congressional intent. NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987)). Courts should also be
reluctant to draw inferences from congressional inaction, Schneidewind v. ANR Pipe-
line Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306 (1988); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 220 (1983), and cognizant that congres-
sional silence or " 'mute intermediate legislative maneuvers' are not reliable indica-
tors of congressional intent." Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722 (1989) (quoting
Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947) and citing Drummond Coal Co. v.
Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 474 (11th Cir. 1984) (unexplained omission of one word from
conference bill is unreliable indicator of congressional intent)).
While it is well settled that courts are to give effect to the "plain meaning" of a
statute, there has been little consensus on the role of legislative history in discerning
plain meaning. See generally 2A JABEZ G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1989) (examining judicial use of legisla-
tive history). Nevertheless, it has been said that "[lIanguage never seems plain
enough in its meaning to forestall the hunt for enlightenment in the legislative ...
context," and courts routinely consult legislative history for such wisdom. Patricia M.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 216 (1983). In the Amendments it seems clear that
Congress "spoke" in both the statutory scheme and legislative history as a whole in
support of statutory maximum penalties for each day of each violation, expressing a
will worthy of judicial deference.
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drafting ambiguity created by the inconsistent penalty liabil-
ity language in the Amendments, court resolution of the issue
may become necessary.
2. Penalty Assessment Criteria
Penalty assessment determinations under the pre-1990
Act required courts, in addition to "other factors," to take
into consideration three specific criteria: (1) the size of the
business; (2) the economic impact of the penalty on the busi-
ness; and (3) the seriousness of the violation. 93 Unfortunately,
these vague criteria made it difficult for the courts to consist-
ently apply the section 113(b) penalty factors.2 94 The Amend-
ments attempted to provide better guidance by clarifying and
expanding the penalty assessment criteria.
a. Penalty Assessment Factors
The Amendments created a new section 113(e) entitled
"Penalty Assessment Criteria." In addition to clarifying and
harmonizing various conflicting judicial interpretations, the
Amendments added four new penalty assessment factors to be
considered by the courts295 in fixing a penalty, all of which
were already addressed to some degree by the EPA's Civil
293. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (amended 1990).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana Pacific Co., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1163-66
(D. Colo. 1988) (court assessed $65,000 for more than 30 days of knowing PSD viola-
tions, without determining the statutory maximum penalty; section 113(b) factors
need not be treated equally or given equal weight); United States v. SCM Corp., 667
F. Supp. 1110, 1125-28 (D. Md. 1987) ($350,000 penalty assessed for 30 days of viola-
tions; statutory maximum determined; section 113(b) factors addressed); United
States v. Arkwright, 697 F. Supp. 1229 (D.N.H. 1988) (court interpreted its discretion
under section 113(b) to allow it to disregard six and one-half months of violations for
penalty calculation purposes); United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 639 F. Supp.
770, 779-80 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (assessing a penalty of over $6 million for over 1000
violations: no statutory maximum determination; section 113(b) factors addressed);
cf. United States v. Mac's Muffler Shop, Inc., C85-138R, slip op. at 15, 17 (N.D. Ga.
Nov. 4, 1983) (analogizing section 205 of the Act to section 113 and applying common
law rule of remedies to determine penalty assessment).
295. The penalty assessment factors, including assessments for continuing viola-
tions as discussed below, also apply to penalty assessments in citizen suits brought
under section 304(a) of the Act and administrative actions under section 113(d). CAA
§ 113(e)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1), (2) (Supp. II 1990).
[Vol. 9
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Penalty Policy (e.g. economic benefit of noncompliance and
good faith efforts to comply).2 96 The four new factors are: (1)
the violator's full compliance history and good faith efforts to
comply; (2) the duration of the violation as established by any
credible evidence (including evidence other than the applica-
ble test method);"9 7 (3) previous payment by the violator of
penalties assessed for the same violation; and (4) the eco-
nomic benefit of noncompliance.298 With these additions, pen-
alty assessment requirements under the CAA will be virtually
identical to requirements in the CWA as amended in 1987.299
Indeed, the Statement of Senate Managers makes it clear that
the Act's penalty assessment criteria "are intended to be ap-
plied in the same manner under this Act as the similar criteria
296. See supra note 280 (citations to stationary source civil penalty policies).
297. The CWA has no comparable provision. The new Act provision concerning
the duration of violation will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
298. CAA § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990). Adoption of the
penalty assessment factors by Congress was not contentious and except for minor
changes in syntax, the final law contained language identical to the provisions pro-
posed by the Administration and approved by both House and Senate committees.
The one key distinction was that the Conference Committee adopted the House ver-
sion which applied the penalty assessment factors to courts and the Administrator -
and thereby to decisions of Administrative Law Judges - where the Senate bill only
applied them to the courts. Compare House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601, 136
CONG. REC. at H3235 with Senate Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601(6), 136 CONG.
REc. at S4437; see also Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952. Con-
gress was particularly concerned that when determining penalty assessments the
courts and the Administrator consider the economic benefit the violator derived from
noncompliance. See id. at S16,952 ("Violators should not be able to obtain an eco-
nomic benefit vis-a-vis their competitors as a result of their noncompliance with envi-
ronmental laws. The determination of economic benefit or other factors will not re-
quire an elaborate or burdensome evidentiary showing. Reasonable approximations of
ecnomnic [sic] benefit will suffice."). This language sets out a virtually identical con-
gressional intention as expressed in the legislative history of the 1987 amendments to
the CWA. See S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1985).
299. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313(c), 101 Stat. 7, 45
(1987). Compare CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) with CAA § 113(e)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). As noted above, and further discussed below, one
critical distinction between the two laws is that the amended CAA contains the dura-
tion of the violation assessment requirement. The addition of this provision, in con-
junction with the presumption and burden shift factor set out in section 113(e)(2),
will likely result in increased penalty assessments. Another distinction is that the
CWA does not contain a provision explicitly accounting for previous payments for the
same penalties.
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that were added to the Clean Water Act in 1987. ''300
Under the Clean Water Act, courts have begun to estab-
lish a body of penalty assessment case law for wastewater dis-
charges that has added greater predictability to the penalty
assessment phase of CWA cases.30 1 In the leading case under
the Clean Water Act, Atlantic States Legal Foundation v.
Tyson Foods, the appeals court reversed and remanded the
district court's decision to award no penalties based solely on
the violator's good faith efforts to comply with the law.302  The
circuit court stated that on remand the district court should
first determine the maximum statutory fine for which Tyson
could be held liable, and then "if [the court chose] not to im-
pose the maximum, it must reduce the fine in accordance with
the factors set out in [CWA] section 1319(d), clearly indicat-
ing the weight it gives to each of the factors in the statute and
the factual findings that support its conclusions." 0 3 This in-
terpretation of the statute has been followed in other CWA
cases, 3 0 and to date, at least one court has already explicitly
applied the Tyson penalty assessment analysis to the
amended CAA for penalty assessment purposes. 5 Should this
300. Statement of Senate Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952.
301. CWA § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
302. 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990). Although decided earlier than Tyson, the
SCM court also appears to have followed a similar approach. United States v. SCM
Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (D. Md. 1987).
303. 897 F.2d at 1142.
304. United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,073,
21,074 (S.D. Ind. 1991) ("In determining the appropriate penalty, first, the statutory
maximum penalty must be determined. Second, the Court reduces the penalty in ac-
cordance with factors indicated by Congress."). A consistent result was reached in
Public Interest Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
80-81 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991), where the court agreed with
the district court's assessment of statutory maximum penalties reduced by amounts
derived by applying the penalty assessment factors mandated by the CWA section
309(d), but ruled erroneous the district court's $1,000,000 penalty reduction on the
basis of the purported nonfeasance of EPA and the state. The court ruled the reduc-
tion erroneous because state and EPA nonfeasance was not an enumerated factor for
which a penalty reduction could be given under the statute and, given earlier rulings
by the district court, the court could not even imply that the district court relied on
the "as justice may require" criterion in the statute. Id. The court remanded for a
determination of the penalty without any reduction. Id.
305. In United States v. Mactal Constr. Co., No. 89-2372, slip op. at 5 (D. Kan.
Mar. 31, 1992), the court followed the Tyson and Powell Duffryn finding that "the
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doctrine take hold in future air cases, the penalties assessed in
judicial and administrative actions could become more pre-
dictable and uniform, resulting in larger penalties and an en-
hanced deterrence message to would-be violators.
b. Duration of Violation
Proving the duration of violations under the pre-1990 Act
was sometimes a difficult task, especially since one court con-
cluded that once EPA had proved its prima facie case it could
not shift the burden of showing continuous compliance to the
defendant. In United States v. SCM Corp.,306 the court held
that to prove continuing violations EPA must affirmatively
prove each day of violation through the use of potentially ex-
pensive reference test methods."0 ' Another court excluded
proof of otherwise relevant evidence of continuous violations
derived from continuous emissions monitors and expert testi-
point of departure for imposing a civil penalty under the Act is the statutory maxi-
mum." The court also held that each of the section 113(e) factors must be examined
to determine if mitigation of the maximum penalty is warranted. Id. at 5-6. However,
going beyond Tyson and Powell Duffryn, the court held that Congress intended the
economic benefit of the violation to be "the floor below which the maximum penalty
should not be mitigated." Id. at 8. In its examination of the section 113(e) factor
concerning the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, the court found
Mactal had demonstrated an inability to pay the maximum penalty. Id. at 7. Accord-
ingly, the court reduced the statutory maximum fine to $126,000, the entire economic
benefit of the violation. Id. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is-
sued an unpublished opinion in which it reversed and remanded a district court's
$3.02 million CAA civil penalty assessment on summary judgment, holding that the
district court erroneously concluded there were no material facts in issue as to three
of the penalty assessment factors. United States v. Vista Paint Corp., No. 92-55160
(9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1992). The court did not reach the question of whether the Clean
Water Act penalty assessment analysis should be applied to the CAA, although the
district court's determination had implicitly followed Tyson and Powell Duffryn. See
United States v. Vista Paint Corp., No. CV 90-6449-R (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1992)
(amended order) at 16 (penalty assessment began with the calculation of statutory
maximum penalty and was reduced based on section 113(e) factors).
306. 667 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Md. 1987). The court reached its result even though
it concluded "there is little doubt that had stack tests been performed with greater
regularity . . . , a substantial number of additional violations might have been identi-
fied." Id. The court did, however, leave open the possibility of inferential proof of
additional days of violation if testing on a routine and periodic basis showed a pat-
tern of emissions at a facility. Id.
307. Id. at 1124-25.
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mony.30 These restricted readings of the Act hampered EPA's
ability to prove certain continuous violations, or even ongoing
sporadic violations, and precluded the assessment of penalties
for each day of violation. The practical effect was to down-
grade the seriousness of such violations and EPA's ability to
demand full accountability for noncompliant activity.
Congress decisively resolved this issue by establishing a
novel and explicit statutory scheme setting forth the bases for
determinations of the duration of violations for penalty as-
sessment purposes.3 9 The penalty assessment criteria now
clarify that, at least for penalty assessment purposes, the du-
ration of the violation can be "established by any credible evi-
dence (including evidence other than the applicable test
method)." 310 Congress also clarified that "[a] penalty may be
assessed for each day of violation," 31 1 apparently intending
this provision to apply to a penalty assessment for each day of
a multi-day averaging period. 12 In addition, section 113(e)
added two new defenses to civil penalties for justifiable viola-
tions of section 114 information requests and section 307(a)
308. United States v.. Kaiser Steel Corp., No. 82-2623-IH (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17,
1984) (the court excluded circumstantial, non-reference test method evidence from
use in determining the length of violation).
309. See CAA § 113(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
310. CAA § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Supp. II 1990). As the legislative
history makes clear, this statutory language was aimed to legislatively overturn
United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp., No 82-2623-IH (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1984), as con-
cerned exclusion of relevant evidence of violation for penalty assessment purposes;
see also S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 366, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3749.
Unlike the Senate Report Bill, the Senate Bill as Passed concerning section 113(e)(1)
did not include the word "any" before "credible evidence." Senate Bill as Passed,
supra note 1, § 601(6), 136 CONG. REc. at S4437. However, on this issue the conference
committee adopted the House version of section 113(e)(1), which like the Senate Re-
port Bill, contained the words "any credible evidence." See Statement of Senate
Managers, supra note 1, at S16,952; see also House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, §
601, 136 CONG. REC. at H3235.
311. CAA § 113(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
312. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 366, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3749 (citing with approval Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 484 U.S. 49
(1987)). In Gwaltney, under the pre-1987 CWA, the court held that a violation of a
monthly averaging period should be deemed to be a violation of each day in that
month. 791 F.2d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 1986); accord Tyson, 897 F.2d 1128, 1139 (11th
Cir. 1990) (construing post-1987 CWA).
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administrative subpoenas. 31 3
c. Presumption of Continuing Violation
New section 113(e)(2) spells out how the number of days
of violation should be determined for penalty assessment pur-
poses.31 Where the applicable agency has notified 5 the
source that it is in violation, and makes out a prima facie
showing that the violation is "likely to have recurred or con-
tinued past the date of notice, the days of violation shall be
presumed to include the date of such notice and each and
every day thereafter until the violator establishes that contin-
uous compliance has been achieved ...."316 The intent of this
provision is to shift the burden of proving continuing compli-
ance to the violating source.3 17 In addition, once the burden
has shifted to the source, the source must rebut the presump-
tion of continuous noncompliance by showing intermittent
days of compliance or that the violation was not continuing in
nature by a preponderance of the evidence.3 18
Thus, under the new penalty assessment criteria, where a
source has not been given notice of its violation, EPA can rely
on any credible and relevant evidence to establish the dura-
313. CAA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (Supp. II 1990); see also discussion supra
part II.B.4 ("sufficient cause" defenses subsection).
314. Section 113(e)(2) applies to civil actions (section 113(b)), noncompliance
penalties (section 120), administrative penalty actions (section 113(d)(1)), citizen suit
penalties (section 304(a)), and all civil penalty assessments except field citations (sec-
tion 113(d)(3)). CAA § 113(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(2) (Supp. I 1990).
315. The House bill did not require any notice, it merely set out that violations
were presumed to be continuous from the first provable date of violation. House Bill
as Passed, supra note 1, § 601, 136 CONG. REC. at H3235. Since the statute does not
define what type of notice (e.g. written, oral, etc.) is sufficient for purposes of invok-
ing section 113(e)(2), the issue is also likely to require judicial resolution. However,
EPA is likely to rely on written notices of violation whenever possible.
316. CAA § 113(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1990).
317. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 366, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3749 (the burden shift is "appropriate because the source is in a better position than
EPA to establish its compliance status.").
318. CAA § 113(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1990). One of the stated
purposes of enactment of this provision was to overrule SCM on the burden shifting
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tion of violation. Additionally, where a source has been given
notice of the violation and EPA proves a prima facie case of a
likely continuing violation, the burden shifts to the source to
prove the date of compliance up to which the violation will be
deemed continuous. Under either scenario EPA now has suc-
cinct, powerful authority to hold violators accountable for
lengthy periods of noncompliance where in the past decisional
law rendered EPA's authority equivocal at best. Another col-
lateral effect of these changes is that the Act will place a
much higher premium on source maintenance of sufficient
monitoring and reporting procedures to help them marshal
the proof to rebut the presumption of continuous violations,
and evade assessment of potentially serious penalties for peri-
ods of presumptive noncompliance. This provision is far-
reaching and unprecedented in environmental law. It is cer-
tain to result in far stiffer penalties than was the case under
the pre-1990 Act and it creates another strong disincentive to
pursue unmeritorious cases to judicial conclusion.
3. Federal Procurement Bar - Contractor Listing
Pursuant to section 306 of the pre-1990 Act, EPA has ad-
ministered a contractor listing program that bars certain vio-
lators of the Act from receiving federal contract monies."1 9
The congressional goal of the program is to prohibit the use of
federal procurement funds to subsidize violators of the Act or
allow violating companies to realize a competitive advantage
based on the cost-savings realized by the violative conduct.32 0
Pre-1990 Act section 306(a) prohibited violators of certain
enumerated criminal provisions of the Act 3 1 from receiving
319. The regulations governing the contractor listing program are found at 40
C.F.R. pt. 15 (1991). The contractor listing program also applies to violations of the
CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 15.1 (1991).
320. Edward E. Reich, Contractor Listing: Powerful Sanction for Encouraging
Environmental Compliance, 6 NAT'L. ENVTL. ENF. J. 5, 5-6 (Nov. 1991).
321. Section 306(a) of the pre-1990 Act required mandatory listing for criminal
violations of section 113(c)(1). CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (1988) (amended
1990). Pre-1990 Act section 113(c)(1) made it a crime to knowingly violate a SIP
requirement, nonferrous smelter orders, delayed compliance and administrative com-
pliance orders issued under section 113(a), knowing violations of the NSPS and
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federal contracts, grants, or loans to be performed at a facility
that was the locus of violative conduct.32 2 Upon conviction, a
violating facility was automatically disqualified from future
procurement activities with all federal agencies and placed on
a list which was periodically transmitted to the General Ser-
vices Administration to provide notice of the disqualifica-
tion. 23 EPA views this program, referred to as "mandatory"
listing,324 as a collateral consequence of the criminal convic-
tion. s25 Pursuant to pre-1990 Act section 306(c) and an execu-
tive order, EPA also instituted a "discretionary" listing pro-
gram that permits EPA to list a facility that is involved in
"continuing and recurring" civil violations of the Act.326 The
pre-1990 Act listing authority extended only to the individual
facility involved in the violation.32 7
NESHAP requirements, certain noncompliance penalty provisions and ozone require-
ments. See CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1988) (amended 1990). Criminal
violations for knowing false statements, recordkeeping and reporting, prohibited by
section 113(c)(2), were not bases for listing under the pre-1990 Act's section 306(a).
See CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (1988) (amended 1990).
322. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (1988) (amended 1990).
323. 40 C.F.R. §§ 15.2 (scope), 15.4 (definition of "List of Violating Facilities"),
15.31 (government-wide agency regulations) and 15.40 (transmittal of the list to GSA)
(1991).
324. 40 C.F.R. § 15.10 (1991).
325. See Jonathan S. Cole, EPA's Contractor Listing Program: A List You Do
Not Want to Make, 2 FED. FACILITIES ENVTL. J. 129, 131 (1991).
326. CAA § 306(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(c) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 15.11 (1991). Execu-
tive Order 11602 established the authority for the discretionary listing program under
section 306(c) of the Act. See Executive Order 11602, 36 Fed. Reg. 12,475 (July 1,
1971). Subsequently, a superseding executive order was issued to accommodate enact-
ment of the CWA listing authority. CWA § 508, 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988); see Execu-
tive Order 11738, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,161 (Sept. 12, 1973). Courts have upheld EPA's
discretionary listing regulations and authority as a proper exercise of its remedial
power. United States v. United States Steel, 10 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1751, 1752
(N.D. Ill. 1977); see also United States v. Interlake, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ill.
1977); United States v. Del Monte, 9 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1495, 1496 (D.P.R.
1976). See also In re Big Apple Wrecking Co., EPA Contractor Listing Docket No.
88-D-02 (Aug. 5, 1991) (construing "continuing and recurring" violation language in
40 C.F.R. pt. 15).
327. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (1988) (amended 1990); see also 40
C.F.R. § 15.2(a) (1991). The definition of "facility" at 40 C.F.R. § 15.4 has been inter-
preted broadly by EPA. See Determination Regarding Exxon Co., U.S.A.'s Petition
for Determination of Independent Facilities, EPA Listing Docket No. 02-91-L034
(Sept. 30, 1991) at 11-13; In re Big Apple Wrecking Co., EPA Contractor Listing
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The Amendments strengthen the pre-1990 Act contractor
listing program and expand EPA's mandatory listing author-
ity by allowing EPA to "extend [the federal contract] prohibi-
tion to other facilities owned and operated by the convicted
person."328 In addition, the conviction of any crime under sec-
tion 113 of the Act, without restriction, will now result in au-
tomatic listing of the facility involved in the violation. 29 In
light of this strong congressional reaffirmation of the listing
authority, EPA's commitment to reinvigorate criminal en-
forcement of the Act,33 and recent policy pronouncements by
the Agency,3 1 the consequences of these changes to section
306 could prove to be far reaching. Indeed, EPA has expressed
its intention to utilize the listing option more aggressively in
the future.3 2
Under the pre-1990 Act, criminal prosecutions for viola-
tions of the Act were virtually nonexistent.33 This was due in
part to the limited range of substantive crimes that gave rise
to the prohibition. Also, many of the violations carried only
misdemeanor status, which have difficulty commanding lim-
ited criminal enforcement resources. If current EPA trends to-
wards increased criminal enforcement continue as expected,
an increasing number of companies will find themselves sub-
Docket No. 88-D-02 (Aug. 5, 1991).
328. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (Supp. II 1990).
329. The Amendments expanded the listing prohibition to all crimes under sec-
tion 113(c) (including criminal false statements, record keeping and reporting), by
striking the reference to section 113(c)(1). See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 705(1), 104 Stat. 2399, 2682 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7606 (Supp. II 1990)) (emphasis added). The final House bill included language ex-
tending listing to mobile sources, but the references to mobile sources were removed
in conference. See House Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 606(1), 136 CONG. REc. at
H3235.
330. See Strock, EPA Enforcement Priorities, supra note 4, at 12; see Pollution
Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 202, 104 Stat. 2962-63 (1990) (EPA
authorized to hire 200 new criminal inspectors by 1995).
331. See EPA Policy Regarding the Role of Corporate Attitude, Policies, Prac-
tices, and Procedures, in Determining Whether to Remove a Facility From The EPA
List of Violating Facilities Following a Criminal Conviction [hereinafter Corporate
Attitude Policy], 56 Fed. Reg. 64,785 (Dec. 12, 1991). See Reich, supra note 320, at 5.
332. See Reich, supra note 320, at 7; see also Strock, Stationary Source Enforce-
ment, supra note 4, at 259 and Cole, supra note 325, at 129, 135.




ject to criminal prosecution and the prospect that a plea
agreement will not relieve the facility involved in the violation
from automatic prohibition from future receipt of federal pro-
curement and nonprocurement monies. 334
In the past, parties charged with several crimes under the
Act had the option of negotiating pleas to counts that did not
invoke mandatory listing.335 With the removal of the restric-
tion on the type of violations that result in listing under the
Act, parties considering a plea for Clean Air Act crimes have
lost that potentially invaluable option. 336 EPA has also re-
cently indicated that neither mandatory listing nor the timing
of removal from the List of Violating Facilities (the "List")
are an appropriate subject of criminal plea negotiations. 337
Under current regulations, a facility that has been placed on
the List for a criminal conviction remains there until the As-
sistant Administrator for Enforcement "certifies that the con-
dition giving rise to mandatory listing has been corrected. '3 1
Recent policy pronouncements by EPA clarify that since
the determination to remove a facility from the List resides
with the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, the deci-
sion cannot be made by the United States Attorney in a crim-
inal plea bargain. 3 The Agency has stated that,
[n]o binding agreement as to the timing or result of any
request for removal from the EPA List of Violating Facil-
ities may be a part of plea negotiations or a plea agree-
ment. Mandatory contractor listing is thus not a permissi-
ble subject of so-called 'global settlements' that purport
to settle all criminal and civil liability resulting from cer-
334. Cole, supra note 325, at 129 n.1.
335. For example, pleas to criminal violations of section 113(c)(2) of the pre-1990
Act did not result in listing.
336. However, in cases where crimes are charged under multiple environmental
statutes, for example RCRA and the CAA, defendants might still seek to avoid
mandatory listing by negotiating pleas to the other statutes for which listing is not a
sanction.
337. See Cole, supra note 325, at 131, 131 n.11; Reich, supra note 320, at 6.
338. 40 C.F.R. § 15.20 (1991).
339. Reich, supra note 320, at 6.
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tain environmental violations. s4'
This means that defendants cannot enter a guilty plea to a
mandatory listing crime and avoid the listing sanction
through simultaneous "de-listing." The loss of the so-called
"global settlement" option in connection with the expanded
scope of crimes subject to listing under section 306 of the Act
assures that an increasing number of companies found guilty
of environmental crimes will wind up on the List of Violating
Facilities in the future.34 1
Under the pre-1990 Act, arguments were made that the
"condition" that gave rise to the listing was the criminal viola-
tion itself. Therefore, once the violation stopped, the condi-
tion had, by definition, been corrected and the listed facility
was entitled to immediate removal from the List.342 EPA
broadly construed the "condition giving rise to" the convic-
tion language to go beyond the acts causing the criminal viola-
tion itself.343 EPA looks to the over-arching causes of the vio-
lation, including corporate policies, practices, and procedures
that foster disregard for environmental laws.344 Consistent
with EPA's broad interpretation, Congress amended the Act
340. Reich, supra note 320, at 6.
341. As of February 7, 1992, there were fifty-two facilities on the EPA's List of
Violating Facilities. Seven of the facilities were listed for violations of section
113(c)(1) of the Act, the remainder were for violations of section 309(c) of the Clean
Water Act. See EPA List of Violating Facilities, (Mar. 27, 1992). The lists are also
incorporated into GSA, Lists of Parties Excluded From Federal Procurement or
Nonprocurement Programs (Feb. 7, 1992).
342. See In re Valmont Indus. Valley, Neb. Facility, EPA Listing Docket No. 07-
89-L068, at 9 (Jan. 12, 1990) (CWA listing action).
343. 40 C.F.R. § 15.20 (1991) (removal of a Mandatory Listing). See, e.g., In re
Valmont Indus. Valley, Neb. Facility, EPA Listing Docket No. 07-89-L068, (Jan. 12,
1990) at 9-12.
344. The so-called "corporate attitude" policy has recently been codified by EPA
in guidance. See Corporate Attitude Policy, supra note 331. In In re Exxon Corp,
EPA Listing Docket No. 02-91-L034, at 9 (Feb. 4, 1992), EPA applied the corporate
policy statement to a removal petition by Exxon for a listing that resulted from Ex-
xon's conviction for Clean Water Act criminal violations when it negligently released
over half a million gallons of heating oil into the Arthur Kill estuary in New Jersey.
EPA applied the corporate attitude policy and construed the "condition giving rise to
the violation" to include failure to adequately train and supervise its managers and




to clarify that for convictions pursuant to section 113(c)(2)
which concern, inter alia, knowing false statements, failure to
submit required reports or notices, and tampering with moni-
toring equipment, the condition giving rise to the conviction
shall be considered to include any substantive underlying vio-
lation as well.-" 5 Consequently, the source will not only have
to correct the falsehood, but must also demonstrate compli-
ance with the applicable underlying requirement before re-
moval from the List will be granted. 4 s Listed sources can ex-
pect intense scrutiny of their environmental practices,
policies, and procedures before removal from the List will be
granted.3 ,7
In addition to the expanded scope of criminal violations
leading to mandatory listing, the Amendments allow EPA to
extend the listing to additional facilities of the convicted per-
son. 48 The Senate report suggests that authority to extend
the listing prohibition to other facilities was necessitated by
the practice of corporations dissolving existing business enti-
ties and forming new ones to avoid the listing sanction. 4 " Ad-
ditionally, the Senate report stated that EPA should have dis-
cretion in certain cases, to extend the listing prohibition to
additional facilities and, if necessary, to the whole company
(e.g. asbestos demolition and renovation operations that move
345. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (Supp. H 1990).
346. See S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 371-72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3754-55. The report stated:
[T]he bill also clarifies that after a conviction under section 113(c)(4) . . . two
separate actions will be required of the convicted party. First, the false state-
ments must be corrected. Second, the convicted party must obtain a certifica-
tion by the Administrator that any substantive violation underlying the false
statement has been corrected. For example, where the convicted person sub-
mitted monitoring information that falsely represented a source to be in com-
pliance with the [NSPS], he must not only correct the information but also
obtain a certification from the Administrator that the source is, in fact, in
compliance before he can be removed from [the List].
Id. at 3754. The report references language in Senate Report Bill section 113(c)(4)
concerning knowing false statements which was ultimately incorporated in section
113(c)(2) of the Amended Act. Senate Report Bill, supra note 1, § 601(g), 136 CONG.
REC. S74.
347. See Corporate Attitude Policy, supra note 331, at 64,785 n.2.
348. CAA § 306(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (Supp. H 1990).
349. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 371, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3754.
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operations from building to building), where the definition of
facility is "problematic. ' 35 ° EPA will set the parameters for
the use of this new authority in revisions to the contractor
listing regulations.
4. Citizen Awards
Authorities in every jurisdiction have always relied on the
assistance of citizen complaints and tips from concerned cor-
porate insiders to enforce the nation's laws. Seeking to en-
courage and reward the important and unique role individuals
350. S. REP. No. 228, supra note 1, at 371-72, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3754-55. The Report also stated:
This amendment clarifies that in such situations EPA can define the facility
to be the office of the convicted company. In this fashion, all the company's
operations will be affected by the listing. Discretionary rather than
mandatory listing of additional facilities provides the flexibility necessary for
the EPA to consider variations in the structure of violating industries.
Id. Presumably, as the Senate Report implicitly recognizes, EPA will have to imple-
ment the authority to list additional facilities through the discretionary listing pro-
gram. See also H.R. REP. No. 490, supra note 1, at 395.
The recognition in the Amendment that listing additional facilities can be appro-
priate completes a Congressional debate on this issue begun when section 306(a) was
originally promulgated in 1970. As originally proposed in Senate Bill 4358, section
306(a) authorized the listing of "facilities" involved in a conviction of knowing viola-
tions of a broad range of Act requirements including emissions standards and civil
failure to comply with federal court orders. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 85-6 (1970)
(emphasis added), reprinted in Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d Cong. 2d
Sess., A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, at 531, 615-16
(1974). The report accompanying the Senate bill stated that section 306 "would be
limited, whenever feasible and reasonable, to contracts affecting only the facility not
in compliance, rather than an entire corporate entity or operating division." S. REP.
No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970), reprinted in Senate Committee on Public
Works, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, at 439 (1974). At that time the Senate report also expressed concern that a
facility subject to the proposed section 306(a) federal financial assistance ban not be
permitted to circumvent the prohibition's effect by so-called contract shifting, that is,
shifting production from a listed facility to an unaffected facility of the same com-
pany in order to avoid the listing sanction. The House bill had no corresponding
provisions. After conference, the final law contained the pre-1990 Act language that
limited the prohibition to knowing violations of section 113(c)(1) and the single facil-
ity involved in the violation. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
§ 12, 84 Stat. 1676, 1707 (1970). Congress had scaled back the Senate version by
limiting the sanction to knowing criminal violations and single facilities. With the
1990 Amendments, the original Senate approach, advocated some two decades earlier,
appears to have finally prevailed.
90http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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can play in uncovering unlawful activity, United States laws
have a long history of citizen awards provisions. As far back as
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,351 and as
recently as the Shore Protection Act of 1988,352 environmental
laws have financially rewarded the public for providing mate-
rial information leading to criminal convictions or civil judg-
ments.3 53 Drawing on this venerable tradition, Congress added
a citizen awards provision to the Act.3"4
Under this "bounty hunter" provision, as it has been
called, EPA may pay an award up to $10,000 to any person
"who furnishes information or services which lead to a crimi-
nal conviction or a judicial or administrative civil penalty" for
a violation of virtually any provision of the Act relating to sta-
tionary sources. 55 Officers and employees of federal, state,
and local governments are ineligible for awards if the informa-
tion or service provided derived from their official duties.
Though the Administration's bill as introduced appeared to
be self-funding,356 the language was changed so that funds
must come from annual appropriations.35 In these tight budg-
351. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
352. Shore Protection Act § 4109, 33 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (1988).
353. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act 11(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(d) (1988); Lacey
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d) (1988); CERCLA § 106(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d) (1988).
354. CAA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(f) (Supp. II 1990). The bill approved by the
full House referred to this section as the "Rewards" provision. House Bill as Passed,
supra note 1, § 601, 136 CONG. REc. at H3235.
355. CAA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(f) (Supp. 11 1990). The awards provision
applies to violations of every title of the Act except title II pertaining to mobile
sources. The Senate bill would have allowed awards for assistance leading to any civil
judgment (as opposed to one for a "civil penalty") and for any violation of the act,
including mobile source violations. Senate Bill as Passed, supra note 1, § 601(j), 136
CONG. REC. at S4437. The conference committee adopted the House version. See Sen-
ate Managers Statement, supra note 1, at S16,952.
356. Apparently, the Administration intended to rely on the citizen suit penalty
fund to finance informer awards. See House Bill as Introduced, supra note 1, §§
601(m), 610(b); Administration's Senate Bill, supra note 1, §§ 601(m), 610(b); Sec-
tion-by-Section Analysis of the "Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989," 135 CONG. REC.
S9651, 89665 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (analysis of Administration's Senate Bill). The
Administration's bill was based on provisions in the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981,
which allows penalty funds upon receipt to be deposited in the Treasury and directly
drawn out for citizen awards at a later date by the Secretary of the Interior. See
Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d) (1988).
357. CAA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(f) (Supp. II 1990).
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etary times, award monies are not likely to flow so freely as to
create a cottage industry of private attorneys general.35 8 Nev-
ertheless, judicious issuance of cash awards, though largely
symbolic, may raise public participation in air enforcement
and will help the Agency increase the visibility, and perhaps
public appreciation, of the Agency's air enforcement efforts.
EPA is currently writing regulations defining the eligibility
criteria for the awards. 59
III. Amendments to the Criminal Enforcement Provisions
A. Background
In the decade prior to passage of the 1990 Amendments,
Congress greatly enhanced two of the most important federal
environmental statutes when it upgraded criminal penalties in
the Resource Conservation Recovery Act"'0 and the Clean
Water Act 36 1 from misdemeanors to felonies. 2  Yet, the third
major component of federal environmental protection, namely
the Clean Air Act, had not seen any significant changes since
1970.363
Meanwhile, criminal prosecution had been acknowledged
as an effective means to deter and punish those who would
knowingly foul the Nation's natural resources. And the types
of environmental criminal defendants have expanded. Mid-
night dumpers and fly-by-night companies are no longer the
sole target of these efforts.364 Today, more sophisticated viola-
tors are targeted as both state and federal authorities find
358. Indeed, the 1992 fiscal year budget includes no appropriations for the
awards. It is unclear whether the Administration's fiscal year 1993 budget proposal
includes such funding. See ExEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
Gov. FY 1993, H.R. Doc. No. 178, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. A-865-76.
359. EPA SemiAnnual Regulatory Agenda, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,378, 17,429 (Apr. 28,
1992).
360. RCRA §§ 1002-11,009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
361. CWA §§ 101-606, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (1988).
362. See RCRA § 3008(d), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e) (1988); CWA § 309(c)(2)-
(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)-(4) (1988).
363. CAA §§ 101-403, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988) (amended 1990).
364. Robert Abrams, The Maturing Discipline of Environmental Prosecution,




that criminal enforcement can sometimes better "focus" cor-
porate attention on environmental compliance if individual
managers understand that they place their personal wealth
and liberty at risk for knowing violations of the law.36
So far, this has not been an empty threat. While environ-
mental prosecution is still far from routine, the strengthening
of environmental criminal provisions has been followed
quickly by growing numbers of investigations, prosecutions,
and convictions. 6
Given that context, the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 offer a mixed bag of good and bad news for environmen-
tal prosecution. Without question, some changes in the Act
will immediately improve enforcement efforts to reduce air
pollutants. Other changes promise expanded enforcement
once regulations for new titles are promulgated, new programs
are implemented, and the regulated community has reasona-
ble time to adjust to new obligations. On balance, however,
the amended criminal provisions raise as many new legal and
conceptual hurdles to enforcement as they do solutions to pre-
existing weaknesses in the Act.
B. New Felony Penalties for Clean Air Act Crimes
As in the pre-1990 version of the Act, the criminal en-
forcement provisions are found at Section 113(c).367 Under the
old version of that subsection, criminal enforcement was lim-
ited to knowing violations of only a few substantive provi-
sions. At least in theory, old subsection 113(c) could be used
to prosecute: knowing violations of state implementation
plans (SIP); or the knowing violation of a New Source Per-
formance Standard (NSPS); or violations of any of the Na-
tional Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
365. Id.; see also U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Address at 1991
Department of Justice Environmental Law Enforcement Conference, (Jan 8, 1991).
366. Criminal Enforcement: 1990 Record Year for Criminal Enforcement of En-
vironmental Violators, Justice Announces, 21 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1397 (Nov. 23,
1990).
367. CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. H 1990).
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(NESHAP). 368 The section also made it a crime to knowingly
make any false statement or to tamper with monitoring equip-
ment installed pursuant to the Act.3 69
In practice, however, the old criminal provisions were
hardly enforced. Between fiscal years 1983 and 1992, only 68
defendants were charged with violating the Clean Air Act, as
compared to 317 defendants who faced criminal prosecution
under RCRA, and 205 defendants charged under the CWA.3 70
Those violations that could be criminally prosecuted carried
lenient penalties when compared to other federal environmen-
tal statutes. For example, conviction for knowingly violating a
SIP or any emissions standard was a misdemeanor punishable
by a maximum of a year imprisonment and/or fines ranging
between $25,000 to $50,000 per day of violation.37' The know-
ing submission of a false statement or tampering with moni-
toring equipment was also a misdemeanor, punishable by im-
prisonment for no more than six months and a fine of not
more than $10,000.372
One immediate improvement in the enforcement poten-
tial of the Act is the upgrading of these violations from misde-
meanors to felonies. A defendant who knowingly violates a
SIP requirement, an existing emissions standard, or any of the
new titles created by the 1990 Amendments, now faces impris-
onment for up to five years.3 73 Excluding the crime of knowing
endangerment, 37 1 criminal fines are no longer provided for in
the Act itself. Rather, the Act incorporates the general crimi-
nal fines provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code.37 15
368. CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988) (amended 1990).
369. Id.
370. National Enforcement Investigations Center, U.S.E.P.A., Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Resulting From Environmental Investigations, (May 31,
1992).
371. CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988) (amended 1990).
372. Id.
373. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). As with other envi-
ronmental statutes, actual sentencing of an individual defendant is controlled by
Chapter 2 Part Q of the United States Sentencing Commissions Guidelines. UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2QI.1 (Nov. 1991).
374. CAA § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (1988) (amended 1990).




Consequently, individuals found guilty of committing felonies
under the Act, excepting the felony of knowing endangerment,
now face fines up to $250,000 per conviction, or twice the
gross pecuniary gain derived from the violation. 76 Organiza-
tional defendants" convicted of these same felonies now face
fines up to $500,000 or twice the pecuniary gain derived.37 8
Similarly, convictions for knowingly filing false statements,
failing to file a required statement, or tampering with moni-
toring equipment, are now punishable as felonies and carry
prison terms of up to two years .37 Fines for both individual
and corporate defendants convicted of violating these provi-
sions are provided under Title 18.380
C. Expansion of Provisions Covered by Criminal
Enforcement
As discussed earlier, the 1990 Amendments create a host
of new titles and programs that must now await implementa-
tion by EPA. Many of these new programs are years away
from being enforced in practice. However, several pre-existing
programs should see immediate expansion of enforcement op-
tions under the Amended Act.
1. PSD Preconstruction Requirements
The goals of the Act are not only to protect, but also to
enhance the quality of the Nation's air.38 Under both the old
and new versions of the Act, state implementation plans must
contain emissions limits and other measures necessary to pre-
376. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (d) (1988).
377. For purposes of any of the violations set forth in section 113(c)(1), (2), (3)
and (4), organizational defendants include corporations, partnerships, associations,
States, municipalities, or political subdivisions of a State, and any agency, depart-
ment or instrumentality of the United States. CAA §§113(c)(6), 302(e), 42 U.S.C. §§
7413(c)(6), 7602(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). It should be noted, however, that all gov-
ernmental entities are excluded from the definition of criminally liable "organization"
under the knowing endangerment provisions. Id. § 113(c)(5)(E).
378. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(3), (d) (1988).
379. CAA § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990).
380. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988).
381. CAA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1988).
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vent the significant deterioration of air quality in those Air
Quality Control Regions identified by the EPA as having air
quality levels that are better than any national primary or
secondary standard for sulfur dioxide or particulate matter."' 2
Each so-called PSD region in the country fits into one of
three classes in which the allowable amounts of additional sul-
fur dioxide and particulate matter air pollution are strictly
limited.113 Section 165 prohibits the construction or modifica-
tion of any "major emitting facility" 3 4 in any PSD region un-
less certain preconstruction requirements are met. Such facili-
ties must also apply for a permit that sets forth emissions
limits for the facility. 5 The Administrator must, and the
382. Compare CAA § 161, 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (1988) and CAA § 161, 42 U.S.C. §
7471 (Supp. 11 1990).
383. Under Section 162, all international parks, and national parks and wilder-
ness areas exceeding certain acreage sizes, are designated Class I areas. CAA § 162, 42
U.S.C. § 7472 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). These PSD areas are deemed to be in the need
of the greatest protection, and consequently, only the smallest increases in particulate
matter and sulfur dioxide pollution are allowed. CAA §§ 162, 163, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472,
7473 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). All other PSD regions are designated Class II areas,
where slightly greater increases are allowed. States, or Indian governing bodies, may
re-designate Class II areas to Class I, thereby imposing stricter standards on those
PSD regions. Conversely, a state seeking to promote economic development in a Class
II PSD region may re-designate such an area Class III, so that even greater increases
in particulate matter and sulfur dioxide pollution may be allowed, although still in
lower percentages than in non-PSD regions. CAA § 164, 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990).
384. For purposes of preconstruction requirements, the CAA defines "major
emitting facility" to include any one of 28 listed stationary sources that "emit, or
have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant,"
or any other source that has "the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per
year or more of any air pollutant." CAA § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (Supp. 11 1990)
(emphasis added). One of the confusing aspects of the Clean Air Act, both in its pre-
1990 and post-1990 versions, is that it frequently uses similar language to define dif-
ferent types of sources that are in turn regulated under different provisions of the
Act. Thus, "major emitting facility" for purposes of PSD requirement, differs sub-
stantially from a "major stationary source" which may be required to adhere to other
requirements provided elsewhere in the Act. Compare CAA § 302(j), 42 U.S.C. §
7602(0) (1988) (general definition of major emitting source) with CAA § 169(1), 42
U.S.C. § 7479(1) (Supp. 11 1990) (definition of major emitting source for PSD areas).
385. A central feature of the permit application and review process is that the
owner or operator of a "major emitting source" demonstrate that emissions "will not
cause, or contribute to," air pollution in excess of any maximum allowable increase in
sulfur dioxide or particulate matter set forth in the PSD region in which the facility
is located; any NAAQS "in any air quality region"; or any other applicable emissions
96http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/1
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state may, issue an order or seek injunctive relief preventing
the construction of a facility in a PSD region if the facility
fails to meet preconstruction requirements.16
The pre-1990 Act provided misdemeanor penalties for fil-
ing false monitoring and reporting data, or any false state-
ment in any application or other document filed with EPA,
such as a permit application. 387 However, the Act contained
no direct criminal penalties for the violation of the precon-
struction requirements. Under the 1990 Amendments, it is
now a felony to knowingly violate either the PSD permitting
requirements or an administrative order finding a violation of
a preconstruction requirement. 88
This is a major improvement in the Act since it affords
criminal enforcement protection to those comparatively pris-
tine regions of the country where air quality may be in the
greatest need of preservation. Yet it would be disingenuous, or
naive, to suggest that every operator of a "major emitting
source" in technical violation of a preconstruction require-
ment now faces criminal prosecution. In civil cases, a violation
may be found if EPA shows by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant's facility constitutes a "major emit-
ting source" and that PSD requirements have not been met. 89
The burden then shifts to the civil defendant to show that its
facility "will not cause or contribute to" air pollution in viola-
tion of section 165.390 Such determinations are highly complex
and subject to wide variances of interpretation of raw scien-
tific data. 91 To sustain a criminal conviction for PSD viola-
tions, the burden must rest entirely on the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the source will cause or
contribute to an otherwise prohibited increase in pollution.3 92
standard. CAA § 165(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1988).
386. CAA § 167, 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (Supp. II 1990).
387. CAA § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1988) (amended 1990).
388. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
389. CAA § 165(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1988).
390. Id.
391. For an excellent illustration of the difficulties of ascertaining a facility's
emissions potential, see United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141,
1143-55 (D. Col. 1988).
392. See supra notes 384, 385.
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Given the highly technical nature of such determinations, the
trial of such violators would likely include conflicting expert
testimony on the issue of whether the operation of a source in
a PSD region would emit otherwise prohibited levels of pollu-
tants, as well as the effect of such operations on surrounding
air quality regions.3 93 Such a trial could be a prosecutor's
nightmare. It would mean having to prove to a jury that a
defendant is guilty of knowingly violating the PSD require-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt by relying on expert opinion
that, almost by definition, must be susceptible to some doubt.
Therefore, the criminal enforcement of PSD requirements
seems destined for sparing use in only the most egregious of
circumstances - for example, where an owner or operator of a
"major emitting source" has failed to apply for a preconstruc-
tion permit or where the pollution generated by a plant is so
obviously in violation of PSD requirements as to reduce the
possibility of a swearing match of experts at trial.
2. The Asbestos NESHAP
The 1990 Amendments broke a decades-long stalemate
during which EPA found it administratively and politically
impossible to promulgate National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for all but a handful of
known hazardous air pollutants.394 Since 1970, the Clean Air
Act has authorized EPA to develop NESHAPs for any air pol-
lutant that "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an in-
crease in mortality or ... in serious, irreversible, or incapaci-
tating reversible illness. 3 95 Yet after twenty years, EPA had
promulgated NESHAPs for only eight substances.9 6
The 1990 Amendments simply list 189 substances that
Congress has accepted as posing a threat to human health and
393. See FED. R. EvID. 702; Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. at 1143-55.
394. Robert L. Munroe, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Will Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants Finally Be Regulated?, 5 ADMIN. L. REv. 161, 165-67 (1991).
395. CAA § 112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).





the environment. 397 With this congressionally-mandated list in
place, EPA must now promulgate emission standards for each
substance in accordance with a ten-year schedule set forth in
the Act. 98 Standards will become effective upon promulga-
tion.399 Those who knowingly violate the standards will imme-
diately become subject to the criminal enforcement provisions
of section 113(c)(1). 40 0
While the criminal enforcement of these new standards
may be years away, pre-existing NESHAPs will remain in ef-
fect and become immediately enforceable under the new fel-
ony provisions of section 113(c)(1).'0 1 This should improve the
enforcement of one of the most commonly violated NESHAPs
- those standards controlling the handling of asbestos that is
removed from renovated or demolished structures.4°2
Asbestos was one of the first substances to be designated
a hazardous air pollutant by EPA.'0 3 Air-borne, friable asbes-
tos 0 4 is a well-documented carcinogen. It also has been linked
to a debilitating lung disease called asbestosis as well as a po-
tentially fatal condition known as mesothelioma, which is the
gradual thickening and constriction of the pleural sack that
surrounds the lungs.10 Asbestos-containing insulation is com-
monly found in many older buildings, from which fibers may
be emitted during renovations or demolitions. One source esti-
mates the number of such operations in the United States at
thirty thousand per year .'0  Therefore, the new felony provi-
sions for knowing violations of the asbestos NESHAPs, cou-
397. CAA § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (Supp. II 1990).
398. CAA § 112(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (Supp. 11 1990).
399. CAA § 112(d)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(10) (Supp. 11 1990).
400. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. I 1990).
401. CAA § 112(q)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(q)(1) (Supp. I 1990).
402. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.141-61.156 (1991).
403. List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (Mar. 31, 1971). Con-
gress too has previously found that "medical science has not established any mini-
mum level of exposure to asbestos fibers which is considered to be safe to individuals
exposed to the fibers." See Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 § 2, 20
U.S.C. § 3601(a)(3) (1988).
404. Friable asbestos is defined as asbestos that can be crumbled by hand when
dry. 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (1991).
405. Id.
406. W.H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 3.11, at 278 (1977).
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pled with EPA's subpoena authority under section
307(a)(1), 0 7 should make enforcement of this standard more
effective.
Enforcement of asbestos NESHAP standards has also
been strengthened by technical amendments that should clar-
ify the proof necessary to show a violation of a work practice
standard. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA is authorized to pro-
mulgate work practice rules governing the handling of hazard-
ous air pollutants where the Agency has determined that it is
not feasible "to prescribe or enforce an emissions standard"
based on the numeric measurements of emissions. 08 EPA de-
termined that such work practice rules should be promulgated
for friable asbestos emitted during building renovations or
demolitions.40 9
Since their promulgation, the work practice standards
have undergone various challenges and revisions as defend-
ants, the courts and Congress attempted to fashion emissions
standards for a kind of pollutant where emissions are virtually
impossible to detect. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States,4 10 the Supreme Court held that the 1970 version of the
CAA did not authorize EPA to promulgate work practice
standards in lieu of emissions standards.411 In the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, Congress amended section 112 by
adding subsection (e) which expressly authorized the develop-
ment of non-numeric emissions controls whenever it was not
feasible to enforce numerical standards based on quantifiable
emissions.412 In the following year, Congress further amended
sections 111 and 112 to provide that any "design, equipment,
work practice, or operational standard ... shall be treated as"
407. CAA § 307(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. H 1990); see also discussion
supra parts II.B.3., 4. (subpoena power subsection and "sufficient cause" defenses
subsection).
408. CAA § 112(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(h) (Supp. H 1990).
409. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-61.156 (1991).
410. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
411. The Court found that the term "emissions standard" as used in section 112
meant a standard that set forth a quantitative level of permissible emissions. See
Adamo, 434 U.S. at 286; see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 61.32 (1991) ("emissions ... shall not
exceed 10 grams of beryllium, over a 24-hour period .... ).




a standard of performance or an emission standard, for all
purposes under the Act."'
Despite these amendments, violators continued to argue
that an actual emission is a necessary element of the govern-
ment's proof in finding that a violation has occurred."" ' The
1990 Amendments further clarify the enforceability of such
work practice rules. The most significant clarification is the
change in the definition of emissions standards, which finally
includes a specific reference to "any design, equipment, work
practice or operational standard promulgated" under the
Act.4 15
3. False Statements
The 1990 Clean Air Act also includes several technical
amendments to the false reporting provisions of section
113(c)(2). Under the pre-1990 Act, the false statements provi-
sion was silent on whether it was a crime to knowingly omit or
conceal some reportable fact to be made to EPA.4"' The cur-
rent version of the subsection now expressly states that a
knowing omission, concealment of fact, failure to file a re-
quired report, as well as the knowing submission of a false
statement, constitutes a felony.4 7
One of the most hotly contested areas of environmental
criminal law is the scienter element of knowledge found in vir-
tually every environmental statute. The majority view is that
knowledge requires proof that a defendant generally intended
to commit certain acts, but not that the accused possessed
specific intent to violate a particular regulatory require-
413. CAA §§ 111(h)(5), 112 (e)(5), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h)(5), 7412(e)(5) (Supp. II
1990).
414. Thus far, courts have rejected these arguments. See United States v. Seal-
tite Corp., 739 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D. Ark. 1990); United States v. MPM Contrac-
tors, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D. Kan. 1990); United States v. Tzvah Urban Re-
newal Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D.N.J. 1988); United States v. Ben's Truck &
Equip., Inc., 1986 WL 15,402 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 1986).
415. CAA § 112(e)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(5) (Supp. 11 1990).
416. CAA § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1988) (amended 1990).
417. CAA § 113(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
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ment415 Most courts have found this no more radical than a
restatement of the axiom that "ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse,"419 particularly in highly regulated industries where
there is a logical presumption that individuals and companies
know they must operate within a multi-faceted regulatory
scheme.42 ° Others have argued that applying principles of gen-
eral intent to environmental crimes somehow changes tradi-
tional mens rea requirements. 4s1
Given these sharp disagreements, any clarification in the
Act is useful. The statute's plain statement that a knowing
omission or concealment of fact is the equivalent of a false
statement provides clearer notice to defendants, and elimi-
nates a conceptual hole that had previously been left for juries
to fill.
The false statement provision also now expressly includes
a materiality requirement that was omitted, although implic-
itly required, under the previous versions of the Act."2 Pre-
sumably, the question of materiality under the Clean Air Act
will be for the court to decide, rather than an element of the
charge presented for the jury's consideration,'2 3 as is the case
under the general false statements provisions of section 1001
of Title 18 of the United States Code.
418. The term "knowingly" is not defined under the Clean Air Act. However, the
Act has been held to only require knowledge of the operative facts that constitute the
crime, not specific knowledge of the statute or of the hazards posed by emissions.
United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 87-88 (6th Cir. 1991). Likewise, the term
"knowingly" currently found in almost every environmental criminal statute has been
held to require general rather than specific intent. See United States v. Sellers, 926
F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Johnson
& Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985);
but c.f. United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). A thorough discussion of the element of
knowledge in the context of environmental crimes is beyond the scope of this article.
But see discussion infra part III.D.1. (shifting scienter and the new definition of "per-
son" subsection).
419. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 47-8 (1881).
420. See supra note 418.
421. See R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent"
and Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 320-21 (1991).
422. CAA § 113(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1990).




With certain important exceptions discussed below,''
these changes in no way disturb the general intent principles
applicable to determining whether a person "knowingly" filed
a false statement. As with other environmental statutes, the
intent element of this crime would appear satisfied if the gov-
ernment proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew the statement was false and yet filed the statement with
knowledge of the falsity, not as a result of mistake or acci-
dent.'2 5 With the exception of two cases in which proof of
knowledge of a specific regulatory requirement would be re-
quired even if only by circumstantial evidence, 26 most courts
have held that specific intent is not an element of an environ-
mental crime. Thus, the government need not prove, for in-
stance, that a defendant first consulted a regulation and then
knowingly omitted relevant facts from a statement filed pur-
suant to that regulation. Instead, the knowing omission, con-
cealment, or alteration of the facts alone, assuming they are
material, will be sufficient to sustain the element of
knowledge.
D. Continued Weaknesses and New Enforcement Problems
1. Shifting Scienter and the New Definition of "Person"
One of the ironies of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
is that despite Congress' and the Administration's stated de-
sire to improve that Act's enforcement potential, the new Act
imposes on the government, in certain cases, a burden of
proof that is much tougher than what has been required
under any other federal environmental statute. The principal
mechanism for altering the Act's scienter element lies in the
new section 113(h) definition of "person. "427
For purposes of determining criminal liability under the
new negligent endangerment provision of section 113(c)(4),
424. See supra notes 418-21 and accompanying text.
425. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
426. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
427. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. II 1990). See supra note 193 and
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the new definition of "person" excludes "an employee who is
carrying out his normal activities and who is not part of sen-
ior management personnel or a corporate officer" unless the
violation is "knowing and willful. '42 8 As for all other criminal
provisions set forth in the amended section 113(c), including
the new knowing endangerment provision, the definition of a
criminally liable person excludes "an employee who is carry-
ing out his normal activities and who is acting under orders
from the employer" unless the employee's conduct in commit-
ting the violation was "knowing and willful. 429
The new definitions do not so much define what consti-
tutes a "person" under the Act as they do create different sci-
enter requirements for potential defendants depending upon
their employment responsibilities within an organization.
Under the new definition, in order to convict certain employ-
ees, the government will apparently need to present evidence
not only that the employee acted with knowledge, but that he
or she willfully violated a specific requirement of the Act.
There is some legislative history suggesting that some-
thing less than specific intent to violate a requirement of the
Act would be sufficient to convict. The Statement of Senate
Managers, which was hastily drafted before the final vote on
the 1990 Amendments, states in part: "A person who knows
that he is being ordered to commit an act that violates the law
cannot avoid criminal liability for such act by hiding behind
such 'orders.' "430 The statement goes on to declare that the
reference to the knowing and willful standard, "does not re-
quire proof by the Government that the defendant knew he
was violating the Clean Air Act per se. It is sufficient for the
Government to prove the defendant's knowledge that he was
committing an unlawful act. 41  The statement makes little
sense given commonly accepted definitions of wilfulness or the
context in which environmental crimes occur.
The Supreme Court has explained that the element of
428. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
429. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. II 1990).





wilfulness stands as an exception to the common law rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse.432 The purpose of requiring
the government to prove a defendant's specific intent to vio-
late a legal requirement is to protect individuals from being
prosecuted for innocent violations of highly complex stat-
utes.4 3 Thus in statutorily created offenses, an act is done
willfully if "done voluntarily and intentionally and with the
specific intent to do something which the law forbids, that is
to say with the bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the
law."43' Recently, in Cheek v. United States,35 the Supreme
Court held that willfulness requires the government to negate
a defendant's claim of good faith belief that his violation was
merely the result of a misunderstanding of the law. 36 More-
over, the reasonableness of the claim, the Court held is solely
for the jury to decide.3 7 While Cheek involved a prosecution
under the tax code, there is no reason to conclude that its in-
terpretation of wilfulness does not apply to cases brought
under the CAA.
Notwithstanding the Statement of Senate Managers, one
must ask how it may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that an employee acted with the "intent to do something
which the law forbids" if not by reference to that employee's
knowledge or ignorance of specific requirements of the Clean
Air Act? For example, if an employee is truly ignorant of the
EPA's emissions standards for asbestos, let us say, even if he
is cognizant as many people are of the general dangers of ex-
posure to asbestos fibers, how can that employee be found to
have acted willfully without proof of his knowledge of specific
requirements and prohibitions governing the handling of as-
bestos as provided by the Act and implementing regulations?
432. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933); Cheek v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 604, 609 (1991).
433. Id.
434. Pomponio v. United States, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976); see also United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (holding that willfulness in the context of the federal
tax statute means "a voluntary intentional violation of a known legal duty ... [in
other words] bad faith or evil intent.").
435. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
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And how might the government negate a good faith claim of
ignorance, if not by some proof that the employee knew he
was violating the Clean Air Act per se?
Since it will be the rare case in which the government will
be able to show that a factory hand or line-employee had pre-
viously consulted the Act or the Code of Federal Regulations,
the new definition of "person" may impose an almost insur-
mountable burden of proof necessary to convict employees
who either acted on orders or - with respect to the crime of
negligent endangerment - were not senior management per-
sonnel. This shifting of the level of intent necessary to con-
vict, based upon an individual's position within an organiza-
tional hierarchy, is unprecedented in environmental criminal
law.
Aside from excluding a certain group of potential defend-
ants from prosecution, the definition will almost certainly
have other effects in the enforcement of the Clean Air Act.
For instance, the higher burden of proof necessary to convict
certain workers was severely criticized by the Department of
Justice on the grounds that it would remove any incentive for
the employee to cooperate with government investigations.4 38
Since the employee may be the only individual who can iden-
tify the "senior management" officers responsible for the neg-
ligent endangerment of others, the virtual insulation afforded
workers may also benefit all individuals in the upper rungs of
the organizational ladder.
The new definition of "person" may have an even broader
impact on the enforcement of the remaining criminal provi-
sions of sections 113(c)(1), (2), (3) and (5). For purposes of
those provisions, the definition requires proof of knowing and
willful conduct if the person is an employee carrying out nor-
438. See Roady, supra note 1, at 10,202. New citizen awards or "bounty hunter"
provisions may pay individuals who come forward with information regarding viola-
tions of the Act. See discussion supra part II.C.4. But the effectiveness of such incen-
tives remains to be seen where employees must rely on the violating employer for
their livelihood long after the government's investigation has ended. The Act does
prohibit the discharge or discrimination of employees on the basis of their coopera-




mal activities and acting under orders from an employer.""
The absence of any reference to management, or senior man-
agement personnel with respect to these crimes, seems to sug-
gest that even a defendant who held some position of manage-
ment in a company and was responsible for the substantive
violation, might only be convicted upon proof of willfulness so
long as he was carrying out normal activities under orders
from a superior.
The new definition of "person" may increase the scienter
element from knowledge to willfulness for a much broader
group of defendants than just the production floor workers.
Such a construction may also encourage mid or lower-level
managers to remain ignorant of specific Clean Air Act require-
ments or may discourage worker education and training lest
the government be able to prove at some future date that they
acted "with intent to do something which the law forbids."4 4 0
And it may encourage individuals to shift the blame for
known violations to upper levels of a corporation's bureau-
cracy, where the specific policy decisions that led to the viola-
tion may be so diffuse as to leave only the corporate entity
legally responsible.' Clearly, such an outcome would run
contrary to the growing awareness of the need to hold individ-
ual managers and decision-makers personally responsible for
known environmental violations."2
The new definition will also slow enforcement by creating
numerous and difficult questions of law and fact as defend-
ants, regardless of their level of responsibility in a corporation
or other entity, seek to argue that they fall within that class of
defendants for which the government must prove willfulness
439. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. II 1990).
440. See CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. 11 1990); see discussion supra
part II.A.8. (restricted definitions of "operator" and "person" subsection).
441. A culpable mental state may be imputed to a corporation through the "col-
lective knowledge" of its employees or agents acquired during the course of their em-
ployment even when the pertinent facts are never brought in aggregate form to the
attention of someone who would fully comprehend their significance. See, e.g., United
States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 865 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Inland Freight Lines v.
United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951).
442. See supra notes 364-65.
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in order to sustain a conviction. For example, the courts will
have to construe, without statutory aid, the meaning of the
phrase "normal activities."44 Would such activities include
unlawful, but regularly ordered by-passes of statutorily man-
dated control measures? Or does the phrase "normal activi-
ties" presume only conduct which is lawful under the require-
ments of the Act?
Similarly, while the term "corporate officer" may be well
fixed by an entity's articles of incorporation or by reference to
state law, section 113(h) does not define "senior management
personnel" for purposes of determining who may be liable for
negligent endangerment."4 In some organizations, such dis-
tinctions may be either obvious or impossible to discern. Is
the son or daughter of the sole shareholder in a closely held
corporation "senior management personnel" by virtue of his
or her familial ties and periodic assistance in running the bus-
iness? And what of a defendant who is a manager in a na-
tional corporation consisting of numerous' departments, divi-
sions, regional offices, and even parent companies? Under the
present draft of section 113(h), both the prosecutor, defend-
ants, and courts are left without any guidance whatsoever to
decide how far down in the organization's structure the label
''senior management" will attach.
2. The Thirty-Day Notice Requirement
As discussed earlier, the pre-1990 Act required EPA to
notify violators of state implementation plans (SIPs) at least
thirty days prior to the commencement of enforcement pro-
ceedings.'45 This requirement had been interpreted to afford a
violator a thirty-day grace period, during which violations
could not be prosecuted civilly or, by inference, criminally. 4 6
The 1990 Amendments clarify this; section 113(a)(1) now spe-
443. See supra notes 364-65.
444. CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (Supp. 11 1990).
445. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990); see discus-
sion supra part II.A.6. (notice of violation subsection).
446. United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1122, 1127-29 (D.




cifically allows the Administrator to commence an action "at
any time" after the thirty days has run, and "without regard
to the period of the violation" so long as the action is com-
menced within the five-year statute of limitations period set
forth in 28 U.S.C. section 2462."" The legislative history ac-
companying the 1990 Act also makes clear that the notice pro-
vision does not require that a violation be continuous for more
than thirty days - a position that had been repeatedly raised
as a defense to SIP enforcement actions.44 These clarifica-
tions in the Amended Act should reinvigorate EPA's civil en-
forcement of SIP violations.4 9
The clarifications should also help in the revival of crimi-
nal enforcement of SIP violators - although here the thirty
day notice provision will continue to form a procedural hurdle
for prosecutors. Under the 1990 Act, a criminal enforcement
"action," (presumably the filing of an information or indict-
ment), cannot commence unless the defendant has persisted
in the proscribed conduct "more than [thirty] days after hav-
ing been notified... under subsection (a)(1)" by the Adminis-
trator that the emissions source is violating a SIP requirement
or prohibition. 50 What this means is that the Act, by its own
terms, restricts criminal prosecution of SIP violators to only
those defendants who have already been warned by the EPA
that they are violating a SIP requirement, perhaps incident to
a civil enforcement action, and yet who persisted in the viola-
tion despite the warning. Given this prerequisite, only the
most egregious SIP violators can expect to face criminal pros-
ecution. On the other hand, a defendant's continued practice
despite EPA's notice of violation should strengthen the gov-
ernment's proof that the defendant's conduct was a knowing
violation of the Act. 51
While the changes in the thirty-day notice provision
should clarify, and thereby strengthen criminal enforcement
447. CAA § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. I 1990).
448. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
449. See discussion supra part II.A.6. (notice of violation subsection).
450. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
451. See supra note 421-22 and accompanying text.
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options for SIP violations, these changes also contain an un-
fortunate reference to the new permitting program. It can be
argued that the nature of SIPs, and consequently their viola-
tions, warrant the "first bite" offered violators by virtue of the
thirty-day notice requirement. SIPs are notoriously convo-
luted documents, applicable to non-specific sources, not read-
ily accessible to the public or even the regulated commu-
nity. 52 In fact, it was this feature of SIPs that prompted the
Administration and Congress to create the new permit title in
the 1990 Amendments, which will hopefully clarify an emis-
sion source's responsibilities in a single, site-specific docu-
ment. 53 In the absence of permits, the thirty-day notice re-
quirement of section 113(a)(1), and its incorporation into the
criminal provisions of section 113(c), provides a mechanism in
which an emissions source has a period of time in which to
correct violations of SIP requirements that a source may not
have been aware of.
The problem with the amended version of section
113(a)(1) is that it now refers to violations of a permit as well
as a SIP violation." 4 Although no similar notice requirement
is incorporated into that portion of section 113(c)(1) dealing
with knowing violations of a permit,45 5 prosecutors might rea-
sonably anticipate defense motions arguing that the thirty-
day notice must precede the commencement of a criminal en-
forcement action based on a permit violation. Whether courts
will find such arguments meritorious or mere attempts to
"bootstrap" one subsection's requirements into another, re-
mains to be seen. The legislative history is silent on the ra-
tionale for adding a reference to permits in the thirty-day no-
tice requirement. Yet the reference in section 113(a)(1), and
452. See Roady, supra note 1, at 10,182.
453. Id.
454. CAA § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
455. Section 113(c)(1) sets forth a list of substantive sections of the Act which
may be prosecuted if knowingly violated. That portion of the list dealing with know-
ing violations of SIP requirements includes a clause indicating that prosecutions for
such violations must be preceded by the 30-day notice requirements of section
113(a)(1), whereas no similar parenthetical limitation appears to apply to remaining





the absence of any clarifying language as to its applicability to
section 113(c)(1), seems an unfortunate and unnecessary im-
pediment to the criminal enforcement of the permits program,
thus far hailed as the 1990 Amendment's most important new
provisions.
3. The Endangerment Provisions
Following provisions already in existence in the Clean
Water Act and RCRA,456 Congress added a knowing endan-
germent provision to the Clean Air Act that carries felony
penalties for certain releases of hazardous air pollutants, or
air toxins, when the release poses a substantial threat of harm
to others.45 The 1990 Amendments also add an entirely new
"negligent endangerment" provision, which carries misde-
meanor penalties for similarly threatening releases of air tox-
ins, when done with negligence."" With the exception of the
varying scienter elements of knowing or negligent conduct
specified in subsections 113(c)(4) and (5), or the varying scien-
ter element of knowing and willful conduct discussed above in
the new definition of criminally liable "person," the elements
for both endangerment provisions are identical.
To begin with, both provisions apply to the release of any
one of the 189 hazardous air pollutants listed in section 112 of
the 1990 Amendments,459 or any extremely hazardous sub-
stance listed pursuant to section 306(a)(2) of CERCLA.46 ° Any
person who knowingly releases into the ambient air any of the
listed pollutants, and who knows at the time of the release
that he or she places another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury, is guilty of a felony, punishable
by imprisonment of up to fifteen years."" Organizational de-
fendants, which for purposes of knowing endangerment ex-
456. See CWA § 319(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988); RCRA § 3008(e), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
457. CAA § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. II 1990).
458. CAA § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (Supp. II 1990).
459. CAA § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (Supp. II 1990).
460. CERCLA § 306(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9656(a)(2) (1988).
461. CAA § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. II 1990).
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cludes government entities,462 may be fined upon conviction
not more than one million dollars for each violation. Fines for
individual defendants convicted of knowing endangerment are
controlled by the fines provisions, of Title 18 of the United
States Code.46
As is the case under the Clean Water Act and RCRA's
knowing endangerment provisions, a person acts with the req-
uisite degree of knowledge if he possesses "actual awareness
or actual belief" that he places another in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury.464 Thus, although knowledge
may not be imputed to an individual defendant based merely
upon his position of authority in an organization, 65 circum-
stantial evidence may be used to prove awareness or belief.4 66
Beyond the requirement of actual belief or awareness, the
"imminent danger" element found in the Clean Water Act has
recently been interpreted as requiring the government to
prove that the defendant was subjectively aware of a "high
probability" that his conduct would cause death or serious
bodily injury to another. 67 In other words, the defendant
must know that the discharge or release will actually place an-
other person in imminent danger, "and not merely that such a
result is a 'potential' consequence of the defendant's act.
466
Under RCRA, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals defined im-
minent danger as "the existence of a condition or combination
of conditions which could reasonably be expected to cause
death or serious bodily injury unless the condition was reme-
died."469 At the same time, it must be stressed that the crime
is in the creation of a "substantial risk"; therefore, actual
462. CAA § 113(c)(5)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(E) (Supp. II 1990).
463. CAA § 113(c)(5)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(E) (Supp. II 1990).
464. CAA § 113(c)(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1990). See also
CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B) (1988); RCRA § 3009(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)
(1988).
465. With respect to other violations under the Act, criminal culpability may rest
upon theories of imputed knowledge such as the corporate officer doctrine. See CAA
§ 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (Supp. 11 1990).
466. CAA § 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (Supp. II 1990).
467. United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
468. Id. at 23.




harm or death is not an element of the offense.47°
Despite similarities with pre-existing endangerment pro-
visions, the crime of knowing endangerment under the Clean
Air Act is substantially different than those found in the
Clean Water Act or RCRA. Moreover, the differences pose se-
rious enforcement hurdles for prosecutors and limit the pro-
tection that might otherwise have been afforded the public.
As already discussed above, the term "person" should be
read in conjunction with the scienter element of knowledge
provided in subsection 113(c)(5)(A). 71 Consequently, in addi-
tion to the need to prove actual awareness or belief of the
danger posed by certain conduct, it is likely that the govern-
ment will have to prove in many circumstances that the de-
fendant acted with willful disregard of the Act's require-
ments.4 72 This requirement would, in only a slightly varying
form, also be imposed under the new negligent endangerment
provision, where the defendant asserts that his conduct was
performed under orders from senior management personnel,
of which he is not a member.'73
In addition to the higher burden of proof for certain clas-
ses of defendants, the Clean Air Act's knowing and negligent
endangerment provisions both include a restriction for which
no equivalent may be found in either RCRA or the Clean
Water Act. Both the knowing and negligent endangerment
provisions of the CAA Amendments make reference only to
releases of toxic air pollutants into the "ambient air."'' 7 ' At
present, EPA defines "ambient air" to encompass only "that
portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the
general public has access. ' '475
In the context of defining a reportable release into the
470. Id.; CAA § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5) (Supp. H 1990).
471. See discussion supra part III.D.1. (shifting scienter and the new definition
of person subsection).
472. See discussion supra part III.D.1. (shifting scienter and the new definition
of person subsection).
473. See discussion supra part III.D.1. (shifting scienter and the new definition
of person subsection).
474. CAA § 113(c)(4), (5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4), (5)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
475. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1991).
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"environment" under CERCLA,'78 EPA has stated that the
term "ambient air" refers only to "air that is over and around
the grounds of a facility.' 77 Several judicial decisions have
concluded that the releases of hazardous wastes into the air
within a building or other structure is not actionable under
CERCLA because such areas do not constitute "ambient
air.' 78 It has even been more recently held that the mere po-
tential exposure of a pollutant to the outside air, as through
the stockpiling of materials inside a structure that is not en-
tirely enclosed, may not constitute a release into the "ambient
air" unless there is proof of actual movement or emission into
the air outside the structure.'79
Applying this definition to the endangerment provisions
then leads to the conclusion that only releases to the outside
air, which pose substantial risk of harm to others, would be
prosecutable under subsections 113(c)(4) or (5)(A). Ironically,
it may be the very emission within a plant or other building
that poses the greatest danger of injury to workers and others
inside.' 80 In fact, it may be the very lack of adequate ventila-
tion and resulting concentration of toxic levels of vapors
within that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bod-
ily injury.
The endangerment provisions of both the Clean Water
Act and RCRA have been hailed as providing valuable protec-
tion to workers, otherwise unprotected by existing federal
health and safety laws.'' These provisions have filled a large
gap in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
which provides only limited federal protection following an
476. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
477. 50 Fed. Reg. 13,456, 13,462 (April 4, 1985).
478. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1360 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1990); First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866-67
(4th Cir. 1989).
479. Fertilizer Institute v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
480. United States v. Protex Indus., Inc., 874 F.2d 740, 744 (10th Cir. 1989).
481. Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Criminalizing Occupational Safety Violations:
The Use of "Knowing Endangerment" Statutes to Punish Employers Who Maintain
Toxic Working Conditions, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 489-92 (1990); see also Clive
Morrick, The Prosecutor and the Workplace: Killing Two Birds with One Stone,




actual injury or death.' 8 The 1990 Clean Air Act implicitly
recognizes this additional benefit to workers by making it an
affirmative defense to the charge of knowing endangerment if
the defendant can show that the danger and conduct "were
reasonably foreseeable hazards of . . . an occupation, a busi-
ness, or a profession" freely consented to by the person
endangered.'"3
Unfortunately, the "ambient air" release requirement in
both the knowing and negligent endangerment provisions has
the practical effect of denying this protection to those workers
or even the general public, whose exposure to air toxins occurs
while inside a plant, an office building or other structure.
Neither RCRA nor the Clean Water Act's endangerment stat-
utes operate under similar limitations. On the other hand, re-
leases that pose a substantial risk to workers out on a loading
dock, parking lot, or other un-enclosed space, would be
prosecutable under the negligent or knowing endangerment
provisions of the Clean Air Act even though such individuals
may be working only a few feet away from colleagues inside.
Given the absence of a congressional statement explaining the
rationale behind such a distinction, one is only left with the
conclusion that the reference to "ambient air" was a gratui-
tous and unfortunate drafting error that should be corrected
by Congress at the earliest possible date.' 8 '
IV. Conclusion
On balance, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 pro-
482. See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988); Schwartz, Jr., supra note 481, at 489-
492.
483. CAA § 113(c)(5)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(C) (Supp. 11 1990).
484. The conclusion that this was an unintended drafting error does not seem
unreasonable in view of other errors found in the statute. For instance, the 1990
Amendments contain no short title provisions, which is common in most federal stat-
utes. More embarrassing are the duplicate provisions for knowing failure to pay a fee
required by the Act. Both sections 113(c)(1) and (c)(3) provide that anyone who
knowingly fails to pay a required fee (other than a fee owed under the mobile source
title) is guilty of a felony. CAA § 113(c)(1), (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), (3) (Supp. II
1990). Although the two paragraphs proscribe identical conduct, they impose entirely
different penalties. Section 113(c)(1) carries a maximum prison term of up to 5 years,
whereas section 113(c)(3) provides a prison term of only 2 years upon conviction.
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vide the potential for vastly improving federal control and
abatement of air pollution in the United States. Much of the
Act represents a radical departure from the traditional com-
mand and control approach of government regulation. Thus,
the new permit program attempts to strike a balance between
setting clear-cut duties upon emissions sources, while at the
same time allowing for operational flexibility so that busi-
nesses can remain competitive. EPA's new administrative au-
thorities, particularly the field citation program, should en-
hance enforcement without further clogging an already
overburdened federal judiciary. EPA should be able to func-
tion as a "cop on the beat," enforcing well known industry
norms, deterring serious violations, and issuing tickets for mi-
nor infractions. Finally, the market-based sulphur dioxide re-
duction program may very well constitute a watershed in gov-
ernment efforts to protect the environment. At the heart of
this program lies the recognition that the air we breath is a
natural resource, a commodity no different than oil or ore that
industrial markets - both producers and consumers -
should pay for and use profitably, rather than destroy
indiscriminately..
Less than two years after passage of the Amendments,
the 1990 Act is still in its infancy. A host of implementing
regulations are only now winding their way through the ad-
ministrative process. If the past is any measure, we can expect
in the near future several rounds of legal challenges and judi-
cial interpretations before the Act's final contours emerge. In
the meantime, it is already clear that the enforcement provi-
sions of the Act - one of the chief problems with the prede-
cessor statute - contain various weaknesses even as they
seemingly expand enforcement options.
It remains to be seen, for instance, whether the rules im-
plementing operational flexibility strike a true balance be-
tween environmental protection and economic vitality, or
whether the program will be left an empty shell. The sulphur
dioxide allowance program is simply so new and experimental
that it is impossible to even begin to evaluate how it might
actually work in the market.




knowing violations have finally come into line with other fed-
eral laws, the Amendments also add disturbing new twists by
shifting the criminal intent level necessary to convict accord-
ing to the defendant's position with an organization. As other
federal environmental statutes come up for re-authorization,
it would seem wise for Congress to first study the effect of the
shifting scienter provisions before replicating them elsewhere.
Congress should at least study whether these provisions
merely shield from prosecution those line employees who are
powerless to stop environmental misconduct by their employ-
ers, or whether these provisions encourage individuals to re-
main ignorant of environmental regulations, and escape per-
sonal responsibility for wrongdoing by diffusing and shifting
blame for violations onto anonymous corporate bureaucracies.
Given the massive scope of the Clean Air Act it should
not come as a surprise that the final product is as chock full of
possible problems as it is solutions. Only time will tell
whether these flaws are minor or not. What is clear, and what
both the Administration and Congress repeatedly recognized
as they drafted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, is
that wonderfully-sounding provisions to protect the environ-
ment will, as with other regulatory efforts, stand for little if
not backed by strict and workable enforcement provisions.
Given that recognition, neither Congress nor the President
should wait another thirteen years before returning to the Act
and correct flaws as they become apparent.
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